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 CHAPTER 2: MILITARISM 
 
   H6. War is more likely when professional militaries have 
large influence on national security policy and on 
civilian perceptions of foreign affairs. 
 
I.  MILITARIES AND WAR 
       This chapter argues that professional militaries foster 
policies and misperceptions that raise the risk of war.  The 
classic anti-military argument that "militaries live by war, 
hence they prefer war, hence they start wars" is wrong.  
However, militaries do cause war as an unwanted side-effect of 
their efforts to protect their organizational interests.  For 
organizational reasons militaries favor military doctrines and 
force postures that raise the risk of war; hence war is more 
likely if militaries shape defense policies, even if they 
prefer peace.  More importantly, militaries also infuse 
society with organizationally self-serving myths that have the 
unwanted effect of persuading society that war is expedient.  
Militaries purvey these myths to persuade society to grant 
them size, wealth, autonomy, and prestige--not to provoke war. 
 Yet these myths also support arguments for war; hence 
societies infused with military propaganda will be warlike, 
even if their militaries prefer peace. 
       Thus militaries are both unwarlike and war-causing.  
They have no innate preference for war, but they create 
conditions for war by the policies they back and the ideas 
they purvey. 
       In this view militaries are governed by the laws of 
organizational survival.  Like all organizations they must 
sell themselves to their environment if they hope to endure 
and prosper.  They cause war because they have large influence 
on national security policies and perceptions, and because 
their organizational interests are served if civilians adopt 
policies and perceptions that harm peace.  War is not their 
goal, but it is their result. 
       Militaries purvey eight principal war-causing 
misperceptions.  They exaggerate other states' hostility, 
painting a world of hostile adversaries and unreliable allies. 
 They exaggerate the tendency of states to bandwagon with 
threatening powers and underestimate states' tendency to 
balance against threats; hence they underestimate the 
self-defeating nature of belligerent policies.  They portray a 
world of easy conquest, understating the obstacles to 
aggression; hence they exaggerate the insecurity of their own 
state and the feasibility of gaining security by aggressive 
action.  They exaggerate the size of first-move advantages and 
windows of opportunity and vulnerability; hence they 
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exaggerate the benefits of starting preemptive or preventive 
wars.  They exaggerate the benefits of conquest--the strategic 
and economic value of empire--while underestimating the 
problems that come with victory.  They underestimate the 
economic, political, and psychological costs of war.  In 
peacetime they tend toward pessimism about the likely results 
of possible future wars, but in wartime they tend toward false 
optimism, leading them to favor prolonging lost or stalemated 
wars. 
       These ideas all exaggerate the importance or usefulness 
of military force.  Militaries produce force; hence their 
organizational sales pitch stresses the need for force, the 
utility of force, the cheapness of force, and the benefits of 
using force.  It exaggerates both the number of problems that 
only military force can solve, and the ability of force to 
solve them.  It also understates the costs and risks of using 
force. 
       Militaries seek to persuade civilians to buy force, not 
to use it.  But selling force to civilians requires persuading 
them that they can use force, or might need to use it.  This 
creates a climate for civilians to decide that they can or 
must use it.  As a result, states come to believe that 
incentives to fight are larger than in fact they are. 
       Militaries cause war in three ways.  Most importantly, 
the military's message can persuade civilians that war or war-
risking policies are expedient, leading the civilians to risk 
or launch war.  Wilhelmine Germany illustrates this scenario. 
 Secondly, a military can come to believe its own arguments 
after hearing them repeated to civilians, persuading itself to 
advocate war.1  This is the "blowback" scenario: the 
military's arguments blow back into the organization, making 
it victim of its own propaganda.  Wilhelmine Germany and 
imperial Japan both illustrate.2  Thirdly, militaries can 
persuade their governments to adopt offensive and preemptive 
military doctrines and force postures.  Militaries prefer such 
doctrines and postures but they raise the risk of war.  The 
continental European powers before 1914 illustrate; the Soviet 
                         
    1  In this scenario the military becomes a war lobby, but 
only after imbibing its own myths.  Since myths are the 
taproot cause at work, not an innate military interest in war, 
this scenario does not fit the classical anti-military 
argument, outlined below, which posits a military interest in 
war. 
    2  Another path to war is also possible: militaries might 
infuse a younger generation with militarist myths, leading it 
to start wars after it assumes power in later years.  Nazi 
Germany illustrates if we believe that Wilhelmine-era 
militarist propaganda shaped the thinking of Nazi leaders and 
their supporters. 
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military also illustrates.3 
       Hence undue military influence causes both dangerous 
perceptions and dangerous policies, although the perception 
dangers seem the larger of the two types. 
       What states are prone to militarism?4  States whose 
militaries live apart from society as a separate culture are 
more prone, since mutual isolation fosters sour civil-military 
relations that animate militaries to purvey militarism.  
States that grant their militaries broad autonomy are more 
prone, since autonomous militaries are more likely to develop 
separate cultures.  Societies that are unimbued with the 
dangers of militarism are more prone, since knowledge of the 
danger can inoculate both military and civilian against it.  
Societies with norms and legal barriers that proscribe 
military involvement in politics are less prone to militarism. 
 Democracies are less prone to militarism because militarist 
myths can be challenged and weeded out in a democracy's free 
marketplace of ideas.  Great powers and isolated powers are 
more prone, since the militaries of lesser powers and powers 
with strong allies gain less by purveying militarist myths.  
States that face large security threats are more prone to 
militarism, since they will have larger, more prestigious 
militaries that are better able to dominate the civilian 
sphere.  States whose civilian publics are ignorant of 
military affairs are more prone to militarism because their 
civilians more quickly accept militarist myths. 
       Virulent militarism is rare because these conditions 
are rare.  Many societies have been touched by low-grade 
militarism, including pre-1914 Austria-Hungary, Russia, 
Turkey, Serbia, and France; and interwar Hungary.  Other 
possible cases include interwar Poland; modern South Africa, 
                         
    3  I outline the dangers of such doctrines and postures in 
Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of 
Conflict (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), chapters 3 
and 6. 
    4  I use "militarism" to denote situations where 
militaries play a large role in shaping civilian ideas about 
security policy, and use this role to imbue society with ideas 
that emphasize the necessity and utility of military force.  
This combines common usages, which denote ideas that glorify 
the utility of force, or the predominance of the military in 
politics or public mind.  On definitions of militarism see 
Volker R. Berghahn, Militarism: The History of An 
International Debate, 1861-1979 (New York: St. Martin's, 
1982): 2-3.  Surveying writings on militarism is ibid.  A 
review of other issues in civil-military relations is Peter 
Feaver, "Civil-Military Relations," in Nelson W. Polsby, ed., 
Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 2, 1999 (Palo Alto: 
Annual Reviews, 1999): 211-242. 
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Chile, Brazil, Argentina, and Pakistan; and Paraguay in the 
1860s.  The United States arguably suffered mildly from 
militarism in the early Cold War.  But only Wilhelmine Germany 
and imperial Japan have suffered full-blown cases of 
militarism. 
       Hence militarism theory explains only a few cases.  It 
cannot explain most wars through the ages.  It says little 
about warfare before the industrial revolution, since 
professional militaries with distinct organizational interests 
only appeared when the industrial age arrived, bringing a far 
sharper division of labor.  And it says little about the many 
modern conflicts involving states that suffer little or no 
militarism. 
       But the theory explains a great deal about the behavior 
of Wilhelmine Germany and imperial Japan, so it says a great 
deal about the origins of World War I and the Pacific half of 
World War II.  Thus the theory has good explanatory power.  It 
covers few cases but it explains a lot about those cases.  Two 
of these cases--the world wars--are of great historical 
importance.  If militarism theory holds water it also holds 
the key to these wars and thus to much recent history. 
       An older anti-military argument has claimed that 
militaries favor war because war serves their organizational 
interests.  In this view militaries have an innate preference 
for war even without ingesting their own propaganda; hence 
they often lobby for war.  For example, Alexis de Tocqueville 
argued in 1835 that militaries want war because war satisfies 
their organizational impulse to grow.  Officers seek 
promotions, he said; promotions come when the military grows; 
the military grows when wars occur; hence military officers 
favor war.5  Joseph Schumpeter similarly argued in a much-read 
1919 essay that professional militaries favor war because 
warfare justifies their existence and supports their budgets.6 
 Warfare was made largely obsolete by the coming of 
capitalism, he claimed, and only self-serving pressure for war 
by professional militaries kept war going.  "Created by wars 
that required it, the [military] machine now created the wars 
it required."7  And in 1934 Ascher Henkin echoed Schumpeter, 
                         
    5  Alexis de Tocqueville, "On War, Society, and the 
Military," in Leon Bramson and George W. Goethals, eds., War: 
Studies from Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology, rev. ed. 
(New York: Basic Books, 1968): 329-344 at 331-332. 
    6  Joseph Schumpeter, Imperialism and Social Classes (New 
York: New American Library, 1974): 23-54. 
    7  Schumpeter, Imperialism: 25.  Schumpeter also claimed 
that militaries have warlike instincts and habits that remain 
from a precapitalist age when war served more purpose.  Ibid.: 
24, 33, 38, 64-65. 
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noting that enduring peace would make militaries useless and 
claiming that this triggered a "clamor for war on the part of 
the military man."8 
       This classical anti-military argument was sometimes 
heard before 1914 (vis Tocqueville), but it flourished 
especially after World War I because many postwar observers 
saw that Europe's militaries had a role of some kind in 
causing the war.  The classical anti-military argument seemed 
to explain this role so it won wide support. 
       Yet it fails on two points.  First, there is no 
evidence that militaries profit as organizations from war or 
believe they profit from war.  More typical is the Russian 
Czarist officer who complained that war "spoils the armies," 
and the U.S. naval officers who thought the U.S. Civil War 
"ruined the navy."9  The motive that the classical argument 
posits is absent. 
       Second, there is no clear evidence that militaries in 
most countries are more hawkish than civilians.  No worldwide 
survey of military input to decisions for war has been done, 
so we cannot be sure on this point.  But my back-of-the-
envelope accounting suggests that modern militaries are not 
the consistent hawks that the classical anti-military view 
suggests.  Militaries have been somewhat more hawkish than 
civilians,10 but this greater hawkishness seems explained by 
                         
    8  Ascher Henkin, Must We Have War? An Inquiry into the 
Causes of War and the Methods of its Prevention (Boston: Bruce 
Humphries Inc., 1934): 25, 103.  David Gibbs recently restated 
this view, arguing that warfare "justifies the continued 
existence of the military" and so "creates a bureaucratic 
pressure for conflict and even war."  David N. Gibbs, "The 
Military-Industrial Complex, Sectoral Conflict, and the Study 
of U.S. Foreign Policy," in Ronald W. Cox, ed., Business and 
the State in International Relations (Boulder, CO: Westview, 
1996): 41-56 at 46.  Bernard Brodie has framed a related 
argument, suggesting that militaries are biased toward using 
force because force-prone people self-select into military 
careers, and because the training and promotion of military 
officers stresses martial virtues.  Bernard Brodie, War and 
Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973): 479-81, 486-7, 490-93. 
    9  Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The 
Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1957): 69. 
    10  Samuel Huntington oppositely claims that militaries 
have been more dovish than civilians.  Huntington, Soldier and 
the State: 68-70, 113-124.  Neither of us rest our claim on a 
complete survey of military inputs to national decision-
making, and such a survey would be useful. 
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cases where militaries in militarized states imbibed and acted 
on their own propaganda--that is, by cases of blowback.  These 
cases include Wilhelmine Germany, Austria-Hungary, Serbia, 
Russia, Turkey and perhaps France before 1914; and imperial 
Japan before 1941.11  In all these cases the military pressed 
                         
    11  Specifically, Prussian and German officers pushed 
Bismarck almost continually for preventive wars during his 
tenure as Chancellor (1862-1890).  Jack Snyder, The Ideology 
of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters 
of 1914 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984): 122.  After 
Bismarck's ouster German officers pushed German civilians for 
war in 1905, 1909, 1912, and finally with success in 1914.  
Richard Ned Lebow, "Windows of Opportunity: Do States Jump 
Through Them?" International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 
1984): 147-186 at 160.  From 1906 to 1914 Austrian officers 
steadily pressed for war against Serbia and perhaps Italy.  
Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., Austria-Hungary and the Origins of 
the First World War (New York: St. Martin's, 1991): 131, 133, 
137, 152, 155, 208; Gerhard Ritter, The Sword and the Scepter: 
The Problem of Militarism in Germany, 4 vols. (Coral Gables: 
University of Miami Press, 1969-1973): 2:227-239; and Norman 
Stone, "Austria-Hungary," in Ernest R. May, ed., Knowing One's 
Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986): 37-61 at 39.  
Russian officers pushed Russian civilians for war in 1912 and 
1914.  On 1912 see Ernest R. May, "Cabinet, Tsar, Kaiser: 
Three Approaches to Assessment," in May, Knowing One's 
Enemies: 11-36 at 20.  On 1914 see, e.g., Bernadotte E. 
Schmitt, The Coming of the War, 1914, 2 vols. (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930), 2:31n: the American charge in 
Moscow reported the Russian army "clamoring for war" in the 
midst of the 1914 July crisis.  French officers viewed war 
with favor before 1914, one declaring that "it will be a 
beautiful war that will deliver all the captives of 
Germanism."  L.C.F. Turner, Origins of the First World War 
(London: Edward Arnold, 1970): 53, quoting La France 
Militaire.  The insubordinate head of Serbian military 
intelligence, Col. Dragutin Dimitrevi, helped organize the 
June 1914 assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand, 
triggering a war that Dimitrevi believed inevitable and 
desirable.  James Joll, The Origins of the First World War 
(London: Longman, 1984): 72-75.  The Panturkist officer Enver 
Pasha led the Ottoman empire into World War I with dreams of 
uniting the whole Turkish east under Ottoman rule.  Efraim 
Karsch and Inari Karsch, Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for 
Mastery in the Middle East, 1789-1923 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1999): 105-112.  Japanese officers pushed 
civilians for war against China in 1894, against Russia in 
1904, against China in the 1930s, and against the United 
States in the 1940s.  Huntington, Soldier and the State: 130; 
 
 
 7 
civilians for war, but in all the military was unusually 
active in shaping civilian perceptions and may well have 
imbibed its own message.  If so, these cases offer no evidence 
of an innate military preference for war; instead they only 
show that militaries can taint their own perceptions.  Hence 
these cases should be set aside.  And if they are, the greater 
hawkishness of militaries disappears.  The remaining cases 
show civilians and militaries thinking in similar ways about 
decisions for war.  Some cases show militaries pressing 
civilians for war, as in Israel before the 1956 and 1967 wars, 
and in Egypt and Jordan before 1967.12  But these are balanced 
by cases where military leaders sought to restrain more 
hawkish civilians, as in Nazi Germany, Mussolini's Italy, and 
interwar Finland.13  And the U.S. military has been no more 
hawkish than U.S. civilians in the years since World War II.14 
                                                                
and on 1904, Ian Nish, The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War 
(London: Longman, 1985): 193-94; also 11, 156, 176. 
    12  The Israeli military was markedly more hawkish than 
Israeli civilians before the 1956 and 1967 wars.  Donald Neff, 
Warriors for Jerusalem: The Six Days That Changed the Middle 
East (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984): 183; Michael Handel, 
Israel's Political-Military Doctrine (Cambridge: Harvard 
University, Center for International Affairs, Occasional 
Papers No. 30, 1973): 28, 32; and Walter Laqueur, The Road to 
War 1967 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968): 124, 126, 
141.  The Egyptian and Jordanian militaries likewise pressed 
reluctant civilians for war in 1967.  Laqueur, Road to War: 
101; Neff, Warriors for Jerusalem : 139; and David Kimche and 
Dan Bawley, The Six-Day War (New York: Stein & Day, 1971): 
105, 111. 
    13  The German military was strikingly more dovish than 
Germany's Nazi civilian leaders during the run-up to World War 
II.  Robert J. O'Neill, The German Army and the Nazi Party, 
1933-1939 (New York: James H. Heineman, 1966): 134-35, 156-59, 
162-63; and Huntington, Soldier and the State, pp. 114-116.  
Finland's Marshall Mannerheim struggled to pull Finnish 
civilians back from war in 1939.  William H. Trotter, A Frozen 
Hell: The Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939-1940 (Chapel Hill, 
NC: Algonquin, 1991): 20-21.  Italy's Chief of the General 
Staff, General Badoglio, fruitlessly advised Mussolini against 
war in 1940.  P.M.H. Bell, The Origins of the Second World War 
in Europe (London: Longman, 1986): 187.  And the Soviet 
military leadership opposed the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan.  Greg Cashman, What Causes War? An Introduction 
to Theories of International Conflict (New York: Lexington 
Books, 1993): 96. 
    14  On the period 1945-1972 see Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, 
Statesmen, and Cold War Crises (Cambridge: Harvard University 
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 Overall, no clear pattern of innate military hawkishness 
emerges. 
       This evidence refutes the specific causal claims of the 
classical argument.  But the classical argument's general 
claim--that militaries deserve large blame for causing several 
major modern wars--is correct.  Militaries cause war not 
because war serves their interests, but because the postures 
and doctrines they favor and the ideas they purvey raise the 
risk of war. 
       In sum, then, militarism theory identifies three paths 
to war: militaries can persuade civilians to favor war; they 
can persuade themselves to favor war; and they can favor 
military force postures and doctrines that cause war.  A 
fourth path, in which militaries outright favor war without 
any self-persuasion, is often alleged but seems invalid. 
       The theory of militarism suggests a general theory of 
war and imperialism.  This theory turns Schumpeter on his 
head.  Schumpeter argued that capitalism is peaceful; war and 
imperialism are sustained under capitalism by militaries that 
survive as anachronisms from former times.  But organization 
theory suggests that militarism is a new problem that arrived 
with capitalism.15  Capitalism created industrialism (goes the 
argument); industrialism created the division of labor; and 
the division of labor created specialized bureaucratic 
organizations, including specialized professional militaries 
and attending dangers that arise from their relations to 
civilian society.  Schumpeter suggests that capitalism and 
industrialism cure militarism, but organization theory 
suggests they create it. 
       In this view the risk of militarism is inherent in 
industrial societies.  Industrialism inexorably creates the 
division of labor that creates the danger of militarism.     
       Can militarism be prevented?  I argue that militarism 
is very dangerous if allowed to flourish, yet easy to control. 
 Modest measures to remove the conditions that it requires can 
prevent its return.  These conditions have already abated 
sharply since the early twentieth century, creating a world 
largely free of even low-grade great power militarism.  A 
small amount of preventive action can sustain this situation. 
 But vigilance is necessary because the root causes of 
militarism--industrialism and the division of labor--are 
                                                                
Press, 1977): 4, 215-219.  And if anything, U.S. military 
advice has grown more dovish relative to civilian thinking 
since 1972. 
    15  As Alfred Vagts noted, the "separation of the toga and 
the sword" is "part and parcel of the inevitable process of 
division and specialization of labor."  Alfred Vagts, Defense 
and Diplomacy: The Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign 
Relations (New York: King's Crown Press, 1956): 470. 
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permanent facts of life. 
       The next section outlines reasons why militaries often 
have disproportionate influence over civilian ideas and 
policies.  The following sections outline the effects of 
military influence, test militarism theory with two brief case 
studies, and suggest ways to control militarism. 
 
II. WHY MILITARIES AFFECT NATIONAL PERCEPTIONS AND POLICIES 
       National perceptions of foreign affairs are shaped by 
government agencies, most of all by the military.  Government 
agencies can dominate national perceptions because they supply 
officials and the public with most of their information on 
world affairs.  Often there is no competing source to provide 
a different view.  Militaries are the most influential 
official agencies because they have the greatest will and 
ability to shape national ideas. 
       All government organizations supply, withhold or 
distort information to further their parochial interests and 
perspectives.16  As a result, top government leaders often find 
themselves at the mercy of selective and biased information 
provided by subordinate agencies.  Lacking objective anaysis 
on which to rely, leaders are often duped by the biased 
information they receive.17  Thus President John Kennedy once 
told aides that he "could not believe a word the military was 
telling him, that he had to read the newspapers to find out 
what was going on" in Vietnam.18  Likewise Francis Rourke notes 
"the striking illustrations of situations in which staff 
members of [U.S. government] executive agencies have 
substantially reshaped the views of political leaders in both 
Congress and the executive."19 
       Official agencies can also shape public opinion, by 
shaping press coverage in their issue area.  This is 
                         
    16  As Alexander George observes, "each [bureaucratic] unit 
tends to produce 'partisan analysis' of the issues and seeks 
to discredit by fair means or foul the analysis produced by 
its rivals."  Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking 
in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice 
(Boulder: Westview, 1980): 112. 
    17  Concurring on the United States is George, Presidential 
Decisionmaking: 112. 
    18  David Halberstam's paraphrase of Kennedy; from David 
Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (Greenwich, CT: Fawcett 
Crest, 1973): 345.  For more examples from the Indochina War, 
see ibid.: 221-3, 247-55, 303-10, 314-17, 327, 338-45, 374-5, 
426, 492-92, 509-10, 609, 616, 660-61, 705. 
    19  Francis E. Rourke, Bureaucracy and Foreign Policy 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972): 23. 
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accomplished by flooding the press with selective information 
that supports the agency viewpoint, and by using rewards and 
punishments to induce the press to write favorable stories.  
Journalists who reflect the official view are graced with 
inside information; those who deviate are disciplined by 
exclusion from information.20 
       Bureaucratic manipulation of information is especially 
pronounced in the areas of foreign and defense policy.21  
Government agencies that deal with domestic issues often have 
no special information advantage over private organizations, 
since private groups often have access to abundant information 
from non-government sources.  But on foreign and defense 
issues government agencies control most--often nearly all--
relevant information.22  Even in the United States, most press 
coverage on foreign policy and military matters originates 
from official agencies.  Studies from the 1970s showed that 
three-quarters of news stories by Pentagon and State 
Department reporters originated from government sources, not 
from enterprise reporting.23  Official foreign policy and 
military agencies not only make policy; they also serve as the 
                         
    20  Concurring is Rourke, Bureaucracy and Foreign Policy: 
34.  Also stressing the capacity of government to influence 
news coverage in the United States is Leon V. Sigal, Reporters 
and Officials (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1973).  For more on 
official influence of news coverage see titles noted in 
Herbert J. Gans, Deciding What's News (New York: Vintage, 
1980), especially p. 357 note 18. 
    21  Concurring is Francis Rourke, Secrecy and Publicity 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972): vii; and 
Rourke, Bureaucracy and Foreign Policy: 32-33. 
    22  Rourke observes:  
    In most areas of domestic policy it is not hard to find 
private organizations which control as much if not more 
information than the government.  In foreign affairs, on 
the other hand, there are many issues on which the 
bureaucratic apparatus stands virtually alone as a source 
of intelligence.  By withholding certain kinds of data 
over which they have control, or on occasion by 
manufacturing and distributing false information, 
executive agencies can in fact lead the public to form 
wholly erroneous impressions of events taking place 
outside the United States.  Bureaucracy and Foreign 
Policy: 32-33. 
    23  Juergen Arthur Heise, Minimum Disclosure: How the 
Pentagon Manipulates the News (New York: W.W. Norton, 1979): 
174, quoting studies by Brit Hume and Mark McIntyre, and Leon 
Sigal. 
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national "eyes" through which the state and society see the 
world.  This gives them large influence over the national 
mind. 
       Among government agencies, the military has far the 
largest impact on public opinion about foreign and defense 
matters in most countries.24  Militaries have far more 
resources for public relations than do other agencies 
concerned with foreign affairs.  This gives them a dominant 
role in defining the facts that shape official and public 
views.  As a result, as S.E. Finer notes, "deference to the 
military in the fields of foreign policy and even domestic 
politics is a commonplace."25 
       The notion that militaries strongly influence national 
perceptions is wholly consistent with scholarship on large 
organizations.  Indeed, it would contradict most organization 
theory if things were otherwise.  As I argue below, their 
organizational character and situation gives militaries strong 
reason to intervene in their political environment.  Their 
organizational capabilities make them unusually able to affect 
national perceptions.  In most societies they are proscribed 
from direct political action, such as forming or supporting 
political parties, so persuasion is their only available 
political weapon.  As a result militaries are strongly 
predisposed to tell their story, and they are well-equipped to 
get their point across. 
       A. Political Will: Why Militaries Care.26  Four factors 
most influence the energy with which foreign policy agencies 
state their case in the public arena.  On each dimension the 
military has an extra incentive to speak with a loud voice.  
First, the organization speaks louder the more its members 
depend on the organization for successful careers.  If members 
of the organization could not find similar work elsewhere they 
have more incentive to help their organization flourish and 
grow.  The contrast is between a profession--a group that 
                         
    24  Concurring on the United States is Rourke, Bureaucracy 
and Foreign Policy: 28-9.  See also ibid.: 18-40 passim. 
    25  S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the 
Military in Politics, 2d ed. enl. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1976): 66. 
    26  May 18, 2000: In making the 9 points below, instead of 
first framing the theory and then matching the military 
situation to it, just state these nine arguments directly.  
"Military officers have only one buyer for their services.  
This heightens their concern for the health of that buyer ... 
Military officers have very competetive career paths ... 
Militaries face strong pressures to innovate ... Militaries 
have an unusually large number of domestic political 
enemies..." I think that works. 
 
 
 12 
sells its skills to many buyers (e.g., doctors or 
lawyers)--and an establishment, whose members have only one 
buyer for their skills (e.g., the military).  Organizations 
composed of members of a profession have a weaker growth 
impulse than do establishments, because members of a 
profession can find work even if their organization falls on 
hard times, while members of an establishment starve or 
prosper with their organization. 
       The military is an establishment, not a profession, so 
the careers of its members depend on its political health.27  
As a result its members' welfare is more dependent on the 
welfare of the organization.  Government lawyers can also work 
for private law firms; but many members of the military have 
only one potential employer, because the work of their 
organization is sharply specialized.  Moreover, if they can 
work elsewhere, it is often in defense industries that supply 
the military and depend for their business on a well-funded 
military.  Thus members of the military promote and protect it 
partly because their own welfare depends on the welfare of the 
organization. 
       Second, the organization has more impulse to grow if 
its members face more competitive career paths.  The members 
of an organization that promotes its people rapidly and seldom 
fires them can enjoy job security and career advancement even 
if the organization fails to grow.  But if promotions are 
scarce and firings are common the members of the organization 
benefit more from organizational growth, since many will not 
be retained or promoted without it.  Growth creates more 
high-level jobs; these may be filled by employees who would 
otherwise be dropped.  Organizational growth and personal 
survival are more closely intertwined. 
       Military careers are very competitive in most 
countries.  Unlike  other government workers, most military 
officers face retirement in mid-life, since few are promoted 
to top command positions.  This harsh system fuels a strong 
growth impulse by closely tying the career prospects of 
military officers to the growth of the military itself.  For 
military officers organizational growth can mean career 
salvation. 
       The establishmentarian character of militaries and the 
competitive structure of military careers give militaries an 
exceptionally powerful organizational impulse to grow, and 
lead militaries to strongly advocate policies and purvey 
perceptions that fuel military organizational expansion.  They 
always want larger budgets: a 1971 study found that the U.S. 
military had requested 25 to 35 percent more than the budget 
                         
    27  As Finer notes, the military are sharply functionally 
specialized: "designed, indoctrinated and trained to perform a 
special task, quite different from that of the rest of the 
community."  Finer, Man on Horseback: 41. 
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deemed adequate by the President and Congress in every year 
since World War II.28  The study authors, Alain Enthoven and 
Wayne Smith, note "a sort of Parkinson's law of military 
requirements: they will always expand to use up the supply 
estimated to be available."29  One high-ranking U.S. officer 
confessed to them: "I'll ask for all I think I can get."30  In 
retirement Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev likewise 
complained that Soviet officers often refused reasonable 
budget limits, concluding that soldiers "always want a bigger 
and stronger army."31  Such budget-seeking can sometimes 
dominate all else in the minds of officers.  Thus Japan's 
Admiral Suetsugu Nobumasa declared in 1934 that for Japan's 
navy even war with the United States was acceptable "if it 
will get us a budget."32 
       Each service also endorses policies that favors its own 
growth against the other services.  In the 1930s the U.S. Navy 
favored a forward strategy in East Asia that required large 
naval forces, while the U.S. Army favored a continental 
defense strategy that required large ground forces.33  In the 
                         
    28  Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is 
Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1971): 201. 
    29  How Much Is Enough?: 201.  Enthoven and Smith explain: 
    The military experts--the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 
particular--are regularly subjected to massive 
institutional pressures for setting ever higher 
requirements.  They have thousands of officers working for 
them whose very careers are bound up in getting more 
forces (and whose promotional possibilities vary directly 
with the expansion or contraction of their parent 
Service).  These are men who have devoted their lives to 
military service and have associated mainly with other 
military officers.  They are not intimately acquainted 
with the other needs of society or in a good position to 
balance them against military needs.  Ibid.: 202. 
    30  Enthoven and Smith, How Much Is Enough?: 201. 
    31  Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last 
Testament, Foreword by Edward Crankshaw, trans. and ed. Strobe 
Talbott (New York: Bantam, 1974): 617, see also 14n, 262. 
    32  Michael A. Barnhardt, Japan Prepares for Total War: The 
Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941 (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1987): 39. 
    33  Michael S. Sherry, Preparing for the Next War: American 
Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941-45 (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1977): 29. 
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1950s the U.S. Air Force favored a counterforce nuclear 
strategy that required large strategic nuclear forces, while 
the U.S. Army and Navy accepted a minimum deterrence strategy 
that required far smaller strategic forces.34  In that period 
the U.S. Army also looked toward nuclear disarmament, which 
would have expanded its importance relative to the Air Force.35 
 In general the Cold War Army was less receptive than the 
other services to proposals to limit ballistic missile defense 
systems or reduce tactical nuclear weapon stockpiles (which 
were army systems), and more receptive to limits on offensive 
strategic nuclear forces (which were Air Force and Navy 
systems).36  The Army was also the most receptive service to 
evidence showing the limits of bombing.37  The Air Force was 
more hostile than other services to strategic arms 
limitations.38  In the late 1950s Air Force intelligence 
thought the "missile gap," which justified Air Force budget 
claims, was larger than Army and Navy intelligence.39  Within 
the Air Force, Tactical Air Command officers were more 
interested in graduated deterrence ideas, which called for 
large tactical air forces, than Strategic Air Command (SAC) 
officers.40  In each case the organization chose views that 
best justified its own size and wealth. 
       Elsewhere the same interservice battle-lines dominate 
defense debates.  Before World War I Germany's navy chief, 
Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, relentlessly sought huge sums to 
build a large battle fleet, which he claimed could prevent 
British intervention against Germany in a future continental 
war.  Oppositely, Chief of the General Staff General Alfred 
von Schlieffen, author of Germany's plan for war in 1914, made 
no plans even to use the German navy in such a war.41  In 
                         
    34  Edgar M. Bottome, The Balance of Terror: A Guide to the 
Arms Race (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971): 59. 
    35  Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises: 111. 
    36  Betts, Soldiers, Statesment, and Cold War Crises: 
111-112. 
    37  Betts, Soldiers, Statesment, and Cold War Crises: 204. 
    38  Betts, Soldiers, Statesment, and Cold War Crises: 112. 
    39  Bottome, Balance of Terror: 53. 
    40  Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises: 128. 
    41  Assessing Tirpitz's program is Paul Kennedy, Strategy 
and Diplomacy 1870-1945 (Aylesbury: Fontana, 1984): 127-160.  
For Schlieffen's views see Gerhard Ritter, The Schlieffen 
Plan: Critique of a Myth (London: Oswald Wolff, 1958; reprint 
ed., Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979): 71-72. 
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Britain navy chief Admiral John Fisher favored British defense 
strategies that would best justify the navy budget.42  Later, 
in interwar Britain each military service argued for the 
military doctrine that gave it the biggest budget and the most 
autonomy.43  In interwar Japan the army favored a northern 
confrontation with the Soviet Union while the navy favored a 
southern advance that risked confrontation with the United 
States.44  Thus each service endorsed the foreign policy that 
best justified its own budget. 
       Third, the more external demands that are made on an 
organization to innovate, the greater will be its impulse to 
dominate its political environment, in order to suppress these 
demands.  Or, to put the proposition differently, the more 
turbulent the organization's environment--the greater the 
tendency of the organization's environment to change in ways 
that demand organizational changes--the stronger the 
organizational motive to take political action.  Organizations 
normally resist external demands to innovate, because 
innovation threatens the careers of the members of the 
organization.  Changes in procedures and tasks imply changes 
in the distribution of power within the organization, and 
changes in personnel.  As a result, those organizations that 
normally would be most required to innovate will try harder to 
dominate the political institutions that otherwise would force 
them to change.  By dominating its political environment, the 
organization can stifle the demand to innovate; or it can 
                         
    42  Paul M. Kennedy, "Great Britain Before 1914," in May, 
Knowing One's Enemies: 172-204 at 184; and Avner Offer, The 
First World War: An Agrarian Interepretation (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991): 287.  On service parochalism see also 
Offer, First World War: 285-299. 
    43  Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Strategy: 
France, Britain, and Germany Between the Wars (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1984): 159. 
    44  Asada Sadao, "The Japanese Navy and the United States," 
in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto with Dale K.A. Finlayson, 
eds., Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations 
1931-1941 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973): 225-259 
at 249-51; Fujiwara Akira, "The Role of the Japanese Army," in 
Borg and Okamoto, Pearl Harbor as History: 189-195 at 190; 
Barnhardt, Japan Prepares for Total War: 34, 44, 174, 209, 
214; Stephen E. Pelz, Race to Pear Harbor: The Failure of the 
London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974): 178, 212, 214, 
223; and Tsunoda Jun, "The Navy's Role in the Southern 
Strategy," in James William Morley, ed., The Fateful Choice: 
Japan's Advance into Southeast Asia, 1939-1941 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1980): 241-295 at 252. 
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shape the demand to the needs of the organization, so that 
innovation does less organizational damage. 
       The task environment of the military is unusually 
turbulent.  Military technology and adversary military 
programs change constantly.  International political 
conditions and national foreign policies also change.  This 
creates ceaseless demands that the military innovate to keep 
abreast of new developments.  The tasks and appropriate 
instruments of national militaries change more rapidly than 
those of most organizations, which makes the military's 
organizational environment exceptionally turbulent, and raises 
exceptional external demands for innovation. 
       Moreover, militaries resist innovation even more than 
most organizations because they are establishments with highly 
competitive career structures, so their members are more 
threatened by change.  Demands to innovate are resisted even 
more fiercely when incumbents members of the organization 
already face precarious careers, and cannot change jobs or 
employers.  Innovation threatens greater-than-average damage 
to their lives; this helps explain why militaries resist 
innovation so resolutely.45 
       Thus in the 1930s the R.A.F. strongly resisted civilian 
demands that it shift resources from bombers to the fighter-
interceptors that eventually won the Battle of Britain.  
Remarkably, as late as May 1940 the Air Staff tried to shut 
down the production lines building Spitfires and Hurricanes.46 
 In most Western countries the military resisted civilian 
demands to phase out the cavalry many decades after this arm 
became obsolete.47  During World War I the British Navy 
                         
    45  Concurring is L.L. Bernard, who notes that the military 
officer "nearly always blocks new defense and offense measures 
and tactical innovations until they are forced upon him by 
their use by the enemy. ... The officers love their horses and 
cling to their spurs."  L.L. Bernard, War and its Causes (New 
York: Henry Holt and Company, 1944): 113. 
    46  Williamson Murray, "British and German Air Doctrine 
Between the Wars," Air University Review, Vol. 31, No. 3 
(March-April 1980): 39-58 at 48. 
    47  See Edward Katzenbach, "The Horse Cavalry in the 
Twentieth Century," in Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, 
eds., The Use of Force: International Politics and Foreign 
Policy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971): 277-297.  Even in 1926 
Britain's General Douglas Haig declared that "aeroplanes and 
tanks are only accessories to the man and the horse, and I 
feel sure that as time goes on you will find just as much use 
for the horse--the well-bred horse--as you have ever done in 
the past."  John Ellis, The Social History of the Machine Gun 
(New York: Pantheon, 1975): 56. 
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resisted civilian efforts to institute the convoy system that 
eventually saved British shipping, and then resisted 
innovations to meet the growing German submarine threat before 
World War II.48  The U.S. Navy resisted efforts to force it to 
shift resources from battleships to aircraft carriers in the 
interwar years.  Later, U.S. military leaders strongly 
resisted the shift toward strategic nuclear forces mandated by 
President Eisenhower's "New Look" strategy.49  The Soviet 
military then failed to build an intercontinental strategic 
nuclear force to counter these powerful U.S. strategic forces, 
instead pouring resources into expanding their already-large 
tank armies.  This negligence left the Soviet Union with no 
secure nuclear deterrent for years, and finally compelled 
Khrushchev to try to restore Soviet nuclear strength by moving 
medium-range missiles to Cuba in 1962. 
       This deeply-rooted impulse to resist innovation drives 
militaries to preserve their institutional autonomy by 
political action.  Autonomy buffers the organization against 
civilian demands for change.  Autonomy also protects the size 
and wealth of the organization, by denying civilians the 
knowledge and authority to impose cuts and set limits.  
Autonomy enhances the organization's monopoly of information, 
which then strengthens it in other ways. 
       For these reasons militaries almost obsessively pursue 
political autonomy and resist outside control.50  As S.E. Finer 
notes, "anxiety to preserve its autonomy provides one of the 
most widespread and powerful of the motives for [military 
intervention in politics]."51  This drive for autonomy can lead 
                         
    48  Harvey A. DeWeerd, "Churchill, Lloyd George, 
Clemenceau: The Emergence of the Civilian," in Edward Mead 
Earle, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1943): 287-305 at 298-98; Dan van der Vat, 
The Atlantic Campaign: The Great Struggle at Sea 1939-1945 
(London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1988): 26-40; and John Costello 
and Terry Hughes, The Battle of the Atlantic (London: Collins, 
1977): 31-34. 
    49  Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower, 2 vols. (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1984), 2:225. 
    50  Thus British General Sir Henry Wilson opined that the 
"whole idea of governing the army by a civilian, whose 
training has been political expediency ... is vicious in 
theory and hopeless in practice."  In 1901, quoted in Alfred 
Vagts, A History of Militarism: Civilian and Military, rev. 
ed. (New York: Free Press, 1959): 300. 
    51  Finer, Man on Horseback: 41.  Alfred Vagts likewise 
notes "the natural tendency of armies ... toward a self-
government brooking no outside influences."  Vagts, History of 
Militarism: 296. CHK99. 
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militaries to demand that only the military should decide 
internal military matters, including training, force levels, 
and weapons procurement.  In extremes it has led militaries to 
demand a role in wider policymaking, to include foreign and 
economic policy and national education policy, since these 
domains also affect the armed forces.52 
       The German, Spanish and French armies each interfered 
in politics before and after World War I less to control 
national policies per se than to defend their own autonomy.  
Finer notes that before the war the German military's itch for 
political power stemmed from its "determination to safeguard, 
to win back, even partly extend its autonomous position in 
politics and  society."53  After the war the German army 
collaborated with the Nazis largely to recover its prewar 
size, status and autonomy.54  The notorious Dreyfus affair in 
France had the same origins: the military saw the Dreyfus 
trial as a test of its right to self-governing autonomy in its 
own sphere, so it dug in its heels.55 
       The American military strongly resisted the firming of 
civilian control of military programs during the 1960s.  The 
Chair of the House Armed Services Committee, a friend of the 
military, called for abolishing the civilian program analysis 
office in the Pentagon that provides the Secretary of Defense 
with independent analysis.56  The memoirs of top U.S. military 
commanders warned of the dangers of civilian control over 
national security programs.  Former SAC commander Nathan 
Twining criticized the "ineffectual and detailed control of 
military operations by political officials."57  Vice-Admiral 
Hyman Rickover, father of the nuclear submarine fleet, 
compared civilian force planners to "spiritualists" and 
"sociologists," accusing them of "playing God while neglecting 
the responsibility of being human."58 
                         
    52  Finer, Man on Horseback: 41. 
    53  Finer, Man on Horseback: 42. 
    54  Finer, Man on Horseback: 44. 
    55  Finer, Man on Horseback: 47-48. 
    56  Enthoven and Smith, How Much Is Enough?: 4, 79. 
    57  General Nathan F. Twining, Neither Liberty Nor Safety 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966): 168; see also 
246, 296. 
    58  Quoted in Enthoven and Smith, How Much is Enough?: 78. 
 General Thomas D. White, former U.S. Air Force Chief of 
Staff, wrote in wrote in 1963: 
    "I am profoundly apprehensive of the pipe-smoking, 
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       Fourth, the number and power of the organization's 
natural enemies in the national polity affects its impulse to 
jump into national politics.  The stronger its enemies, the 
more it must intrude in politics in self-defense. 
       Militaries have more natural enemies than most 
government agencies.  These enemies include pacifists and 
anti-war religious groups, potential draftees, and taxpayers. 
 Militaries require a heavy sacrifice of money and perhaps 
time from citizens.  This makes them inherently intrusive and 
obnoxious unless they sell themselves effective.  Moreover, 
dominant Western Liberal values conflict with military 
values--the violent function of the military, and its stress 
on hierarchy and restriction of individual freedom for its 
members--so the military always swims in a hostile social sea, 
at least in liberal industrial societies.  If the military 
does not keep a hand in politics it can be attacked, as the 
American military-industrial complex was attacked in the 1930s 
for its imagined role in causing World War I.  This supplies 
another reason why the military feels it must speak with a 
strong voice. 
       To summarize: the establishmentarian character of the 
military, combined with the competitive nature of military 
careers, the turbulent nature of the military 
task-environment, and the natural antagonism of society toward 
militaries, together cause a strong military impulse toward 
                                                                
tree-full-of-owls type of so-called professional "defense 
intellectuals" who have been brought into this nation's 
capitol.  I don't believe a lot of these often 
over-confident, sometimes arrogant young professors, 
mathematicians and other theorists have sufficient 
worldliness or motivation to stand up to the kind of enemy 
we face" (Enthoven and Smith, How Much Is Enough?: 78). 
       U.S. Air Force General Curtis LeMay expressed similar 
views in 1968: 
    "The military profession has been invaded by pundits who 
set themselves up as popular oracles on military strategy. 
 These "defense intellectuals" go unchallenged simply 
because the experienced professional active duty officers 
are officially prohibited from entering into public 
debate.  The end result is that the military is often 
saddled with unprofessional strategies. ... My quarrel is 
with those who usurp the military professional's 
position--those who step in front of him and who volunteer 
and enforce strictly military advice and guidance with 
little knowledge of or experience in such matters.  These 
are the men who have endangered America" (General Curtis 
E. LeMay with Major General Dale O. Smith, America Is in 
Danger [New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968]: viii, 1, 
emphasis in original). 
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growth and autonomy.  This in turn causes defensive military 
political intrusion into its environment.  In short, 
militaries are inherently and exceptionally control-resisting 
and domain-expanding, for reasons rooted in both their 
organizational character and their political environment.  
Thus military interference in politics is largely defensive.  
Because militaries cannot safely coexist with the larger 
society, they intrude into it to forestall intrusions against 
themselves. 
       Military political action focuses on affecting national 
perceptions because direct military interference in politics 
is usually considered illegitimate.  As S.E. Finer notes, 
militaries suffer a "lack of moral title to rule,"59 hence they 
must defend their interests by persuasion rather than 
coercion.  They must exert political influence by shaping 
national beliefs, not by directly controlling national 
policies.  They cannot participate openly in politics without 
raising objections of impropriety, and they cannot claim 
legitimacy to rule if they seize power by force.  Moreover, 
professional militaries would damage their organizational 
essence if they assumed administrative responsibility, since 
war machines and governments are different organizations, so 
they prefer not to govern directly.60  Hence the threat of 
militarism is not the threat of a coup, but of the infusion of 
society with self-serving militarist beliefs.  Militarism is 
less dangerous to national political institutions than to 
national perceptions. 
       Moreover, the military must cloak its political efforts 
in secrecy--which in turn conceals militarism itself from 
view.  Since military political action is illegitimate, 
military propagandizing is also illegitimate, so militaries 
must spread their views covertly.  Hence military manipulation 
of opinion is a self-concealing phenomenon.  Its invisibility 
is a condition for its success.  Journalists are cultivated, 
news stories are planted, friendly civilian strategists are 
assisted, and quasi-civilian "think tanks" are created to 
launder military views.  As a result militarism is hard to 
study and tends to be underestimated.61 
                         
    59  Finer, Man on Horseback: 12. 
    60  A distinction should be drawn between truly 
professional militaries that are imbued with a war-fighting 
ethos, and the police forces that masquerade as national 
militaries in many Third World states.  These police-force 
militaries are seldom "militaristic" in the manner described 
in this chapter, while they are prone to seize direct power, 
since acting as the national government does less damage to 
their organizational essence. 
    61  Thus Alfred Vagts complained that "political scientists 
have neglected to treat, at length or in depth, the 
 
 
 21 
       B. Political Capability: Sources of Military Power.  
Government organizations can most affect public and elite 
perceptions if they have five attributes: symbolic appeal, 
large workforce, organizational superiority, monopoly of 
information, and large public relations resources.  Militaries 
rate high in all five. 
       First, organizations with strong symbolic appeal have 
greater ability to shape public and elite perceptions.  Some 
organizations have far more symbolic appeal than others, 
because they are identified with patriotism, national pride, 
or other national values.  
       Militaries have powerful symbolic appeal.  As Finer 
notes, militaries often acquire "a moral halo which is 
politically of profound importance," and enjoy "a highly 
emotional symbolic status."62  Rourke notes that "the military 
role exerts a symbolic appeal that is as rare among 
bureaucratic organizations in the United States as it is in 
other societies. ... [This appeal] is a quite extraordinary 
bureaucratic resource--setting the Defense Department apart 
from all other executive agencies in the country."63  
Militaries are identified by the public with national honor, 
patriotism, courage, discipline and self-sacrifice by the 
public, which enhances their prestige and credibility. 
       Militaries also have more credibility on military 
matters than civilian experts.  Thus McGeorge Bundy, national 
security advisor to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, complained 
that the U.S. Congress reflexively defers to military views: 
"their position is that the generals and admirals are right 
simply because they are professionals."64  And Soviet Premier 
Khrushchev complained of Communist officials who "regard the 
defense establishment as a higher caste."65 
                                                                
influences, pernicious or otherwise, exercised by the military 
on governments and politics," and referred to a "secret 
history (secret largely because unwritten) of the relations 
between heads of states and army chiefs."  Vagts, Defense and 
Diplomacy: 496. 
    62  Finer, Man on Horseback: 9, 5.  Finer notes that "an 
atmosphere of candor, self-sacrifice and vigor clings to the 
armed forces, and of all among the 'powers that be' there is a 
tendency to esteem them as the most noble."  Ibid.: 10. 
    63  Rourke, Bureaucracy and Foreign Policy: 30. 
    64  Bundy commenting on a clash between Defense Secretary 
McNamara and top military leaders before the U.S. Senate, 
quoted in Enthoven and Smith, How Much is Enough?: 310. 
    65  Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament: 
618. 
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       Second, organizations with a large workforce have the 
advantage, if this workforce can be socialized to support and 
purvey the aims and values of the organization in national 
politics.  A large workforce gives an organization a large 
audience for its views and direct control over votes. 
       Militaries have a vast workforce, to include at some 
point most male citizens in states with conscription.  This 
gives the military a large audience for its views.  Ludwid 
Quidde observed in 1893 that German militarism "is rooted in 
the fact that the largest part of the male population is 
drafted into the Army for a number of years," with the effect 
that military values seep into civilian life.66  Thus Max Weber 
reportedly was militarized by reserve officer duty: his widow 
wrote that "the final result of his military training was a 
tremendous respect for the 'machine,' in addition a warlike 
and patriotic attitude which made him hope that one day he 
would be able to go into the field at the head of his 
company."67  Likewise Francis Rourke notes that U.S. veterans' 
organizations, which attract large memberships, "indoctrinate 
[their members] on the virtues of supporting the goals and 
policies of the military."68 
       Third, organizations have greater power if authority in 
the organization is highly centralized; if members are tightly 
disciplined; if communication among members is good; and if 
the organization's esprit de corps is high.  These attributes 
provide organizational superiority--an ability to act with 
decisive effect in politics or elsewhere.69  An organization 
with these attributes can act as a unit in politics, can 
better plan and coordinate its political actions, and can 
better discipline dissenters.  It also can create a cohesive 
ideology among its membership; hence its members are more 
loyal and effective agents for its programs.  And the 
organization can better achieve a monopoly of information in 
                         
    66  Berghahn, Militarism: 17.  Gerhard Ritter concurs that 
"military patterns of thinking came to invade the ideology of 
the middle class" in Wilhelmine Germany, and that this 
happened "primarily by way of the reserve officer corps."  
Ritter, Sword and Scepter: 2:101. 
    67  Martin Kitchen, The German Officer Corps, 1890-1914 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968): 121-22.  Thus a 
founder of organization theory paradoxically became the pawn 
of one of the world's more pernicious organizations. 
    68  Bureaucracy and Foreign Policy: 30. 
    69  Suggestive on this topic is Philip Selznick, The 
Organizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and 
Tactics (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960). 
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its issue areas, through tight control of the activities of 
its membership.   
       Modern militaries possess all the elements of 
organizational superiority: centralized command, discipline of 
members, close communication among members, esprit de corps, 
and a corresponding isolation and self-sufficiency.70  These 
characteristics follow from the nature of the military task.  
Centralized command, strong discipline, and close 
intercommunication among members of the military enable the 
military to respond as a unit to command.  Esprit de corps and 
close intercommunication enable the military to act as a unit 
without constant direction when the chaos of battle disrupts 
command channels. 
       Most armies are far more structured than civilian 
agencies.71  This makes the military more capable, not only on 
the battlefield, but also in politics.  The characteristics of 
military structure--centralized command, internal discipline, 
internal intercommunication, and esprit de corps--make 
militaries highly capable of domestic political action and 
enhance their capacity to infuse society with their message.72 
 These characteristics allow militaries to develop a common 
ideology and to take coordinated action to purvey it.  
Moreover, this ideology is reinforced within the organization 
by the military system of promotion, under which each officer 
is promoted by his immediate superiors, weeding out non-
conformists; and by the social separation of the military, 
which encloses officers in a military social milieu. 
       In short, military organizations can act as a unit in 
politics precisely because they are designed for unitary 
action on the battlefield. 
       The cohesive and monolithic character of militaries 
gives them a special advantage in wars of ideas by inhibiting 
"whistle blowers" from defecting.  This starves outside 
critics of information.  For example, in the 1960s many 
                         
    70  Finer, Man on Horseback: 5-9. 
    71  Finer, Man on Horseback: 8. 
    72  Finer notes that modern militaries usually are far more 
highly organized than any civilian bodies.  Only the Communist 
parties of communist-ruled states can match the degree of 
organization that militaries achieve.  The Roman Catholic 
church also displays the five features of military structure, 
but its member can join or leave at will and it is less 
segregated from the laity than most officer corps from 
civilians.  Firms and public agencies can also have the five 
features, but again are voluntary bodies, are not segregated 
from society, have weak sanctions for indiscipline, and few 
special codes or rules to follow.  Man on Horseback: 8. 
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individual U.S. Air Force officers recognized the large 
shortcomings of the proposed RS-70 reconnaissance/strike 
aircraft but they kept silent because, as Enthoven and Smith 
note, "it would have cost an officer his career to speak out, 
even within the confines of the Defense Department, against 
the views of his Chief of Staff."73  As a result Congress was 
oversold on the RS-70 and almost forced the administration to 
build it. 
       Fourth, organizations that enjoy a monopoly of 
information in their issue area have the advantage.  Outsiders 
cannot assess or effectively criticize the organization's 
claims.  Superiors cannot challenge the organization's 
judgement.  Members of the press are more dependent on the 
organization for stories and information, so the organization 
can manipulate the press more easily.  The organization can 
leak or withhold stories as it wishes.  It can reward friendly 
reporters with scoops or sanction unfriendly reporters by 
cutting off access.  "Information is power," and a monopoly of 
information is an important political asset for a public 
organization. 
       The degree of dominion of an organization over 
information in its issue-area is a function of organizational 
superiority, and three other factors in addition.  The more 
secrecy that surrounds an issue, the more pronounced the 
monopoly of information that the organization enjoys, since 
outsiders are prevented by classification from knowing enough 
to judge what they are told.  Thus the military in every 
country can affect official judgements and the public climate 
by classifying or releasing information as they see fit.  
Other organizations with a plausible claim to classify their 
data, such as the F.B.I. in the U.S., can do the same. 
       The more technically complex and arcane the subject, 
the more pronounced the monopoly, since non-expert outsiders 
must rely on the judgments of experts within the organization. 
 Finally, the more unanimous the organization on the issues 
with which it deals, the more pronounced the monopoly, since 
outsiders cannot find dissenters within the organization to 
give them information or explain complex questions.74  This in 
turn is a function of the organizational superiority of the 
bureaucracy--that is, its degree of hierarchy, scope of 
discipline of members and intercommunication among them, and 
esprit de corps. 
       Militaries usually enjoy a near monopoly of information 
in the defense area.  Secrecy surrounds most military 
questions, so national militaries can guide the defense debate 
by classifying or releasing information.  Civilian managers 
                         
    73  Enthoven and Smith, How Much is Enough?: 251. 
    74  See Rourke, Bureaucracy and Foreign Policy: 23-4. 
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are left with only the data that the military lets them see.  
As a result they cannot exert effective control on policy.  
Thus the Soviet military allowed Soviet civilians analysts so 
little defense information during the Cold War that they had 
to use Western military data for a long period.75  This 
information advantage helped the military to dominate defense 
policy making. 
       Moreover, many military issues are technically complex. 
 This compels civilians to rely on military experts.  As Finer 
notes, the influence of militaries has grown in modern times 
as military arts have grown more specialized and arcane, 
leaving civilians less able to assess military question.76  
Thus U.S. Senator Karl Mundt once argued that Congress could 
not oversee details of defense policy "because we are not the 
experts in defense, and we are not the economists and the 
engineers."77  Instead Congress members often defer to military 
expertise. 
       Finally, the organizational superiority of the defense 
establishment enhances its monopoly of information, as noted 
above. 
       Naturally the information monopoly of militaries varies 
across time and space.  Where military secrecy is tight and 
civilian military analysts are lacking, e.g., in Wilhelmine 
Germany or the Soviet Union, the advantage of the military is 
greater.  Where information is more open and civilian experts 
are more numerous, e.g., in the United States, the military 
lacks a full monopoly of expertise.  But as a general matter 
national militaries enjoy far more control over information 
relevant to their issue-area than other government agencies. 
       Fifth, some organizations control more public relations 
resources than others.  Public agencies usually make their 
case to the public by creating news and manipulating press 
coverage.  But they also make their case directly, through 
public relations campaigns organized by client industries or 
interest groups, or which they organize themselves.78  The 
                         
    75  Georgi Arbatov, The System: An Insider's Life in Soviet 
Politics (New York: Times Books, 1992): 303.  Arbatov, who 
headed the main Soviet civilian foreign policy think-tank, 
notes that Soviet defense policy was "shaped and executed 
under the cloak of secrecy" and so "ceased being an instrument 
of our foreign policy and acquired a life of its own."  Ibid.: 
189. 
    76  Finer, Man on Horseback: 66. 
    77  Enthoven and Smith, How Much is Enough: 42. 
    78  On this subject is Francis E. Rourke, "Bureaucracy and 
Public Opinion," in Francis E. Rourke, ed., Bureaucratic Power 
in National Politics (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965): 187-199. 
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superior organization and prestige of the military gives the 
military control over large public relations resources, which 
militaries can use to infuse the polity with their ideas.  
This, in combination with their near-monopoly of information 
in their issue-area, magnifies their ability to manipulate the 
press and affect the public debate. 
       Thus before World War I the German Navy played a major 
role in shaping German public views by exploiting its public 
relations assets.  The Tirpitz press operation planted 
thousands of article in the German press.  The "fleet 
professors," including many of the great names at German 
universities, were organized to tour Germany giving talks for 
the big Navy.  The Colonial Society was induced to print and 
distribute thousands of pro-Navy pamphlets and books, and to 
organize hundreds of lectures.  By 1906 the German Navy League 
had more than a million members, and its journal Die Flotte 
was selling 300,000 copies.79 
       The American military also maintains a major public 
relations program.80  A 1979 survey of Defense Department PR 
activities found that the Pentagon spent tens of millions of 
dollars annually on a public relations operations81 that 
                         
    79  J.C.G. Röhl, Germany Without Bismarck: The Crisis of 
Government in the Second Reich, 1890-1900 (London: B.T. 
Batsford, 1967): 253-55; and Oron James Hale, Publicity and 
Diplomacy, with Special Reference to England and Germany, 
1890-1914 (New York: D. Appleton Century, 1940): 162-64; see 
also 158-161, 217-220.  Likewise, in interwar Japan the 
military's large propaganda machine helped engineer a sharp 
turnabout in Japan's mass media and public opinion from 
internationalism to a bellicose expansionism and a hostility 
to arms control between 1930 and 1934.  Pelz, Race to Pearl 
Harbor: 41-45. 
    80  Works on the scope and character of the Pentagon public 
relations effort include Juergen A. Heise, Minimum Disclosure: 
How the Pentagon Manipulates the News (New York: W.W. Norton, 
1979); Derek Shearer, "The Pentagon Propaganda Machine," in 
Leonard S. Rodberg and Derek Shearer, The Pentagon Watchers 
(Garden City, New York: Anchor, 1970): 99-142; J. William 
Fulbright, The Pentagon Propaganda Machine (New York: Vintage, 
1971); John M. Swomley, The Military Establishment (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1964): 113-128; Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military 
Establishment: Its Impacts on American Society (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1971): 187-213; Gene M. Lyons, "PR and the 
Pentagon," The New Leader, Oct. 17, 1960: 10-12; Morris 
Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 2nd ed. (New York: Free 
Press, 1971): 395-414; and Brit Hume and Mark McIntyre, 
"Polishing Up the Brass," More, June 1973. 
    81  During the 1970s the Pentagon variously estimated its 
own annual PR budget at $24 million and at $44 
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employed thousands of workers, provided the Washington press 
corps with hundreds of press releases each year, produced 
films, helped Hollywood produce films congenial to Pentagon 
views, arranged public speeches by members of the military, 
organized VIP tours for Congressmen and important civilians, 
and arranged interviews and background briefings.  It operated 
a school for public relations officers, with 85 faculty and 
1500 students, whose handbook explained that "favorable public 
opinion is considered the key-stone of the successful 
accomplishment of the Department of Defense Mission."82  The 
purpose of this activity is "to develop our program so that we 
can lay down mass PR fire when and as we need it."83 
       The Pentagon can use its control of information to 
induce the press coverage it prefers, rewarding friendly 
reporters with inside data while denying data to those who 
provide critical coverage.  Journalists are tempted to tailor 
their coverage accordingly. 
       Clients and political allies can help the military make 
its case.  Thus the German Navy League was organized by Krupp, 
the steel maker,84 and newspapers owned by Krupp and by other 
defense-related interests helped promote the big-navy 
program.85  Likewise Richard Cobden thought the British naval 
panic of 1847 was caused partly by a "Mr. Pigou, the gunpowder 
maker," who claimed the French were planning to attack 
England,86 while another observer thought the panic was 
engineered by half-pay military officers.87 
                                                                
million--amounts then equivalent to the money spent on news 
programming by the three U.S. television networks.  Heise, 
Minimum Disclosure: 51, 54; and Rourke, Bureaucracy and 
Foreign Policy: 29.  Others made higher estimates, e.g., CBS 
News, which estimated the total Defense PR effort at $190 
million in 1971.  Heise, Minimum Disclosure: 49. 
    82  Heise, Minimum Disclosure: 138. 
    83  An army memo on public affairs, quoted by Heise, 
Minimum Disclosure: 141.  See also James A. Donovan, 
Militarism, U.S.A. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970): 
55-61; and, on military-industrial associations and leagues in 
Europe and the United States before World War II, Vagts, 
History of Militarism: 355-359. 
    84  Rohl, Germany Without Bismarck: 254. 
    85  Hale, Publicity and Diplomacy: 218. 
    86  Quoted in Vagts, History of Militarism: 364. 
    87  Richard Cobden, "The Three Panics", in The Political 
Writings of Richard Cobden (London: Cassell & Co., 1886): 537-
704 at 567, quoting Joseph Hume. 
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       In sum, nine factors promote strong military influence 
over national perceptions in most states.  Militaries have 
strong symbolic appeal; they have a chance to acquaint the 
millions who serve in the military with the military 
perspective; in many countries they have substantial resources 
available for public relations programs; they are hierarchical 
and tightly disciplined, making them better able to take 
focused political action; and most important, they enjoy an 
unusual monopoly on information in their issue-area.88  These 
assets give the military an enlarged ability to influence 
national perceptions.  Their impulse to use this influence is 
strong because the economic welfare of members of the military 
is tightly tied to the welfare of the organization; the 
competitive promotional system in most militaries tightens 
this tie further, by attaching the career success of members 
of the organization to the growth of the organization; the 
political environment of the military will make frequent 
demands that it innovate, unless the military controls that 
environment; and this political environment contains natural 
enemies against which the military must defend itself. 
       Militarism is not universal.  Rather, military 
influence varies sharply from one country and period to 
another.  Germany and Japan were far more militarized before 
than after the two world wars, and they were markedly more 
militarized than most other states before the wars.  Many 
industrial states are almost completely unmilitarized.  My 
point is that militarism can appear in industrial states under 
the right conditions. 
       What states are prone to militarism?  Seven conditions 
increase their vulnerability.  None are sufficient but several 
are necessary to produce militarism, which is why full-blown 
militarism is blessedly rare. 
       States whose militaries live apart from society as a 
separate culture are more prone to militarism.  Social 
separation breeds fear and loathing on both sides of the 
civil-military divide.  Officers with few ties to civilians 
more often view them with suspicion and disrespect.  These 
feelings fuel the impulse to intervene in politics.  Civilians 
with no knowledge of the military are likewise prone to view 
                         
    88  Thus Finer summarized the unusual power-assets that 
national militaries control: 
    The armed forces then are not only the most highly 
organized association in the state.  They are a continuing 
corporation with an intense sentiment of solidarity, 
enjoying, in many cases, considerable favor.  This 
formidable corporate body is more lethally and heavily 
armed than any other organization in the state, and indeed 
enjoys a near-monopoly of all effective weapons.  Finer, 
Man on Horseback: 10. 
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it as alien, which in turn feeds military suspicion of 
civilians.  Social integration of officers and civilians goes 
far to dampen this spiral of alienation.  Militarism is far 
less likely, perhaps even impossible, if officers are educated 
with civilians and later live in some contact with civilian 
society.  It grows best where militaries are educated apart 
from an early age and then live apart as a wholly separate 
social community, as in Germany and Russia before 1914 and 
Japan before 1945.89 
       It follows that militarism is more likely if militaries 
have broad political autonomy, since this will likely foster 
social separation.  Like all organizations the military tends 
to seek autonomy in all things; hence it will likely use 
political autonomy to achieve social autonomy.  Samuel 
Huntington has argued that things are best when civilians 
grant militaries broad autonomy to run their own affairs.90  
But if autonomy leads to a wider social gap between civilian 
and military, as seems likely, it will also strengthen the 
military impulse to intervene in politics.91 
       Societies that are unaware of the possible dangers of 
militarism are more prone to it.  Awareness of the danger is a 
self-denying prophecy.  It inoculates civilians against 
military propaganda.  It also leads militaries to curb their 
political conduct, since they realize that they serve poorly 
if they act without self-restraint.  Europe was militarized 
before World War I partly because Europeans had never 
witnessed the disasters that rampant militarism brings.  After 
World War I militarism abated partly because the war revealed 
these disasters.  Germany today has no militarism partly 
                         
    89  On the isolation of the Wilhelmine German military see 
below at notes 534-538.  On imperial Japan see below at notes 
578-582.  In pre-1914 Russia the military "was a little world 
apart, its members often even living physically removed from 
the civilian population in isolated garrisons."  Officers 
often spent their whole adolescence in special military 
schools.  Dominic Lieven, Russia's Rulers Under the Old Regime 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989): 173.  Oppositely, 
the markedly unmilitaristic U.S. General George Marshall spent 
so much time with civilians from 1927 to 1937 that "he became 
familiar with the civilian point of view in a way rare among 
military men."  Forrest Pogue, quoted in Mark A. Stoler, 
George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century 
(Boston: Twayne, 1989): 60. 
    90  Huntington, Soldier and the State: 83-85. 
    91  Moreover, civilian influence over military promotions 
is a barrier to militarism, but military autonomy limits such 
influence. 
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because German officer training includes the history and the 
results of the German military's past political activism. 
       States with national ideologies that proscribe military 
involvement in politics are less prone to militarism.  
Militarism needs a permissive political environment.  
Bolshevism dampened militarism in the Soviet Union by its 
insistence that the Communist Party alone could speak about 
politics, and by its tenet that the military must be tightly 
controlled to prevent Bonapartism.  Together these dogmas 
fostered a strong taboo against military involvement in 
political discourse.  American and British liberal ideology, 
suspicious of military influence in politics, also acts as an 
inhibition on militarism.92  Wilhelmine Germany and imperial 
Japan had no such ideological inhibitions on militarism. 
       Only great powers and isolated powers are prone to 
militarism, for two reasons.  First, great powers cannot free 
ride for security on other states (rather, others free ride on 
them); hence their militaries are larger and more influential 
in society.  Second, the militaries of great powers get more 
budget payoff by purveying militarist ideas than the 
militaries of lesser powers.  Great power governments respond 
to threats by military buildup; hence their militaries can 
gain budget by painting a threatening world.  On the other 
hand, governments of lesser powers with access to allies 
address security threats by reaching for allies, not by 
building up their forces, since building up will rarely solve 
the problem--a Belgium can not stop a Germany no matter how 
much it builds--while reliance on allies often will.  Hence 
the militaries of medium and lesser power (except those that 
are isolated) have little incentive to sow militarist myths. 
       Insecure states are more prone to militarism.  They are 
bound to have larger, more prestigious militaries that are 
better able to shape civilian perceptions.  Thus Wilhelmine 
Germany was the most militarized state in pre-1914 Europe 
partly because was the least secure--surrounded by strong 
neighbors and cursed with borders that provided little natural 
protection.  Thus militarism is partly grounded in 
international reality.  A harsh security climate breeds 
militarism.93 
                         
    92  Descring this Liberal tradition but oppositely arguing 
that it failed to stem the growth of military influence in the 
United States is Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., The Civilian and the 
Military: A History of the American Antimilitarist Tradition 
(Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles, 1972). 
    93  Making this argument is Otto Hintze, summarized in 
Berghahn, Militarism: 14-15.  Barry Posen and Michael Desch 
oppositely argue that civilians more tightly control 
militaries when large security threats loom.  Posen, Sources 
of Military Doctrine: 75-79; and Michael C. Desch, Civilian 
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       Authoritarian regimes are more prone to militarism than 
democracies, because militarist myths can be challenged and 
weeded out in a democracy's free marketplace of ideas.  The 
marketplace of ideas is hardly a perfect filter for fallacies. 
 It often fails to catch them.  But it catches some, so 
democracies are less prone to misperceptions of all kinds, 
including those sown by the military. 
       Societies whose publics are ignorant of military 
affairs are more prone to militarism, because they know too 
little to reject bogus security arguments.  Public education 
about security matters inhibits public acceptance of 
militarist myths.  Also, ignorant civilians can encourage 
military resistance to civilian control by imposing poorly 
conceived military policies.  Militaries more willingly accept 
skilled than unskilled civilian control.94 
       Some of these conditions are merely helpful to 
militarism--it can appear without them--but the first four 
seem necessary for full-blown militarism to arise.  It is hard 
to imagine full-blown militarism where the military is 
integrated into society; or where civilians and militaries are 
imbued with the dangers of militarism; or where the national 
ideology strongly proscribes military involvement in politics; 
or among lesser powers that are not isolated.  Full-blown 
militarism seldom appears because these conditions rarely 
appear together. 
       A mutation of full-blown militarism--what might be 
called contained militarism--appears when conditions that move 
                                                                
Control of the Military (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1999): 13-14, 115.  This seems a strong possibility 
when civilians also are highly alert to the danger of undue 
military influence on policy, but this is seldom the case, so 
under most conditions insecurity should make militarism worse. 
 During the 1930s external threats led European civilians to 
tighten their grip on their militaries, as Posen explains.  
But the 1930s were anomalous because Europe's civilians were 
unusually alert to the dangers of military dominance over 
policy due to their World War I experience. 
    94  Jack Snyder further argues that oligarchies with 
cartelized politics are more prone to militarism because 
militaries can logroll with other members of the ruling cartel 
to get them to back the military's message.  Such logrolling 
benefits all cartel members, including the military.  Thus 
Wilhelmine Germany saw the logroll of "iron and rye"--the 
alliance of the conservative agrarians and the modern 
military-industrial complex, each echoing the other's agenda. 
 Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and 
International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1991): 31-32, 43-49 and passim. 
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the military to intervene in politics are present, but 
conditions that let it shape public views are absent.  This 
produces an active military eager to purvey its views, but 
hemmed in by a resistant society that compels it to keep 
silent or ignores what it says.  This occurs, for example, if 
the military of a great power lives as a separate society and 
is unimbued with the dangers of militarism, but faces a 
society with an ideology impermissive to militarism.  The Cold 
War Soviet Union illustrates.  Its military chafed at its 
political confinement, and it loudly argued a highly 
militaristic worldview to any who would listen.  But its 
bellicose noise fell largely on its own ears because Bolshevik 
authorities forbade it to broadcast its views to the wider 
public. 
       Another mutation--what might be called denatured 
militarism--occurs when when conditions that move the military 
to intervene in politics are absent, but conditions that 
empower it to persuade are present.  This produces a military 
with little will to bend society to serve its interests but 
large capacity to do so.  Military influence on policy and 
ideas will be large but less pernicious than under full-blown 
militarism, because the ideas that the military purveys will 
be less militaristic.  This occurs, for example, if the 
military lives in close integration with society in an 
insecure and isolated state that, due to its insecurity, 
requires a large military.  Israel illustrates.  The Israeli 
military has large influence on Israeli public and elite 
opinion,95 but it has not used this power to militarize Israeli 
society. 
 
III. THE WEB OF MILITARIST MISPERCEPTIONS 
       What misperceptions do militaries purvey? 
       The content of military propaganda reflects military 
organizational interests.  These interests in turn reflect the 
basic goals of all organizations.  These goals, which overlap 
somewhat, include:96 
                         
    95  Noting the military's monopoly over security planning 
in Israel is Yehuda Ben Meir, Civil-Military Relations in 
Israel (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995): 144-45, 
156. 
    96  Summarizing relevant ideas from organization theory are 
Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1974): 26-62; Morton H. 
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       Size and wealth.  Most organizations seek to grow.  
Organizational growth confers job security, higher salaries, 
and personal prestige on members of the organization.  As a 
result organizations search for larger budgets, new 
jurisdictions, and new missions, as long as these new missions 
and jurisdictions do not threaten the organization's essence 
or autonomy (see below).97 
       Conservation of organizational essence.  Organizations 
seek to preserve their "essence"--their missions and 
methods--in order to protect the jobs and status of incumbents 
in the organization.  A shift in missions or methods often 
requires new expertise while making old expertise obsolete.  
Hence a shift in missions or methods can make incumbent 
members of the organization expendable, to be replaced by 
newcomers with skills that better suit the new mission.  To 
avert this threat, organizations resist changing missions 
whenever the change would devalue the expertise of 
organization incumbents.98 
       If forced to choose between essence and size, 
organizations will choose essence.  Big budgets are much 
desired but conservation of essence is even more highly 
prized. 
       Uncertainty reduction.  Organizations develop routines 
to accomplish their tasks.  Without these routines the 
elements of the organization would improvise at chaotic cross-
purposes.  But uncertainty in the organization's task-
environment--changes in the nature of the problem that the 
organization addresses, or external demands to change missions 
or methods--disrupts these routines.  Hence organizations try 
to reduce uncertainty by dominating their environment--that 
is, by imposing their programs on the world, rather than 
vice-versa.  Instead of adapting the organization to the 
                                                                
Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1971): 67-78.  More general surveys of organization 
theory include Donald F. Kettl, "Public Administration: The 
State of the Field," in Ada W. Finifter, Political Science: 
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    97  Discussing organizational budget-seeking are Halperin, 
Bureaucratic Politics: 56-58; and Halperin, "Why Bureaucrats 
Play Games": 85-88. 
    98  On conservation of essence see Halperin, Bureaucratic 
Politics: 28-40; and Halperin, "Why Bureaucrats Play Games": 
78-81. 
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milieu, the organization seeks to adapt the milieu to the 
organization.  This helps the organization preserve its 
routines from disruptive pressure to innovate. 
       Control of the task-environment also helps the 
organization to plan.  Organizations dislike un-plannable 
tasks, and structure their relations with their environment to 
make planning easier.  They often prefer tasks that are easier 
to plan even if these tasks are harder to perform.99 
       Autonomy from external authority.  Organizations resist 
outside control or interference.  If outsiders control the 
organization they can interfere with its plans and procedures. 
 They can threaten its essence by imposing new missions and 
methods.  They can force innovation.  These actions can 
redistribute power within the organization, threatening the 
careers of top managers, and they create planning uncertainty. 
       Outsiders also can better limit the size and wealth of 
the organization if they control its operation.  Control gives 
outsiders the authority to impose limits and the expertise to 
know where to impose cuts and efficiencies that threaten 
organizational incumbents.  As a result, organizations are 
autonomy-seeking and control-resisting.100 
       Organizations also suffer myopias that distort the 
advice they give, even when this advice is not meant to be 
organizationally self-serving.  Thus organization theory 
suggests that organizations purvey misperception both to serve 
the interests of the organization and because the organization 
is myopic--it simply does not know how things really work.  
First, organizations suffer "bounded rationality."  They tend 
to know only what they must know to manage their tasks.101  
They do not know what other organizations must know to achieve 
their assigned tasks, so if they seize another organization's 
jurisdiction they may lack the expertise to cope.  Thus the 
military often mishandles diplomacy and foreign affairs when 
it assumes responsibility for foreign policy, since its 
organizational experience does not prepare it for this task.  
Where matters of statecraft and diplomacy are concerned, the 
military rationality is bounded. 
       Yet public organizations still intrude beyond their 
                         
    99  On uncertainty reduction by organizations see Posen, 
Sources of Military Doctrine: 44-47. 
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area of expertise, partly because they do not know the limits 
of their own understanding.102 
       Second, organizations only poorly evaluate their own 
perceptions and performance.  As a result they cannot easily 
improve performance, correct misperceptions or learn new 
things.103  I comment more on this idea in chapter 4, below, as 
it applies to state conduct.  But it also applies here.  Poor 
self-evaluation lowers the quality of military perceptions; 
this in turn distorts the nature of military advice. 
       These interests and myopias lead the militaries to 
purvey eight misperceptions that raise the risk of war. 
       A. "Others Are Hostile."  Militaries tend to exaggerate 
the hostility of other states.  Budget-seeking is their prime 
motive: the case for big military budgets is stronger if 
others appear hostile.  Thus before World War I a colleague 
advised British Admiral John Fisher that "an invasion scare is 
the mill of God that grinds you out a Navy of Dreadnoughts."104 
 Asada Sadao likewise notes that overblown Japanese fears of 
foreign encirclement in the 1930s were "cultivated by Japanese 
naval planners as a pretext for naval expansion. ... Behind 
the navy's special emphasis on the prospect of war with the 
United States one can detect, as usual, its desire for a 
larger share of the nation's resources."105 
       The belief that others are hostile also supports 
arguments for the offensive military doctrines that militaries 
prefer (see below).106  Enemies that are blindly hostile cannot 
                         
    102  Thus Bernard Brodie noted the "common tendency among 
the military to give without hesitation assurances that are 
well beyond their qualifications and knowledge."  Brodie, War 
and Politics: 487. 
    103  Aaron Wildavsky, "The Self-Evaluating Organization," 
Public Administration Review, Vol. 32, No. 5 
(September-October 1972): 509-520. 
    104  Second Viscount Esher, quoted in W. Mark Hamilton, The 
Nation and the Navy: Methods and Organization of British 
Navalist Propaganda, 1889-1914 (New York: Garland, 1986): 173. 
 In the same era German Foreign Office Counsellor Friedrich 
von Holstein observed that fears of British naval attack were 
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of British attack.  Quoted in Jonathan Steinberg, "The 
Copenhagen Complex," in Walter Lacqueur and George L. Mosse, 
eds., 1914: The Coming of the First World War (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1966): 21-44 at 40. 
    105  Asada, "Japanese Navy": 243-244, 251. 
    106  Suggesting this is Jack Snyder, "Perceptions of the 
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be accommodated and so must be crushed.  The only sensible 
wartime strategy is total victory--which calls for offensive 
forces and doctrine. 
       Moreover, the military's purview of international 
politics is over-weighted with evidence of others' hostility. 
 Militaries study each other to anticipate each other's 
strategies.  Then they infer other states' intentions from 
their military's postures and doctrines.  This often makes 
other states seem more hostile than in fact they are, since 
military postures and doctrines are often more aggressive than 
the foreign policies they support.107 
       Finally, militaries are quick to detect signs of 
others' aggressiveness and slow to notice benign behavior 
because they are responsible for alerting the state to danger. 
 Their job is to find threats, not to find the absence of 
threat. 
       The pre-1914 German military imagined Germany 
surrounded by rapacious enemies ready to pounce.  In the late 
1880s and early 1890s General Alfred von Waldersee's military 
attaché in Paris "filled his reports with hair raising 
accounts of the imminence of a French attack."108  He told 
Berlin that "the present peaceful exterior is only a thin 
covering over France, a slight puff of wind and the bayonets 
are through,"109 although French leaders actually had no 
belligerent plans.  In 1904 the German naval attache in London 
so alarmed Berlin with his reports that the Kaiser became 
persuaded that Britain might attack the next spring--a 
groundless fear.110  In 1909 former Chief of the General Staff 
Schlieffen wrongly imagined that Germany and Austria-Hungary 
faced sudden attack by Britain, France, Russia and even Italy, 
then Germany's ally:111 
                                                                
Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence 
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admirals. 
    108  Kitchen, German Officer Corps: 73, summarizing Huene. 
 Waldersee was German Chief of General Staff during 1888-1891. 
    109  Quoted in Kitchen, German Officer Corps: 73. 
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   An endeavor is afoot to bring all these Powers together for 
a concentrated attack on the Central Powers.  At the given 
moment the doors are to be opened, the drawbridges let 
down, and the million-strong armies let loose, ravaging 
and destroying, across the Vosges, the Meuse, the 
Königsau, the Niemen, the Bug and even the Isonzo and the 
Tyrolean Alps.  The danger seems gigantic.  
In 1911 General Friedrich von Bernhardi, the German army's top 
publicist, echoed Schlieffen, writing that "France aims solely 
at crushing Germany by an aggressive war," and that Germany's 
eastern territories were "menaced" by "Slavonic waves."  "Our 
German nation is beset on all sides."112  And in 1912 Admiral 
Tirpitz wrongly claimed that the Anglo-French Entente "has the 
character of an offensive alliance."113 
       Russian officers of the era viewed the world with a 
parallel paranoia, finding enemies everywhere.  Russian war 
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plans from 1908 to 1914 wrongly assumed that Sweden and 
Rumania would join Germany against Russia in a general war.  
General Iurii Danilov, Russia's Deputy Chief of Staff, thought 
that China and Japan might also join the war as enemies, even 
though the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs advised 
otherwise.114  A critic complained that Danilov "left out only 
the Martians" from his enemies list.115 
       Imperial Japanese officers had frightful fantasies 
about the United States.  In 1918 an officer of the Naval 
General Staff urged a Japanese deployment to Russian Siberia, 
since otherwise the United States might seize Siberia and then 
close in on Japan from all directions--the north, south 
(Philippines), east (Hawaii and Guam) and west (China).116  In 
1920 a former army officer published a popular book urging his 
fellow citizens to prepare for air attack and invasion by U.S. 
forces.117 
       Around the same time some U.S. military writers warned 
of far-fetched combinations against the United States.  In the 
midst of World War I, as Britain and Germany were locked in 
battle, General Francis Vinton Greene feared an aggressive 
British-German alliance against the United States, "allies as 
they were under Chatham and under his great son, the younger 
Pitt."118 
   In that event we should be hopelessly outclassed.  The 
allies would have no trouble in crossing the ocean and 
selecting such a point for landing as the General Staffs 
of the two countries should decide to be most favorable.  
       American military reports from Europe in the late 1940s 
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warned of imminent war.  At one point in 1948, before the 
Berlin blockade, the U.S. Air Force refused to endorse an 
intelligence estimate that war was "not probable within sixty 
days."119  General Lucius Clay in March 1948 wrote that "within 
the last few weeks, I have felt a subtle change in Soviet 
attitude which I cannot define but which now gives me a 
feeling that [war] may come with dramatic suddenness."120  
Later, U.S. military commanders drew alarming pictures of 
Soviet and Chinese intentions.  Former SAC commander Thomas 
Power forecast in 1964 that Soviet leaders would resort to 
"all-out military action" if they could not subdue the United 
States by other means.  "They have long prepared for such a 
contingency."121  General Twining likewise argued that 
"coexistence to any Communist leader means 'coexistence on my 
terms after surrendering your freedom.'"122  He also dubiously 
divined that "the ultimate objectives of China's leaders are 
certainly the subjugation and communization of all Southeast 
Asia, the Indonesian area, the Philippines, and Australia" and 
described a "Hitler-like mentality which now dominates Red 
China."123  Cold War-era polls showed that U.S. military 
officers had darker views of Soviet intentions than their 
civilian counterparts.124 
       Militaries exaggerate the hostility of friends as well 
as adversaries.  Allies are pictured as unreliable or even 
malicious; hence enemies must be faced largely alone.  In 1968 
NATO had a long and bright future, but General LeMay wrote 
that "NATO is breaking up and I am saddened to witness the 
demise of thegreatest of all peacetime alliances and one which 
I helped build."125 
       The image of hostile neighbors is fashioned both 
directly--in simple claims of neighbors' hostility--and as a 
mosaic of lesser misperceptions that add up to an image of 
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    121  General Thomas S. Power with Albert A. Arnhym, Design 
For Survival (New York: Coward-McCann, 1964): 44. 
    122  Twining, Neither Liberty Nor Safety: 244. 
    123  Twining, Neither Liberty Nor Safety: 273, 293. 
    124  Ole R. Holsti, "A Widening Gap between the U.S. 
Military and Civilian Society? Some Evidence, 1976-96," 
International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99): 5-42 
at 18, question B. 
    125  LeMay, America Is in Danger: 327. 
 
 
 40 
neighborly malevolence. 
       Militaries exaggerate the degree of cooperation among 
adversaries, so the hostile actions of each are imputed to the 
other, and the hostility of all is thereby exaggerated.  
Before World War I Germany's General Bernhardi preposterously 
claimed that the Balkan states fought the Balkan wars of 1912-
13 at Britain's instigation, and that Britain "directs" the 
Triple Entente.126  In 1966 General Twining likewise spoke of 
the Communist world as "the enemy bloc," although China and 
the Soviet Union then were deeply hostile to one another.127  
He also claimed that "behind the North Vietnamese invasion of 
the territory and the sovereign rights of the South Vietnamese 
lies Red Communist China,"128 despite the indigenous roots of 
the Vietnam conflict and the deep and ancient antagonism 
between China and Vietnam. 
       Militaries exaggerate the likelihood of war, a belief 
that imputes dark intentions to others.129  Before World War I 
many European generals held the view that "the great war" was 
inevitable--and helped bring it on by giving advice shaped by 
this view.  British Adjutant-General Wolseley said in 1890 
that "the world must have a great upheaval before long."130  
Lectures at the Russian staff academy stressed that war 
between Russia and the Central Powers (Germany and Austria-
Hungary) was unavoidable.131  In Germany Colonel Colmar von der 
Goltz wrote that "modern wars have become the nations' way of 
doing business,"132 and as 1914 approached General Moltke 
declared that "a European war must come sooner or later."133  
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In the interwar years both Japanese and American naval 
officers widely assumed that war against the other was almost 
unavoidable.134 
       Militaries exaggerate others' hostility by understating 
the threat their own state poses to others.  This makes the 
other's provoked hostility seem unprovoked, hence unwarranted. 
 I.F. Clarke reports that before 1914 a flood of military-
authored popular novels painted their characters in black and 
white, "the polar opposites of the unspeakable enemy and the 
glorious nation.  Since the nation is an object of worship in 
these stories, the enemy must equally be an object of 
detestation. ... Complete virtue faces total wickedness."135  
Later, former U.S. SAC commander Thomas Power wrote that the 
world was "well aware of our peaceful intentions toward 
Russia,"136 although elsewhere in the same volume he spoke 
open-mindedly of preventive war against Russia.137 
       One's own threat to others is downplayed by 
understating one's own military effort.  In 1964, for example, 
General Twining warned that the United States was conducting 
"a creeping disarmament" although the U.S. then had far the 
largest defense budget in the world, exceeding the Soviet 
defense budget by 40 percent, and NATO outspent the Warsaw 
Pact by 70 percent.138  In 1968 the United States still had the 
                                                                
Staff from 1857-1887, also was quick to assume that war was 
unavoidable.  As early as 1860 he thought war with France was 
inevitable, and he forecast war with Russia in 1871, although 
German-Russian relations then were quite good.  Snyder, 
Ideology of the Offensive: 127-28. 
    134  Asada, "Japanese Navy": 234; and Waldo H. Heinrichs, 
"The Role of thee United States Navy," in Borg and Okamoto, 
Pearl Harbor as History: 197-223 at 202-203.  Insurrectionary 
Japanese army officers likewise declared in 1936 that "our 
country is on the verge of war with Russia, China, Britain, 
and America, who wish to crush our ancestral land."  Butow, 
Tojo and the Coming of the War: 64. 
    135  I.F. Clarke, Voices Prophesying War, 1763-1984 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1966): 122. 
    136  Power, Design For Survival: 50. 
    137  Power, Design for Survival: 79-84, esp. 82-83. 
    138 Twining, Neither Liberty Nor Safety: 286.  Defense 
spending ratios are read from charts 2-2 and C-12 in Harold 
Brown, Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1982 
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1981): 17 and C-12. 
 U.S.-Soviet ratios are for 1964, NATO-Pact ratios are for 
1965. 
 
 
 42 
world's largest defense budget, exceeding the Soviet defense 
budget by 29 percent, yet General Curtis LeMay lamented:139 
   It is disheartening to have lived through a period of 
history when the great United States has dwindled from the 
first power in the world to a questionable military 
entity.  For so many years we held the biggest stick but 
through inattention and far out national defense 
philosophies we have let our big stick be whittled down to 
a lathe. 
       The image of national inaction is created two ways: by 
understating what is being done, or by assuming a too-
demanding national military strategy, leaving the national 
defense effort looking pallid when measured against its 
missions.140  Thus during the Cold War the U.S. Air Force 
included very demanding strategic nuclear counterforce 
operations among its missions,141 and the U.S. Navy sometimes 
included the imposing task of attacking heavily defended 
Soviet bases on Soviet home territory with carrier-based 
airpower.142  The strongest military would look weak measured 
against such daunting assignments. 
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       No doubt militaries understate their own programs 
chiefly to strengthen their case for a bigger budget.  But 
this also makes other states appear more hostile by obscuring 
the military programs to which other states are responding 
when they build their forces, thereby making this response 
appear unprovoked.  Militaries themselves are prone to this 
misperception.  Thus before World War I Germany's General 
Bernhardi found British hostility toward Germany "not very 
comprehensible" and speculated at length on its causes, but 
devoted only one sentence to the possibility that German naval 
building--a prime cause of British enmity--was a factor.143 
       Militaries tend to exaggerate others' capabilities and 
military programs, which also makes their intentions appear 
hostile.  Enthoven and Smith note "the persistent bias of the 
military and intelligence bureaucracies toward overestimating 
one's enemy by making 'conservative assumptions.'"144  This 
bias is endemic among national military establishments.  For 
example, before World War I U.S. military leaders often 
painted a stark picture--absurd in retrospect--of powerful 
enemies poised to invade and conquer the United States.  In 
1893 Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan warned that Hawaii, if not 
annexed by the U.S., might become "an outpost of a Chinese 
barbarism which might soon burst the barriers which contained 
it, and bury civilization under a wave of invasion."145  In 
1908 General J.P. Storey warned that in only three months 
Japan could "land on the Pacific Coast four hundred thousand 
troops, and seize, with only insignificant resistance, 
Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, and Los Angeles."  Then 
Japan could exploit the western mountains and deserts to hold 
the west coast against U.S. recapture.  "Never has there been 
on this earth so rich a prize, now so helpless to defend 
itself."146  In 1915 Major General Greene suggested that either 
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the British or the Germans could cross the Atlantic and land 
where they wished in the United States even without allied 
assistance.147 
       In 1957 U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Thomas D. White 
warned that the Soviet Union would soon surpass the United 
States in strategic bombers; in fact the U.S. strategic bomber 
force outnumbered the Soviet force by over 11:1 in 1960, and 
by over 4:1 in 1965.148  In 1968 General Curtis LeMay wrote 
that the Soviets "have already deployed an anti-ballistic 
missile system and are rapidly improving and expanding it," 
and "lead us in numbers of strategic bombers,"149 although the 
Soviets then had no effective anti-ballistic missile system 
and U.S. strategic bombers outnumbered Soviet bombers by over 
3:1.150  And during the great SALT II debate of 1979-80 Admiral 
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Warsaw Pact. 
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Hayward Thomas Hayward, Chief of Naval Operations, warned 
Congress that "the Soviets will attain a first-strike 
capability in the next few years," a forecast that proved 
egregiously wrong.151  
       Threat inflation also infected U.S. conventional 
military planning in the 1950s and early 1960s.  Military 
briefers warned the incoming Kennedy administration defense 
team that Soviet ground forces in Europe had more than 7-1 
superiority against NATO ground forces and that Soviet 
tactical air forces in Europe could win air superiority over 
NATO tactical air forces in a mere three days.  But careful 
review revealed that NATO actually had material equality with 
the Soviets on the ground and had 4-1 superiority in tactical 
air power.152  The military assessment was far too pessimistic, 
and the Soviet conventional superiority it described was 
illusory. 
       Such threat inflation makes other states seem 
aggressive as well as strong.  If a case is made that 
adversary programs are larger than needed for defense, this 
suggests that the adversary plans aggression.  Thus General 
Power warned that "the tremendous expansion of the Soviet's 
military power can serve but one purpose--aggression."153 
       States then overbuild because they exaggerate the 
other's power and aggressiveness.154  War also becomes more 
likely, because the case for expansionist foreign policies and 
for preemptive and preventive war is stronger when others are 
assumed to be hostile. 
       The opposite error--understating threats--can also 
occur when this serves organizational interests.  Speaking 
generally, threats are understated when their recognition 
would cause civilians to force innovations on the military 
that threatened organizational essence; or to force a shift of 
resources from offensive to defensive missions; or when to 
acknowledge the threat would reflect poorly on past military 
performance, or on the military generally.  In Germany before 
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1914 General Schlieffen failed to consider threats to his 
offensive war plan posed by France's excellent quick-firing 
artillery (the famous "75s"), or by possible French 
demolitions of transport infrastructure, or by a British naval 
blockade.155  To acknowledge these threats might stir calls for 
a more defensive plan, which Schlieffen axiomatically opposed, 
so he neglected them.  And the French Army preserved its 
offensive doctrine before 1914 by badly understating the 
strength of Germany's planned attack through Belgium;156 this 
deflected arguments for a more defensive strategy focused on 
meeting the German attack. 
       In the 1930s the British Navy preserved its essence and 
its offensive mission by ignoring the German submarine 
threat.157  If the submarine threat were acknowledged, it 
followed that the Navy should shift its emphasis from 
battleships to anti-submarine forces (to counter the submarine 
threat) and also to submarines (to exploit their power).  The 
British battleship admirals resisted this.  Also in the 1930s 
the Japanese Navy understated the future submarine threat to 
the sea lanes within the empire it aimed to conquer.  If it 
acknowledged the submarine threat, this would undermine its 
claims that an overseas empire could give Japan economic 
independence, which would undermine its arguments for empire, 
which would undermine its claim to a large budget.  Similarly, 
during the early Cold War the Soviet military downplayed the 
American strategic nuclear menace, instead defining 
neighboring states as the main threat.  This allowed the 
Soviet military to avoid a painful shift from large armored 
ground forces to strategic rocket forces, thus preserving the 
essence of the Soviet military--but leaving the Soviet Union 
woefully vulnerable. 
       Later the U.S. strategic nuclear command-and-control 
apparatus grew vulnerable to Soviet attack.158  Yet military 
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writers seldom raised this problem, perhaps because it cast 
doubt on the feasibility of second-strike counterforce 
operations, and so undercut the more general case for 
counterforce, which the Air Force strongly preferred to more 
defensive alternatives. 
       During the Indochina War U.S. military intelligence 
badly underestimated Viet Cong troop strength.  Military 
figures showed Viet Cong strength at 270,000 while the CIA put 
the Viet Cong at 600,000.159  The military figures were too 
low, but had the virtue--from a military viewpoint--of showing 
the military making good progress. 
       This suggests some general axioms on threat perception. 
 Threats are exaggerated when they provide justification for 
(1) expansion of current forces, and/or (2) more offensive 
forces and doctrine.  Threats are downplayed when they justify 
(1) larger but different forces, with cuts in current forces, 
and/or (2) a shift of resources from offense to defense, 
and/or (3) they reflect poorly on the performance of the 
military, or on the military as an institution.  This pattern 
of threat perception best serves military organizational 
interests; national threat perception will follow the same 
pattern if militaries shape national perceptions. 
       B. "Force is Useful, States Bandwagon with Threats."160 
 The possession, threat, and use of force has important self-
limiting and self-defeating aspects.  Great powers usually 
resist the strongest, most threatening state in the 
neighborhood, by building up their own arms or by forming 
countering coalitions.  They seldom "bandwagon"--that is, 
align with or submit to the strong and threatening state.  
Hence strong and bellicose states are often enmeshed in arms 
races and are contained or even crushed by strong countering 
coalitions.  The threat of force often evokes answering 
threats, and the use of force often evokes answering force, 
leaving those who threaten or use force without gains.  Wars 
often develop their own momentum, outliving their original 
rationales or escalating out of control, and trapping the 
belligerents in fruitless spirals of violence.  Menacing 
offensive military capabilities can trigger defensive attacks 
by others that seek to remove the threat. 
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       Militaries underestimate these dynamics.  They discount 
balancing behavior and exaggerate bandwagoning.161  
Specifically, they expect states to align with power and 
comply with threats more often than in fact they do.  They 
underestimate the possibility that others will answer power 
and threats with counter-threats, arms racing, and countering 
alliances.  They downplay the tendency of war to get out of 
control, and the tendency of wartime adversaries to 
counter-escalate.  They underestimate the risk that aggressive 
military postures will provoke defensive or preemptive 
violence by others.162 
      Of course sometimes states do align with power and 
comply with threats.  Sometimes wartime enemies concede to 
force without counter-escalating.  Even offensive force 
sometimes dissuades.163  But militaries take these arguments 
too far.  They resist the notion that possessing, threatening, 
or using force can be counterproductive.  They doubt that 
there could be capabilities that one does not want to possess. 
       These misperceptions serve the military's 
organizational interests.  Military force is more useful if 
states submit to it instead of arming and aligning against it. 
 Aggressors could then use force to cow others into 
submission, and could use these gains to cow still others into 
submission.  Their potential victims would need more force to 
address the greater threat that aggressors pose.  Hence all 
states' appetites for military power would expand.  This would 
expand the size, wealth, and prestige of the military. 
       Force is more useful if wars have little propensity to 
develop momentum or to escalate.  Solving problems by 
threatening or using force is then more expedient, hence 
possessing force is also more expedient.  And force is more 
useful if it seldom triggers defensive or preemptive violence 
by others.  States will buy more force if leaders assume these 
facts. 
       Military writings are ridden with notions of 
bandwagoning.  Before 1914 the German navy premised the case 
for the High Seas fleet on the false notion--embodied in 
Admiral Tirpitz's "risk theory"--that a big German fleet could 
intimidate Britain into remaining neutral in a future 
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continental war.164  The German army similarly hoped that a 
swift German victory over France would cow Britain into 
leaving the war if it did intervene,165 and that crude threats 
would scare Belgium into neutrality.166 
       In 1940 the Japanese army pushed Japan to ally with 
Germany and Italy in hopes of intimidating the U.S. to remain 
neutral; the alliance had the opposite effect, energizing the 
U.S. against both Germany and Japan.167  Japanese military 
                         
    164  Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy: 132-135.  The risk 
theory held that Britain would not risk even a victorious war 
against Germany if its naval combat losses would leave its 
fleet without naval dominance over France and Russia.  Robert 
K. Massie, Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of 
the Great War (New York: Random House, 1991): 181. 
    165  Ritter, Schlieffen Plan: 163; and Hajo Holborn, 
"Moltke and Schlieffen: The Prussian-German School," in Edward 
Mead Earle, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought 
from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1971): 172-205 at 188-89, 203.  In contrast, German 
civilians doubted that Britain could be scared into 
neutrality.  Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow realized in 1908-09 
that the German naval buildup was merely provoking a British 
buildup and unsuccessfully sought to restrain it.  Chancellor 
Bethmann-Hollweg largely held to a balancing view of the 
world, arguing that "England follows a policy of balance of 
power and therefore will stand up for France if the latter is 
in danger of being annihilated by us."  Snyder, Myths of 
Empire: 86-87, 60. 
    166  John C.G. Röhl, "Germany," in Keith Wilson, ed., 
Decisions for War 1914 (New York: St. Martin's, 1995): 27-54 
at 44; Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, 3 
vols., trans and ed. Isabella M. Massey (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1952-1957; reprint ed., Westport: Greenwood 
Press, 1980): 441; Bernadotte E. Schmitt, The Coming of the 
War, 1914, 2 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930): 
2:390n; and Barbara W. Tuchman, The Guns of August (New York: 
Dell, 1962): 39-40, 147.  For his part France's General Joseph 
Joffre advised in 1912 that France plan to invade Belgium to 
forestall Germany's invasion, blind to the backlash that a 
French invasion would cause in Belgium and Britain.  Joll, 
Origins of the First World War: 81-82. 
    167  Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American 
War with Japan (New York: Random House, 1985): 64-65; and 
Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor: 216.  Japanese civilians were more 
skeptical of the rewards of such intimidation.  See, e.g., the 
views of President of the Privy Council Hara Yoshimichi, who 
feared that Japan's alignment with Germany and Italy would 
evoke a U.S. backlash against Japan.  Nobutaka Ike, ed., 
 
 
 50 
officers also reasoned that if the U.S. fought Japan, U.S. 
fighting morale would collapse if Britain collapsed, or if 
Japan won a major military victory early in the war.  Then, 
Japanese officers argued, the U.S. would make a compromise 
with Japan.168  But the U.S. defeat at Pearl Harbor only 
stiffened U.S. resolve to defeat Japan. 
       Historians now think China joined the Korean war 
because it feared American power on its doorstep in North 
Korea.169  But at the time General Douglas MacArthur, U.N. 
commander in Korea, thought China would not intervene 
precisely because U.N. power in Korea was so great.  Shortly 
before the Chinese attack MacArthur boasted that his command 
possessed "vastly greater [military] potential in the air, on 
the ground and on the sea"; therefore, he deduced, Chinese 
threats to intervene were "just blackmail."170  Then after 
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China's devastating intervention MacArthur denied that his 
rush to the Yalu had provoked it, instead blaming "Chinese 
imperialistic aspirations."171 
       General LeMay claimed that American use of nuclear 
weapons could persuade neutrals to jump on the U.S. 
bandwagon:172 
   In our recent limited wars we have unilaterally avoided the 
use of nuclear weapons.  One reason for this is our 
decision-makers' belief that a nuclear explosion would 
cause escalation of political problems, solidifying loose 
enemy alliances against us and alienating our friends.  
They seldom contemplate that the opposite effect is 
considerably more likely.  Against a winner, enemy 
alliances break up.  Friends grow more ardent as victory 
approaches. 
       Germany's General Bernhardi also thought 
power-balancing was a weak tendency in international affairs. 
 Discussing the prospects for German expansion, he admitted 
that balancing may occur but claimed that bandwagoning was the 
ultimate tendency:173 
   Several weak nations [may] unite and form a superior 
combination in order to defeat a nation which in itself is 
stronger.  This attempt will succeed for a time, but in 
the end the more intensive vitality will prevail.  The 
allied opponents have the seeds of corruption in them, 
while the powerful nation gains from a temporary reverse a 
new strength which procures for it an ultimate victory 
over numerical superiority. 
       Militaries have a blindness for the notion that one's 
own military capabilities can provoke others to attack.  They 
underestimate the risk that by acquiring a capacity to preempt 
others, they give others an incentive to preempt them.  Thus 
in the interwar years British air force officers argued that 
others could best be deterred by a devastating British first-
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strike capability, slighting the notion that this might 
provoke others to strike first instead.174  And General LeMay 
bridled at warnings that preemptive U.S. forces could provoke 
Soviet attack:175 
   At a White House meeting with President John F. Kennedy in 
1962, I recall being lectured by an articulate defense 
intellectual who had served briefly in World War II as a 
bombardier, but whose background was essentially legal and 
journalistic.  For the listening President's benefit he 
told me how "provocative" Strategic Air Command bombers 
were, how their "first strike" characteristics were 
"destabilizing" and liable to result in a "miscalculated" 
or "spasm" war. ... After this dramatic and erudite 
discourse, which left me almost speechless, I began to 
wonder if my military education had been complete. 
       General Twining had similar disregard for the notion 
that preemptive war posed a risk.  When a scientist argued 
that peace was stronger when Soviet nuclear forces were more 
survivable, Twining thought this was "upside down" 
reasoning.176 
       Militaries discount arms race dynamics, sometimes 
claiming that action-reaction theories are false, or 
suggesting that arms limitation is achieved by military 
superiority.  Thus a spokesman for the British aircraft 
industry once explained how arms control is achieved:177 
   Disarmament in fact is not negotiated; it is dictated by the 
strongest Powers.  Once we have the strongest Air Force we 
shall be able to call a halt in competition and then only 
shall we of the [aircraft] industry be able to turn our 
activities to the genuine development of aircraft for 
purposes of peace. 
Likewise Japanese naval officers argued in 1934 that Japan 
would not suffer if the 1930 London naval agreement were not 
renewed, since a naval arms race would entail no increase in 
naval spending.178  And in 1979 U.S. General Alexander Haig 
claimed that the United States could have maintained nuclear 
superiority over the Soviet Union after 1962 for a mere $2-3 
billion per year179--a plausible scenario only if the Soviet 
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Union had passively watched U.S. programs without reacting. 
       Similar thinking often prevails in military writings on 
war limitation and escalation control.  "War is limited if we 
are strong--the other side won't dare escalate."  Militaries 
generally downplay the risk of pre-emptive or preventive 
escalation in wartime--that is, the risk that strengths on one 
side may provoke the other to escalate to eliminate these 
strengths.  General LeMay's view is typical:180 
   The military base for successful deterrence at any level is 
over-all force superiority; that is, a capability to fight 
successfully at whatever level of intensity to win our 
objectives. ... If we have a war-winning ability to disarm 
the enemy we can put such a high penalty on escalation 
that the enemy will seek other than military means to 
attain his objectives. 
In line with this view LeMay urged President Kennedy to invade 
Cuba during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, assuring him that 
the Soviet Union would not react.181  He had believed that 
"there wasn't a chance that we would have gone to war with 
Russia because we had overwhelming strategic capability and 
the Russians knew it."182  And during the Vietnam War U.S. 
military and civilian leaders saw opposite paths to 
escalation: civilians feared that U.S. strikes on North 
Vietnam could provoke Chinese intervention, while military 
leaders feared that U.S. restraint could lead China to sense 
U.S. weakness and intervene.183 
       Militaries underestimate the risk that wartime 
opponents will refuse to concede even a lost war.  Thus in 
1937 Japanese officers thought China would concede once Japan 
conquered north China, giving Japan a quick victory.184  
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Instead China stubbornly resisted and was still unsubdued when 
Japan surrendered to the United States in 1945. 
       In short: militaries exaggerate how easily others can 
be cowed into submission by displays of strength or threats of 
force.  They also understate their own state's role in 
provoking others' hostility, understate war's propensity to 
persist and escalate, and understate the possibility that 
posing a menace to others can provoke their attack.  
Militaries purvey these illusions because they serve military 
organizational interests. 
       These misperceptions, in turn, lead states to 
overcommit themselves in crises, because leaders exaggerate 
the chances that blustering will make the other side back 
down.  They also lead to reckless uses of force because states 
underestimate the risks that forceful policies raise. 
       C. "Conquest Is Easy."  Conquest has been hard through 
most of history, especially in modern times.  Since 1815 great 
powers have been conquered on only eight occasions.  On six of 
these eight occasions--France in 1815, Germany in 1918 and 
1945, Austria-Hungary in 1918, Japan in 1945, and Italy in 
1945--the defeated great power lost to an overwhelming 
coalition that it conjured up by its own belligerent conduct. 
 Only France in 1870 and France in 1940 were conquered by a 
solitary opponent.  And both times France was soon freed by 
other states that sought to preserve Europe's balance of 
power.  Thus no state has been durably conquered in recent 
years except by an overwhelming coalition.  This striking 
result reflects the dominance of the defense on the 
battlefield and the strong tendency of great powers to 
coalesce against aggressors. 
       Militaries paint an opposite world of easy conquest and 
scarce security, exaggerating the strength of the offense 
against the defense in all aspects of war.  They inflate the 
ease of offensive military operations on the battlefield.  
They misread military technology, seeing defensive technology 
as offensive.  They claim--wrongly--that attacking lifts 
morale, giving attackers the advantage even when other factors 
favor the defense.  They claim that civilian morale can be 
broken and regimes can be collapsed by attacking civilian 
society.  They exaggerate bandwagoning and downplay balancing, 
as noted above; this leads them to understate the political 
resistance that forms to check aggressors and protect their 
targets.  They exaggerate the finality of victory and 
understate the problems of ruling beaten states.  Each 
argument leads militaries to overstate the feasibility of 
conquest. 
       Military claims for the offense are sometimes correct. 
 Sometimes conquest is easy, security is scarce, and offensive 
doctrines are appropriate.  But militaries axiomatically laud 
the offense, as a general and broadly applicable postulate of 
war.  They may adopt defensive strategies if civilians demand 
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them, but without civilian direction they nearly always purvey 
offensive ideas and favor offensive force postures and 
doctrines. 
       Military thinking abounds with offense-minded 
assertions and warnings against defensive strategies.  As 
Bernard Brodie observed, military doctrine has been 
"universally ... imbued with the 'spirit of the offensive'" 
since the time of Napoleon.185  During the American Civil War a 
typical Union tactics manual declared that "offensive wars ... 
have many advantages; purely defensive ones will always end in 
submission.  There is one great maxim ... to encounter an 
advancing enemy by our own advance."186  Union General Henry 
Halleck argued that defenders should always try to move to the 
offense even if they were defending entrenched positions.187  
Confederate commander Robert E. Lee was a dogmatic believer in 
the offensive who decimated his armies by repeated attacks.188 
 One author notes that Lee "never defended when he could 
attack."189  Another Confederate officer announced in November 
1862, after entrenched defenders had repeatedly massacred 
attackers in previous battles, that defensive entrenchments 
"never paid anywhere" and "will ruin our cause if adopted 
here."190  The war's heavy toll stemmed in part from the 
repeated marching of troops into murderous fire from defenders 
protected by breastworks or trenches. 
       Offensive ideas also shaped more recent American 
military thinking.  SAC's General Curtis LeMay explained in 
1956 that "it is one of the principles of war that the 
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advantage lies with the offense," and warned that "history is 
full of examples of people who put all their blue chips on 
defense and they are no longer with us."191  A top U.S. Army 
Air Corps commander declared in 1946: "I don't like the word 
'defense.'"192  A U.S. naval officer warned in 1981 against a 
"defensive mind-set" that would "hamstring us in the event of 
[war].  We must subdue this defensive attitude."193  The Joint 
Chiefs of Staff repeatedly chafed at the defensive strictures 
of America's Cold War containment policy, at one point 
declaring that American basic national security policy "should 
reflect ... offensive spirit, if the United States is to 
survive and prosper."194  In the early Cold War the Air Force 
focused so exclusively on preparing an offensive against the 
Soviet Union, and thereby so neglected its own defenses, that 
it left itself vulnerable to Soviet surprise attack.195  
Opinion polls taken in the 1990s showed that U.S. military 
officers were markedly more offense-minded than U.S. 
civilians.196 
       In Europe and elsewhere we see the same pattern.  
Before 1914 European officers argued that "one cannot defeat 
the enemy without attacking,"197 and claimed that all 
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victorious armies have "an unmitigated offensive spirit."198  
In France General Joseph Joffre declared that defensive 
strategy ideas should be "rejected as contrary to the very 
nature of war."199  Colonel Loyzeaux de Grandmaison taught that 
almost any offensive plan was better than a defensive plan, 
and that any who criticized the army's offensive concepts 
thereby showed their moral weakness and unfitness for high 
command.200  Other French officers proclaimed it necessary that 
"the concept of the offensive penetrate the soul of our 
nation"; that "defeat is inevitable as soon as the hope of 
conquering ceases to exist"; and that "there is only one way 
of defending ourselves--to attack as soon as we are ready."201 
       British officers declared that "the defensive is never 
an acceptable role to the Briton, and he makes little or no 
study of it," and that the offensive "will win as sure as 
there is a sun in the heavens."202  Italian officers were 
dogmatic believers in the offensive and embraced offensive 
tactics that cost Italy dearly in the war.203  Samuel 
Williamson writes that Austrian Chief of Staff General Franz 
Conrad von Hötzendorff had a "fanatical faith in the 
offensive" and a corresponding belief in a short war.204  
German officers also celebrated offensive ideas.  A 1902 
German General Staff study explained that Germany could defend 
itself "only when we take the offensive."205  A German officer 
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claimed in 1914 that "the superiority of offensive warfare 
under modern conditions is greater than formerly," despite the 
appearance of new technology--such as the machine gun--that 
strongly favored the defense.206  Even after the war Germany's 
General Erich von Ludendorff wrongly claimed that "the 
offensive makes less demands on the men and gives no higher 
losses" than the defensive.207  Martin Kitchen notes an 
"obsession in the [Wilhelmine German] army with attack at all 
costs."208 
       Most other militaries have also embraced offensive 
ideas.  Before World War II imperial Japanese military cadets 
were taught that offense was the best tactic under all 
circumstances.209  The modern Soviet military embraced highly 
offensive tactical and strategic doctrines, and Soviet 
officers extolled the virtues of the offensive in strident 
terms: one officer claimed that "the offensive has 
incontestible advantages over the defense"; another warned 
that "defensive strategy should be decisively rejected as 
being extremely dangerous to the country."210  Many modern 
militaries, including those of China, Israel, Britain, the 
United States, and the Soviet Union, teach that the 
offensive--but not the defensive--is a prime principle of 
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war.211   
       Officers have often argued that international conflicts 
are eventually decided by final victory or defeat.  The 
preamble to a pre-World War I U.S. naval war plan explained 
that "the three great competitors for the world's trade are 
now the United States, Great Britain, and Germany.  Following 
the teachings of all history, two of these three must in the 
sequel be practically subordinated to the third."212 
       This faith in the offense fuels dreams of easy conquest 
and fear of sudden defeat.  In the military image of war, 
attacking armies penetrate far into enemy territory and 
quickly smash their opponents.  One side or the other soon 
overruns the opponent's capital.  Before World War I leading 
officers almost unanimously believed that a general war would 
end in a matter of months.213  A German general thought the 
German army could sweep through Europe like a bus full of 
tourists, forecasting that "in two weeks we shall defeat 
France, then we shall turn round, defeat Russia and then we 
shall march to the Balkans and establish order there."214  A 
British general thought "the Germans would be crushed in no 
time."215  In the U.S., General Story feared that Japan could 
quickly conquer the American West Coast in 1908, and General 
Greene thought Germany and Britain could conquer the U.S. from 
the East in 1915 (as quoted above).  And in 1918 British 
generals had frightening visions of German forces sweeping 
clear to the north-west frontier of India, and deployed troops 
in the Caucuses and TransCaspia as a precaution.216 
       In the 1930's Japanese officers boasted they could 
defeat China in three months.217  And before Germany's 1941 
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invasion of the Soviet Union, the German army commander 
thought German forces could beat the Soviets in four weeks.218 
       In 1940 British and French Air Force officers argued 
for a Franco-British air strike against Soviet oil fields at 
Baku, British officers claiming that a single 177-plane attack 
would induce "sooner or later the total collapse of the war 
potential of the U.S.S.R.," and so deny this war potential to 
the Germans.219  Likewise Sir John Slessor wrongly claimed that 
strategic bombing "on anything approaching an intensive scale 
... even at irregular intervals for any length of time" could 
conquer states by destroying their war industry.220 
       In 1964 General Thomas Power wrote of Castro's Cuba--a 
country with two-thirds the land area of South Vietnam--that 
the U.S. "could have eradicated this festering cancer in our 
hemisphere without risk and without working up a sweat,"221 and 
claimed that the U.S. could have conquered both Russia and 
China in the early 1950's: "we could have crushed Communism at 
its root, despite the vast inroads it had made all over the 
world."222  General Douglas MacArthur claimed the U.S. could 
have destroyed Chinese military power during the Korean War, 
"probably for all time.  My plan was a cinch."223 
       This bias toward offense creates an unwillingness to 
take defense seriously.  Thus British entrenchments during 
World War I were primitive because British officers preferred 
to invest in preparing attacks.  The British officer's Field 
Service Pocket Book enjoined its readers: "The choice of a 
[defensive] position and its preparation must be made with a 
view to economizing the power expended on defense in order 
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that the power of offense may be increased."224  A British 
soldier later explained why British trenches were shabby:225 
   The whole conduct of our trench warfare seemed to be based 
on the concept that we, the British, were not stopping in 
the trenches for long, but were tarrying awhile on the way 
to Berlin and that very soon we would be chasing Jerry 
across the country.  The result, in the long term, meant 
that we lived a mean and impoverished sort of existence in 
lousy scratch holes. 
       Ingredients of offensive illusions.  The illusion of 
easy conquest is has several ingredients.  Militaries misread 
new technology, seeing offensive implications even in 
defensive military innovations.  Before World War I French 
officers argued that the machine gun and other improvements in 
firearms strengthened the attacker, not the defender.  
Marshall Ferdinand Foch explained this bizarre conclusion: 
"Any improvement of firearms is ultimately bound to add 
strength to the offensive. ... Nothing is easier than to give 
a mathematical demonstration of that truth."226  If two 
thousand troops attacked one thousand troops, each firing 
their rifles once a minute, he explained, the "balance in 
favor of the attack" would be one thousand bullets per minute. 
 But if troops on both sides could fire ten times a minute, 
the balance favoring the attackers would increase to ten 
thousand bullets per minute, giving the attack a larger 
advantage.227  What he missed, of course, was that both 
attacker and defender would have to take cover against such a 
storm of steel, making advance by the attacker impossible.228 
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       U.S. military officers likewise overlooked the power 
that nuclear weapons confer on defenders.229  The U.S. Air 
Force Association argued that nuclear weapons make conquest 
easier: "Given modern weapons ... one nation can paralyze and 
conquer other nations without undue risk to itself."230  
General Twining wrote that "there is no question that a 
nuclear war can be 'won,' as wars of the past have been 
won--by the side which is best prepared to fight it."231  And 
many Soviet military officers argued that nuclear weapons 
strengthen the offense. 
       Officers allege--without evidence--that attackers have 
better morale than defenders.  U.S. Civil War general Henry 
Halleck wrote that "offensive war ... adds to the moral 
courage of its own army, while it disheartens its 
opponents."232  Germany's Colonel Colmar von der Goltz wrote in 
1887 that "all impediments in his way will awaken in the 
assailant new ideas and new vigor, will sharpen his mind, and 
enhance his love of enterprise. ... Happy the belligerent who 
is by fate destined to play the part of the assailant!"233  
French Captain Georges Gilbert contended in 1890 that "the 
offensive doubles the energy of the troops."234  Later Marshall 
Foch glorified "the moral superiority" generated by fighting 
on the offense.235 
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       When technology weighs heavily against the offense, 
soldiers use mystical psychological arguments to explain why 
conquest is still possible.  What might be called the "psychic 
shock" theory of victory--holding that armies or regimes will 
collapse under the psychic shock of attack--is trotted out.  
Before 1914 Russian officers claimed the Austro-Hungarian 
regime would disintegrate under Russian attack: "On the 
occasion of the first great defeats all this multinational and 
artificially united mass ought to disintegrate."236  In the 
1920s Italy's General Giulio Douhet, a founding airpower 
theorist, thought bombing would "stampede the population into 
panic."237  (In fact bombing has repeatedly stampeded 
populations into supporting their wartime governments.)238  In 
1939 France's General Maurice Gamelin thought a French attack 
on the Soviet Union in the Black Sea area perhaps could "lead 
to the collapse of the entire Soviet system."239  In 1940 
Germany's General Alfred Jodl thought German attacks on 
Britain would "break the will of the people to resist, and 
thereby force its government to capitulate."240  And in 1941 
Japan's Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto hoped that American morale 
would "sink to the extent that it could not be recovered" if 
he destroyed the U.S. main fleet at Pearl Harbor.241  (In fact 
the Pearl Harbor attack greatly energized the American public 
for war.) 
       Conquest is made to appear easier by developing a 
contemptuous image of the enemy--a cowardly bully, dangerous 
but prone to panic and collapse when its homeland is invaded. 
 John Stoessinger notes that General MacArthur's false 
optimism in 1950 was based partly on "a curious contempt for 
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the Chinese soldier."242  Robert Butow observes that Japanese 
military planners' hopes for success against the U.S. were 
based partly on "the mind-over-matter factor"--the Japanese 
believed they had better spirit than the Americans, who they 
thought were ridden by personal selfishness and an absence of 
patriotism.243 
       Finally, some soldiers equate tactical success with 
strategic victory and exaggerate the permanence of military 
triumph.  Before World War I Germany's General Bernhardi wrote 
that Germany should "finally get rid" of the French threat, as 
if this were possible.244  "France must be so completely 
crushed that she can never again come cross our path,"245 he 
wrote, and "must be annihilated once and for all as a great 
power."246  By expanding, Bernhardi thought, Germany could "so 
amply [secure] our position in Europe that it can never again 
be questioned."247  Colonel von der Goltz spoke of the next war 
as "a final struggle" for Germany, as if German victory would 
being international politics to an end.248  Germany's General 
Wilhelm Groener believed a German victory would give Germany a 
hundred years of peace.249  More recently General Twining wrote 
that the United States could have eliminated Russian power 
"for generations to come" by attacking in the late 1940s.250  
In 1967 Israel's General Ariel Sharon thought the Arabs so 
weakened by the 1967 war that he would be too old to fight in 
the next war.  But Arab power soon recovered and Sharon 
quickly served in two more Arab-Israeli wars.251 
       Militaries tend to assume that enemies are beaten when 
their main force units are defeated, and confuse the winning 
                         
    242  John G. Stoessinger, Nations at Dawn: China, Russia, 
and America, 6th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994): 51. 
    243  Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War: 418. 
    244  Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War: 105. 
    245  Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War: 106. 
    246  Quoted in Tuchman, Guns of August: 26. 
    247  Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War: 81. 
    248  Quoted in Michael Howard, Studies in War and Peace 
(New York: Viking Press, 1959): 103. 
    249  Snyder, Ideology of the Offensive: 149. 
    250  Twining, Neither Liberty Nor Safety: 19. 
    251  Nadav Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1978): 257. 
 
 
 65 
of battles with winning the war.252  Thus von der Goltz spoke 
of "the object of all war, the crushing of the enemy's 
forces."253  They underestimate the risk that others will form 
countervailing coalitions to limit or reverse their conquests. 
 They overlook guerilla resistance.  They underestimate the 
harm to national morale caused by empire-building, and the 
harm to army morale caused by counterinsurgency and police 
operations in conquered territories. 
       Motives for military offense-mindedness.  Militaries 
exaggerate the ease of conquest because this strengthens the 
case for larger and more offensive military forces. 
       States buy larger forces when conquest seems easy 
because they feel less secure.  Arguments that national 
defenses are too weak and more forces are needed are more 
persuasive.  Conversely, if conquest seems difficult civilians 
will feel safe enough to give priority to other claims on the 
budget.  Force also seems more useful when conquest seems 
easy; it can conquer empires and destroy opponents, so having 
more force seems more expedient. 
       States buy more offensive forces when conquest seems 
easy because offensive strategies promise more success.  The 
claim that "we should buy what works, and offense works best" 
carries more weight.  Conversely, if conquest seems difficult 
civilians will more likely choose defensive postures and 
doctrines on grounds that defense works best. 
       Militaries prefer offensive military postures and 
doctrines for three reasons.  First, offensive strategies 
enhance military autonomy.254  A defensive strategy envisions a 
war settled by compromise.  Force is used to support a 
diplomatic solution.  Hence political considerations must 
shape military operations; hence politicians must have a say 
in military decisions.  In contrast an offensive strategy 
requires little civilian control of wartime operations, since 
the purpose of fighting is to attain victory.  Civilians take 
the reins only after victory is won.  In the meantime the 
military enjoys autonomy. 
       Second, offensive doctrines let militaries impose their 
programs on the enemy, rather than vice versa.255  The attacker 
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structures the battle, while the defender reacts.  Hence the 
attacker can follow its organizational routines while the 
defender must improvise.  This satisfies the organization's 
desire to minimize uncertainty--even if, as in this case, the 
organization now must perform more difficult tasks.  Thus U.S. 
General William Tecumseh Sherman declared: "Instead of being 
on the defensive, I would [prefer to] be on the offensive; 
instead of guessing at what he means to do, he would have to 
guess at my plans."256  General Foch argued for offensive 
action because "we must always seek to create events, not 
merely to suffer them"; and General Joffre favored the 
offensive to "prevent our maneuver from being dominated from 
the start by the enemy's decision."257  Israel's General 
Avigdor Kahalani warned that "the defensive is very dangerous" 
because "we, the defender, are forced to react to all the 
actions that the attacker makes."258  General Curtis LeMay 
explained:259 
   The offensive doctrine gives the power of initiative to the 
attacker.  He can plan and carry out his campaign with 
precision.  The defender is never sure which way to turn 
until it may be too late.  His reaction is fraught with 
indecision. 
       Third, an offensive strategy enhances the size and 
wealth of the military.260  Offense is a demanding mission.  An 
offensive strategy gives the military a greater claim on 
national resources, once civilian leaders endorse it, because 
offense is usually harder than defense.  This means that 
militaries must dissemble when they estimate the offense-
defense balance: offense is easy if national strategy is being 
debated, but hard when budgeting forces for an agreed 
offensive strategy.  (In fact militaries often claim that 
offense is easy in the abstract, while complaining that they 
have too little to carry out specific assigned offensive 
missions.) 
       Evidence from World War I.  The "cult of the offensive" 
before World War I illustrates the strength of the military 
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bias toward the offensive.261  During the several decades 
before 1914 Europeans widely came to believe that the offense 
had the advantage in war, and the next war would quickly end 
with a decisive attack.  This illusion was heavily promoted by 
European militaries, who purveyed it widely to European 
leaders and publics.  Moreover, these militaries were engaged 
in a deliberate deception, not an honest mistake.  We know 
this because the case they made for the offense shows telltale 
signs of willful bias. 
       Long before the war, abundant evidence showed that new 
technology--accurate rapid-fire rifles, machine guns, barbed 
wire, railroads, and developed entrenchments--vastly enhanced 
the strength of the defense.  European militaries saw this 
evidence and grasped its meaning.  In private they puzzled how 
to overcome these enormous new defensive obstacles.  But in 
public they obscured these new realities and glorified the 
offensive.  Tortured logic was used to support claims that the 
offense remained strong.  Far-fetched notions of the alleged 
morale advantages of operating on the offense were invented.  
Militaries also ridiculed or silenced writers who criticized 
offensive ideas.  In short, what militaries knew to be the 
situation, and the image of war they conveyed to civilians, 
were starkly different.  Militaries saw the new power of the 
defense but they still insisted on offensive doctrines and 
strategies, and they assured European leaders and publics that 
the offensive was supreme. 
       In Britain, for instance, many officers saw the growing 
power of the defense, and military insiders discussed possible 
tactical responses, but this never shook their devotion to the 
offense.  Tim Travers shows that British officers widely 
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perceived the rising strength of the defense during 1900-1914 
but refused to face up to its tactical implications.262  Their 
writing on offensive versus defensive tactics reveals "an army 
fighting a rear-guard action against the full implications of 
firepower."263  They accepted that new weapons were far more 
lethal but dismissed the conclusion that strategy must change 
accordingly. 
       British officers made tortured arguments to evade the 
defensive lessons of the Boer War.  These arguments included 
claims that conditions in South Africa were unique and would 
not be repeated, and professions that new technology would not 
change the essential principles of war.264 
       The German and French militaries twisted or ignored 
historical evidence showing the greater power of the defense, 
purged advocates of the defense, and publicly endorsed 
offensive strategies that they privately knew faced enormous 
obstacles.  Germany's General Schlieffen dogmatically endorsed 
his highly offensive war plan--envisioning sequential attacks 
on Belgium, France, and Russia--in policy discussions, but his 
private papers reveal that he doubted it would succeed.  It 
was, he wrote, "an enterprise for which we are too weak."265 
       In France Marshall Foch issued a remarkable dictum: 
"All improvements in firearms add to the strength of an 
offensive intelligently planned because the attackers, 
choosing their ground, can concentrate on it so much greater a 
volume of fire."266  He supported his case by deceptive use of 
history, e.g., twisting the record of the Battle of Wagram 
(1809) to show the resilient power of infantry on the offense, 
although it did not show this.  He also advanced the strange 
claim that attacking lifts the morale of attackers.267 
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       Lessons from the U.S. Civil War were resolutely ignored 
by European officers.  The European militaries sent many 
observers to study the American war, but they learned 
selectively.  Lee's losses at Malvern Hill, Pickett's 
disastrous charge at Gettysburg, and the massacres of Union 
attackers at Fredericksburg and Cold Harbor showed the 
enormous power of entrenched troops equipped with modern small 
arms.  Yet, as Jay Luvaas details, while these European 
observers duly noted and applied new American developments in 
military technology, they ignored the war's defensive tactical 
lessons.  "Most of those who studied the Civil War after 1870 
were in reality seeking to confirm accepted principles," so 
that "the tactical lessons of the Civil War went unheeded."268 
 Luvaas explains:269 
   There were ample observers and military visitors in America 
at all times; scarcely a campaign in Virginia and Maryland 
did not come under the scrutiny of some foreign officer 
accompanying one or the other of the armies. ... The 
necessary information was available--it simply was ignored 
or misinterpreted. 
       Prussian officers were aware of the Civil War, but no 
high-ranking Prussian officers thought it held important 
military lessons.270  French military writings all but ignored 
the Civil War during the decade before 1914, and French 
official doctrine was untouched by tactical lessons from the 
American war.271 
       Fatuous arguments were offered to explain why the 
lessons of the Civil War did not apply to Europe.  Moltke the 
elder claimed the conditions of the war were too different 
from Europe: the American war was only "two armed mobs chasing 
each other around the country, from which nothing could be 
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learned."272  Others argued that entrenchments were chiefly of 
value to raw troops and militia, not to the well-trained 
armies of Europe.273  Still others, such as General Bernhardi, 
cited examples from the war that appeared to show the power of 
the offense (the battle of Chattanooga), while ignoring much 
more numerous counter-examples (Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, 
Cold Harbor, Nashville, Malvern Hill, and Second Bull Run).274 
       More candidly, another German officer rejected the 
demonstrated value of entrenchments because this lesson led 
logically to a defensive strategy: "A carry-over of this 
method of fighting [to Europe] ... would imply a want of 
appreciation for the purposes of every battle--the overthrow 
of the enemy."275  In short, the Civil War was to be dismissed 
not because its lessons were false, but because a defensive 
strategy was unacceptable, so evidence supporting it should be 
ignored. 
       After the Civil War scores of battles in Europe and 
Asia taught the same lessons again.  During the Russo-Turkish 
war of 1877 entrenched Turkish troops inflicted huge losses on 
Russian attackers at Plevna.  The several major battles of the 
Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5 saw the first use of the machine 
gun, and showed again that attackers could not carry 
entrenchments without great superiority and heavy losses.  In 
the Boer War, Boer defenders held far larger attacking British 
forces at bay. 
       But European militaries would not learn defensive 
lessons from these episodes.  Instead they twisted history to 
obscure the weakness of the offensive.  The Russian failure at 
Plevna was blamed on insufficient Russian elan,276 and the 
facts of the Russo-Japanese war were tortured to salvage the 
overall doctrine of the offensive.  The official French 
observers reported the Russo-Japanese war as "a resounding 
confirmation of the superiority of the offensive ... and of 
the powerlessness of the defensive."277 
       The real lessons of even the 1870 Franco-Prussian war 
were essentially defensive.  The French lost the war by 
attacking too often, which put them on the tactical offensive, 
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although they stood on the strategic defensive.278  Yet later 
French military officers concealed this lesson simply by 
claiming that the losing French tactics had in fact been 
defensive!279  As Jack Snyder notes, "preferred doctrine ruled 
history, not vice versa."280 
       The lessons of the Boer war were obscured by twisting 
the facts to suit the argument.  Before the war, as Ivan Bloch 
notes, the British military dismissed evidence favoring the 
defense derived from maneuvers on grounds that maneuvers 
differed from the actual battlefield; defenders in real battle 
would panic and fire wildly, they argued, so attackers would 
suffer fewer casualties than they lost in maneuvers.  Then the 
Boer war disproved this, so the army argued that Boer soldiers 
were exceptional marksmen and European defenders would never 
shoot as well.281  British military leaders also claimed that 
British junior officers in South Africa had lacked the true 
spirit of the offensive and been too cautious.282  A French 
analyst claimed that the Boers had done well against the 
numerically superior British because of their superior morale, 
but lost in the end because they adopted a defensive 
strategy.283  Another argued that Boer rifle fire was so 
effective because Boers had better eyesight than Europeans, 
and South African air was exceptionally clear.284 
       Authorities were misquoted as advocates of the offense, 
                         
    278  The French military historian Jean Colin later wrote 
that the 1870 campaign showed that "well-chosen and well-
arranged defensive positions, even when very weakly held, 
could not be carried."  Quoted in Liddell Hart, "French 
Military Ideas Before the First War": 141. 
    279  Liddell Hart, "French Military Ideas Before the First 
World War": 140-41.  Thus Marshall Joffre later wrote that the 
war of 1870 "amply proved that a passive defense is the 
forerunner of defeat." Joseph Joffre, The Personal Memoirs of 
Joffre, Field Marshall of the French Army, 2 vols. (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1932): 1:26. 
    280  Snyder, Ideology of the Offensive: 65. 
    281  Jean De Bloch, "Militarism in Politics and Lord 
Roberts' Army Reorganization Scheme," Contemporary Review, No. 
432 (December 1901): 761-793 at 787-88. 
    282  Travers, "Technology, Tactics and Morale": 273-74. 
    283  Georges Gilbert, summarized in Snyder, Ideology of the 
Offensive: 78. 
    284  Frédéric Culmann, summarized in Snyder, Ideology of 
the Offensive: 79. 
 
 
 72 
whether or not they were.  In his classic On War, Carl von 
Clausewitz emphasized the greater power of the defense and the 
need to limit war, but in death he was reinvented as an 
apostle of the offense and total war.  Dallas Irvine 
paraphrased a French war college professor's bogus version of 
Clausewitz:285 
   War must be an utmost exertion of force, and especially of 
moral force, for the complete destruction of the enemy's 
armed resistance, and to this end the offensive should be 
undertaken whenever practicable and in its simplest, most 
direct, and most vigorous form. 
       Other officers simply ignored Clausewitz to focus 
instead on the shallower but more offense-minded Antoine 
Jomini.  For example, no Russian translation of On War 
appeared until 1899-1900, sixty-seven years after its German 
publication.286 
       Military analysts cooked the books in favor of the 
offense by biasing their exercises and analyses.  In Germany 
General Schlieffen made a string of dubious assumptions to 
conceal his plan's weakness.  Specifically, he assumed that 
Britain would give no effective aid to France; that Germany 
could rapidly shift forces from one front to the other but 
France could not; that German infantry could sustain an 
unrealistic rate of advance; and that Germany would have 5-7 
more corps available to invade France than were actually 
available in 1914.287  He made no mention of machine guns, 
barbed wire entanglements, or the effect of demolitions of 
rail bridges by retreating French on German logistics.288  And 
he failed to examine his ability to supply troops on his all-
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important right wing.289  Faced with a world where his plan 
would fail, he invented by assumption a world where it would 
work. 
       German planners gave little consideration to defensive 
alternatives to the Schlieffen plan after about 1894; and when 
such alternatives were evaluated, they were held to a tougher 
standard than was the Schlieffen plan.290  In Russia analysts 
likewise downplayed logistics calculations in their estimates, 
a ploy that hid weaknesses in their planned offensive against 
Germany.291 
       Data from intelligence or exercises was ignored when it 
raised doubts about preferred offensive doctrines.  Top French 
officers dismissed intelligence estimates that undermined 
arguments for an early French offensive.292  Russian officers 
likewise discounted captured German war games that foretold 
Germany's smashing of Russia's offensive in East Prussia.293 
       Instead of examining hard evidence pro-offense officers 
referred to mystical morale concepts.  Germany's Colonel Von 
der Goltz argued that being on the offense gave the attacker 
"new ideas and new vigor," and France's Captain Georges 
Gilbert claimed that being on the offensive "doubles the 
energy of the troops," as quoted above.  General Foch argued 
that sheer will would propel the attacker to victory: "A 
battle won is a battle we will not acknowledge to be lost."294 
 Britain's General Ian Hamilton wrote that "war is essentially 
the triumph ... not of a line of men entrenched behind wire 
entanglements and fireswept zones over men exposing themselves 
in the open, but of one will over another weaker will."295  
       The 1907 British Cavalry Training Manual preposterously 
claimed that intangible moral factors would sweep the mounted 
cavalry to victory against the rifle and machine gun: "The 
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rifle, effective as it is, cannot replace the effect produced 
by the speed of the horse, the magnetism of the charge, and 
the terror of cold steel."296  The French emphasized the 
superiority of the bayonet over rifle fire: the 1884 field 
regulations were inspired partly by the Russian tactician 
Dragomirov, famous for the maxim: "The bullet is a stupid 
fellow, but the bayonet is a true friend."297 
       The fallacies in these arguments were pointed out by 
contemporary critics.  The most famous of these was Ivan 
Bloch, a Warsaw banker and author of The Future of War, a work 
that massively documented the power of the defense in modern 
war, and other works on military matters.298  In 1901 Bloch 
noted that "entrenchments impart a power of resistance to the 
defence out of all seeming proportion to numbers," and 
described "the master-fact of the new situation, that defence 
is become more formidable than ever before."  In the future, 
he wrote, "the attack cannot hope to strike a decisive blow or 
inflict a telling defeat."299  He correctly explained that 
quick-firing rifles, smokeless powder, earthworks, and barbed 
wire entanglements gave the defense its new superiority.300  He 
also foresaw that militaries would ignore these new 
conditions, and that their addiction to offense seems 
"destined to crop up one day in the form of dearly-bought 
object lessons like that of Plevna."301  If the militaries 
applied their offensive theories in a war among the great 
powers, he feared, the "disaster and misery [would] ... 
stagger humanity.  And to this we shall surely come unless the 
people themselves ... take the matter into their own hands."302 
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       Bloch even forecast in 1900 the opening slaughter of 
attacking French and German armies in August and September 
1914 and the long and bloody siege that followed on the 
Western front:303 
   At first there will be increased slaughter--increased 
slaughter on so terrible a scale as to render it 
impossible to get troops to push the battle to a decisive 
issue.  They will try to, thinking that they are fighting 
under the old conditions, and they will learn such a 
lesson that they will abandon the attempt for ever.  Then, 
instead of a war fought out to the bitter end in a series 
of decisive battles, we shall have as a substitute a long 
period of continually increasing strain upon the resources 
of the combatants.  The war, instead of being a 
hand-to-hand contest in which the combatants measure their 
physical and moral superiority, will become a kind of 
stalemate, in which neither army being able to get at the 
other, both armies will be maintained in opposition to 
each other, threatening each other, but never being able 
to deliver a final and decisive attack. 
       Today historians describe Bloch as a brilliant prophet, 
but Bloch himself believed his arguments were obvious.  His 
writing conveys cold fury that his message even needed saying, 
and bitter anger at the military for what he believed was 
their deliberately twisting and suppressing of evidence he 
presented.  Bloch reiterated that evidence demonstrating the 
dominance of the defense was abundant and unambiguous, and 
that arguments to the contrary were patently frivolous and 
ridiculous.  He made no claim for originality, noting that 
other experts agreed with his analysis.  He found it 
"astonishing" that people "who had facts, figures and 
reasoning powers" could so badly misconstrue the situation.  
The military experts were "blind" and "incurably deaf."304  The 
military forecasts of the Boer war had been "so utterly wrong 
as to stagger belief," and leaders showed "slipshod 
happy-go-lucky indifference" in continuing to respect such 
incompetent advice.305 
       In the military Bloch saw a "stubbornness which ... set 
itself to twist and distort the facts."306  He wrote that the 
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military belief in the strength of the offense grew from "an 
irrational faith in worthless tradition" and a "blameworthy 
shortsightedness and naive faith in fetishes."307  He wondered 
how the military retained public esteem after being wrong so 
often, noting bitterly in 1901, after the British disasters in 
the Boer War, that the military profession is308 
   implicitly trusted. ... But events now show that they erred, 
and not within the reasonable bounds which circumscribe 
error in all walks of life, but so wildly that the mere 
man in the street could not well have been so far astray 
as they.  Again and again they repeat their prophecies, 
which are soon afterward belied by the vicissitudes of 
war.  Then they turn to actual facts, and misconstrue them 
in the same wholesale manner. 
And Bloch accused the military of knowing they were wrong, 
referring to opponents "who understand very well" the general 
defensive lessons of the Boer War while ascribing its results 
to unique local conditions.309 
       European militaries were familiar with Bloch's 
arguments.  His work was widely published and translated into 
Russian, German, French and English.  In 1901 he lectured to 
British officers at the Royal United Services Institute.310  
Britain's Colonel F.N. Maude credited Bloch with a wide 
reputation, even blaming him for contributing to the reverses 
in South Africa by undermining the offensive spirit of the 
army--Maude thought the timidity of British troops at Modder 
River and Paarde Kraal was "entirely traceable to the vicious 
teachings of that misguided school whose fallacies find their 
highest expression in the works of M. Bloch."311 
       Moreover, Bloch was not alone in his forecast.  Around 
Europe maverick officers warned that the advertised power of 
the offense was an illusion.  Thus the weakness of the offense 
was more politically than technically undiscoverable.  The 
power of the defense was not recognized because European 
militaries preferred not to recognize it. 
       In Britain Major C.E. Calwell, Major B.F.S. 
Baden-Powell, Lieutenant-Colonel J.E. Edmonds and Colonel G.F. 
Henderson all recognized the increased power of the defense 
and suggested defensive innovations.  In 1903 Baden-Powell 
wrote that machine guns would make some places "practically 
impassible" and thought long lines of defense might be 
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impossible to turn.312  Edmonds wrote that the Wilderness 
campaign in Northern Virginia in 1864 forecast the shape of 
wars to come, predicting "the universal use of the spade both 
in the attack and the defense, making the war one of what may 
be called siege operations in the field."313  Henderson wrote 
that "good infantry, sufficiently covered ... is, if unshaken 
by artillery and attacked in front alone, absolutely 
invincible."314  General E.A. Altham noted in 1914 that the 
crossing of the fire zone led to "punishing losses" and was a 
"stupendous task," perhaps "the most formidable enterprise 
known to war."315 
       In France Colonel Montaigne predicted a siege war 
decided by exhaustion.316  J. Colin, Captain L. Auger, Emile 
Mayer and P. Poullet discussed the growing fire effect of arms 
and the power of entrenchments.317  Lieutenant-Colonel Grouard 
warned that an offensive strategy for France was "absolutely 
impracticable," and General Victor Michel proposed a fairly 
defensive strategy to address a German invasion.318  In 1895 
Auger noted that the growing firepower of modern weapons made 
all movement in the open increasingly costly, and predicted a 
war of continuous trench lines.  He concluded that the 
defensive was "the true mode of combat of the future," indeed 
"the only one possible in the presence of the probable 
hetatomb of future war."  A future war would certainly 
"approximate to a certain extent the [Civil War] battles 
fought before Richmond, and ... the attack, instead of placing 
all confidence in numbers and elan, will have to proceed with 
slowness, gain ground gradually, and consolidate each step."319 
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 In 1902 Mayer predicted the 1914-18 trench war in France, 
including even the "race to the sea"--the rush to extend the 
trench lines from the Alps to the English Channel once the 
first attacks failed.  He imagined inviolable fronts320 
   putting face to face two human walls, almost in contact, 
only separated by the depth of danger, and this double 
wall will remain almost inert, in spite of the will of 
either party to advance. ... Unable to succeed in front, 
one of these lines will try to outwing the other.  The 
latter, in its turn, will prolong its front, and it will 
be a competition about who will be able to reach farthest. 
... The line will stop at a point d'appui, at a sea, at 
mountains, at the frontier of a neutral nation.  From this 
moment on, there will be so to speak no reason for the 
fight to stop, at least for one side.  Exterior 
circumstances (the entrance of the United States into the 
European War!) will bring the end of the purely defensive 
war of the future. 
       In Germany General von Janson wrote that the "assailant 
can only hope to succeed if the defenders lose their heads."321 
 Colonel F. von Meerheimb wrote in 1868 that "the combination 
of modern long-ranged, rapid firing weapons and prepared 
positions give the defensive such a great superiority that 
frontal attacks will succeed only on the rarest occasion."322  
A civilian, Karl Bleibtreu, wrote of the U.S. Civil War that 
"Lee's trenches, running for many miles along the river banks 
or through the forests, anticipate ... what can well make its 
appearance in the war of the future."323  Baron von 
Freytag-Loringhoven wrote that entrenched infantry on the 
defensive, however outnumbered and exhausted, would always 
prevail.324 
       These critics of the offense were ignored, punished or 
slandered by their offense-minded parent organizations.  Bloch 
was treated with great derision by Europe's militaries.  
Grouard and Michel were pushed out of the French army.325  
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Mayer was passed over for promotion and retired.326  His 
articles were refused by the French military journals,327 and 
he was forced to hide behind pseudonyms and in foreign 
publications.328  His clairvoyant prediction of trench warfare 
and the "race to the sea" was published not in France but in 
the Swiss Military Review.329 
       Even as they dismissed their critics, advocates of the 
offense searched for new innovations to redress the growing 
power of the defense.  In Britain some officers advanced the 
"suffer casualties" thesis--British troops should simply be 
instilled with greater willingness to die, so they would 
sustain the much greater casualties that would be suffered in 
the offense.330  Other British officers thought more 
enthusiastic soldiers would neutralize the machine gun.  Sir 
Ian Hamilton, for instance, accepted Bloch's arguments on the 
effectiveness of the magazine rifle and smokeless powder, but 
thought these weapons could be overcome by soldiers with more 
initiative, enthusiasm, and esprit de corps.331 
       This search for answers reveals that militaries knew 
that the offense faced large new obstacles.  Yet all the while 
officers across Europe were telling publics how easily others 
might overrun their country, and how they could forestall this 
by overrunning others.  The problem was not that militaries 
misunderstood the situation; rather, they did not want others 
to understand it. 
       In short, Europe's military establishments sold 
illusions of easy conquest and scarce security to Europe's 
leaders and publics despite abundant evidence to the contrary. 
 They sustained their arguments by ignoring or suppressing 
contrary evidence, while acknowledging in private the strength 
of this evidence.  Together this evidence suggests that 
Europe's militaries had a strong bias for the offense. 
       Two counter-arguments could be advanced against this 
claim; both hold that offensive strategies made sense for 
Europe's powers in 1914.  First, some contend that the 
European powers could best defend exposed allies by attacking 
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their allies' attackers, and this required offensive forces 
and strategies.332  If so, the offensive doctrines and force 
postures of 1914 stemmed not from the biases of European 
militaries, but from the harsh realities of power politics. 
       There is some truth in this argument, but far too 
little to explain the offensive extremes of 1914.  Russia did 
need some offensive capability to save its French ally from 
the nightmare of fighting the entire German army alone, and to 
help its Serbian ally survive Austro-Hungarian attack; hence 
Russia was prudent to prepare offensives against Germany and 
Austria.  And France needed the option to attack Germany to 
assist its Russian ally in the unlikely event that Germany 
concentrated its forces first against Russia, not France.  But 
France was immensely unwise to exercise that option when 
Germany concentrated against France in 1914; instead, France 
should have entrenched its frontier and awaited the German 
attack.333  And Germany was immensely unwise to embrace 
Schlieffen's extravagant offensive scheme, with its successive 
attacks on Belgium, France, and Russia.  Instead, Germany 
would have been far better served by a defensive strategy in 
the west against Belgium and France, and a defensive or 
limited offensive strategy in the east, following the elder 
Moltke's earlier plan.334  Such a strategy would have fully 
protected Germany's Austro-Hungarian ally.  It also would have 
let Germany avoid war with Belgium and Britain; it would have 
reduced French popular support for war against Germany by 
leaving French soil unattacked; and, by keeping Britain out of 
the war, it would have greatly reduced the risk of American 
entry against Germany.  Finally, turning to Britain, it had no 
political need for an offensive army; its main goal was the 
defense of France, which a defensive strategy could achieve. 
       A second counter-argument holds that the offense was 
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fairly strong in 1914, so powers that chose offensive 
strategies were placing a prudent bet; offense had a fair 
chance of success.  If so, once again, the offensives of 1914 
were a pragmatic response to circumstance, not an outgrowth of 
the biases of European militaries.  The offensives of 1914 
failed but the decision to adopt them was not inexpedient.335 
       In this view the strength of the offense in 1914 is 
revealed by the near-success of the Schlieffen plan, which 
allegedly failed only through the blunders and bad luck of 
German commanders.  In fact, however, the Schlieffen plan was 
very unlikely scheme that only approached success because of 
French mistakes.  The French war plan nicely served Germany's 
needs.  France concentrated its forces on the Franco-German 
border while leaving its northern frontier with Belgium only 
lightly defended; then France hurled its armies into Germany. 
 This allowed German forces to sweep around France's northern 
flank, drive into France, and nearly encircle the French 
armies attacking Germany.  Had France instead chosen to stand 
on the defensive its forces surely would have smashed the 
attacking German armies at or near the French border.  Thus 
the folly of Germany's offensive was masked by the equal folly 
of France's offensive.336 
       In short, the French and German offensives of 1914 were 
strategic blunders of the first order.  They cannot be 
explained as required or invited by circumstance.  An 
explanation that points to the biases of the French and German 
militaries better fits the evidence. 
       Evidence from the Interwar Era.  Officers in the 
British Royal Air Force, the United States air force, the 
British Royal Navy, the imperial Japanese Navy, and the German 
army continued to exalt the power of the offensive and to 
favor offensive strategies after World War I.  Once again 
these arguments for the offense were much overdone, and often 
rested on twisted arguments and analysis--a telltale sign of 
willful bias. 
       The British Royal Air Force dogmatically pursued long-
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range bombing and neglected air defenses throughout the 
interwar years.337  It insisted that bomber forces now could 
quickly level great cities in a matter of days, and claimed 
that states could even be quickly conquered by a "knock out 
blow" from the air.  The only defense against such attack, the 
RAF argued, was to be ready to launch even more devastating 
bombing raids against the attacker.338  Hence all effort should 
go toward building up Britain's offensive long-range bomber 
force.   
       Air defenses against enemy bomber attack were a 
pointless waste of money, the RAF claimed, because they would 
surely fail to stop the enemy bombers.  This view led the RAF 
to resist the development of British defenses, since this 
would divert resources that would otherwise go toward building 
bombers.  Amazingly, as late as May 1940 the Air Staff tried 
to shut down the production lines building Spitfires and 
Hurricanes, the mainstay fighters that won the Battle of 
Britain.339  Had the Air Staff gotten its way, that battle 
could well have been lost and with it the war.  Fortunately, 
British civilian leaders and maverick RAF officer Hugh Dowding 
together build a strong air defense despite RAF resistance.340 
       The RAF's claims for the power of bombing came to be 
widely believed by British leaders and the British public.  
This crippled British diplomacy in the late 1930s, since many 
British leaders shrank from risking a war that they feared 
                         
    337  On the RAF favoring offensive over defensive missions 
see Posen, Sources of Military Doctine: 142-43, 160-61, 167-
69, 171-75; Tami Davis Biddle, "British and American 
Approaches to Strategic Bombing: Their Origins and 
Implementation in the World War II Combined Bomber Offensive," 
Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1 (March 1995): 91-
144 at at 92-105, 127; and Allan D. English, "The RAF Staff 
College and the Evolution of British Strategic Bombing Policy, 
1922-1929," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3 
(September 1993): 408-431 at 409-25. 
    338  Murray, "British and German Air Doctrine": 46-47. 
    339  Murray, "British and German Air Doctrine": 48.  In the 
same spirit the RAF Chief of Staff, Lord Hugh Trenchard, 
declared in 1939 that Britain should not limit the development 
of its offensive air power by "devoting too large a proportion 
of the country's resources to defence work, like air raid 
shelters and fighter aircraft."  Quoted in Elizabeth Kier, 
Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between 
the Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997): 99. 
    340  On the origins of British air defense see Posen, 
Sources of Military Doctrine: 142-43, 161, 166-67, 169, 171-
73. 
 
 
 83 
would destroy much of Britain.341 
       Yet the RAF's claims were grossly mistaken, as the 
actualities of World War II revealed.  Before the war RAF 
intelligence estimated that bombs would cause 50 casualties 
per ton dropped, while in fact they caused seven casualties 
per ton;342 it grossly exaggerated the capacity of bombers to 
defend themselves against fighters; and it misconstrued the 
effect of bombing on civilian morale, suggesting that 
civilians would crack under attack, while the effect was quite 
the opposite, rousing civilian resistance.343  The Air Staff 
estimated that aerial bombing would cause 150,000 casualties 
in London in a week, while in fact there were less than 
147,000 casualties in the whole United Kingdom in the whole 
war.344 
       How could the RAF be so wrong?  The answer is simple: 
it had almost no empirical basis for its claims.  The RAF 
based its doctrine on strategic bombing from 1918 forward, yet 
it conducted no bomb effectiveness tests until 1937.345  It 
also failed to reanalyze results from World War I, and it 
failed to dispatch an observer to the Spanish Civil War.346  As 
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a result, as the British World War II Official History put it, 
the RAF had "no clear idea what was operationally possible, 
what targets could be reached, how far they could be hit, what 
would happen to them if they were hit, or what were likely to 
be the casualties incurred."347 
       The few empirical studies done by the RAF used 
assumptions and evidence chosen to favor the case for 
strategic bombing.  For instance, the Air Staff estimated bomb 
damage by treating the sixteen most devastating German air 
raids of World War I as representative--in fact British 
casualties in these raids were triple the British average for 
the war--and extrapolating from this sample.348  Sir John 
Slessor, Chief of Plans in the Air Ministry, admitted after 
the war that the Air Staff's belief in the bomber before the 
war had been "intuitive ... a matter of faith," not 
analysis.349 
       Thus Britain's interwar devotion to bombers, and the 
British public's extreme fear of bomber attack, were fueled by 
deceptive self-serving information purveyed by the RAF.  The 
RAF sought an offensive long-range strategic bombing mission, 
in part to keep itself in the offense business.350  To sell 
this mission the RAF stressed the capabilities of the long 
range bomber.  The ineffectiveness of strategic bombing was 
discoverable, but the RAF was unwilling to discover it.  Given 
the early wartime performance of the RAF bomber force this 
unwillingness is understandable: the British Official History 
recounts that when the war began, "Bomber Command was 
incapable of inflicting anything but insignificant damage on 
the enemy."351 
       The interwar U.S. Army Air Corps took a more reasonable 
view of long-range bombing than the RAF, but it, too, 
exaggerated the power of bombing while under-investing in 
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fighter aircraft.  Not until 1944 did the Corps embrace the 
mission--tainted with an aura of defense--of fighter escort 
for its bombers.352  In the meanwhile U.S. bomber crews 
suffered heavy losses that long-range fighter escorts could 
have prevented. 
       The interwar imperial Japanese Navy over-indulged in 
offensive forces and tactics while neglecting crucial 
defensive missions.  Most important, the Navy utterly failed 
to prepare to defend Japan's commercial sea lanes, despite 
World War I experience that vividly showed the devastating 
effects of submarine attack on unprotected commercial 
shipping.353  The Navy first gave serious attention to 
defending shipping from submarines, including the 
establishment of convoys, only in late 1943.354  Other tasks 
that smacked of defense, such as equipping warships with anti-
aircraft guns or designing rugged aircraft that could take 
punishment, were also neglected.355  Instead, all effort went 
toward building up the offensive power of great main battle 
fleets. 
       Japan's false faith in the offensive arose in part 
because Japan's navy suppressed evidence showing it would 
fail.  For example, the Navy doctored war games that it 
conducted in early 1942 to show that the offensive operations 
it planned for the coming summer would succeed.  The game's 
umpire judged that Japan's aircraft carrier force had taken 
nine hits and lost two carriers during the simulated attack on 
Midway Island.  The director of the game, Rear Admiral Ugaki, 
arbitrarily reduced the number of hits to three and the number 
of sunken carriers to one, and then allowed even the sunken 
carrier to play in the game's next engagement.356 
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       The British Royal Navy made similar mistakes.  During 
World War I it saw convoy tactics as essentially defensive, 
and therefore to be rejected.  Instead, the Navy committed its 
ships to actively hunting German submarines along shipping 
lanes--a futile tactic that bore very meager results.357  
Ruinous British shipping losses resulted.  Only pressure from 
civilian leaders finally brought the Navy to adopt a convoy 
system.  British shipping losses then plummeted, from around 
fifteen percent to around one percent per sailing.358 
       This experience should have taught the Royal Navy the 
price of offensive excess and defensive neglect.  But the Navy 
rejected the lesson.  In fact it did not even bother to record 
its World War I experience, compiling no comprehensive history 
of the 1914-18 anti-submarine campaign after the war.359  And 
so, again in World War II, the Royal Navy obstinately insisted 
that German submarines could best be killed by actively 
hunting them with groups of destroyers and aircraft 
carriers.360  It did adopt convoy tactics faster than in 1914, 
but it also again devoted large resources to aggressively 
searching out German U-boats.  And once again these hunting 
tactics were a failure.  John Costello and Terry Hughes note 
that "these tactics suited the Navy's desire for aggressive 
action, but they flew in the face of First War experience."361 
 A strategy of forcing German submarines to attack escorted 
convoys promised far better results.  Many allied merchant 
seamen died because it was not pursued. 
       The U.S. Navy likewise resisted the introduction of 
convoys in U.S. coastal waters in the first months after Pearl 
Harbor, despite the vast evidence by then showing their value. 
 As a result German submarines ran wild in what historian 
Samuel Eliot Morrison sardonically called a "merry massacre" 
of U.S. east coast merchant shipping.362  With seldom more than 
a dozen submarines on station, Germany sank a spectacular 216 
allied ships off the U.S. coast in the first quarter of 
1942.363 
       The German army of the 1920s embraced an offensive 
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strategy that made little more sense than the earlier 
Schlieffen plan.  The German Chief of Staff, Hans von Seeckt, 
planned an attack brusquée: Germany would hurl its always-
ready army on its opponent before the opponent could mobilize 
its forces.364  What this overlooked was that the Versailles 
agreement imposed deep cuts on German forces, leaving Germany 
incapable of effective offensive action.  Seekt's plan was a 
template offensive response and a recipe for disaster. 
       Two interwar military organizations stood aside from 
this offensive parade: the British and French armies.  Both 
embraced largely defensive doctrines during most of the 
interwar period.  These cases show that the offense-mindedness 
of militaries is not universal.  However, they do not 
undermine the claim that professional militaries have a strong 
bias toward the offensive.  Rather, they show that under some 
conditions, which are not very common, this bias can wane or 
disappear. 
       The French Army adopted a defensive approach in large 
part because the French parliament imposed a one-year term of 
service for conscripts on the Army in 1928.365  The Army felt, 
probably with good reason,366 that a one-year service term left 
too little time to prepare troops for training-intensive 
offensive missions.  Much of the army would always be in 
training, leaving an inadequate ready force.  Instead, the 
Army judged that a less training-intensive defensive strategy 
was necessary. 
       What does the French Army case indicate?  It shows that 
militaries may adopt the defensive if they are denied the kind 
of personnel that the offensive requires.  However, this is 
not a common problem.  The French one-year service term was 
unique in the interwar years.  Moreover, French conscripts 
served only 18 months during 1923-28,367 yet the Army stuck 
with offense during this period.  This suggests that only 
severe restrictions on personnel could dissuade the army from 
an offensive approach.  The milder but still significant 
limitations of an 18-month service term were not enough. 
       We should also notice that the French Army's operations 
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during the 1940 Battle of France had a daring offensive 
element.  Specifically, as the battle began the French Army 
tried to move all the way across Belgium and into the 
Netherlands, to forestall the German seizure of northern 
Belgium.368  This bold offensive maneuver--which was undertaken 
against civilian opposition, and which brought disaster by 
exposing French forces to encirclement--shows that top French 
officers were still attached to offensive ideas. 
       The interwar British Army rested content with a 
defensive approach partly because it could not enhance its 
budget by embracing offense.  In the context of the 1930s an 
offensive strategy required the development of armored and 
mechanized forces.  However, armored forces would only be 
useful in a campaign on the European continent, and the 
British government had firmly decided against a continental 
commitment.  Hence Army entreaties to civilians to support a 
new mechanized army surely would have been rejected, with no 
budget gain for the army.  Militaries can usually gain budget 
growth by selling and adopting offense; the British army is a 
special case to the contrary. 
       The British Army also resisted offense to preserve its 
organizational essence.  The 1930s Army retained a regimental 
system, an amateur culture, and constabulary roots.  An 
offensive strategy meant armored and mechanized forces; and 
mechanization meant massive change that would threaten these 
quaint attributes.  Offense seldom threatens the essence of 
military organizations, but in this instance it did. 
       In summary, the interwar years again find militaries 
exalting the offensive.  As in the years before 1914 
militaries had little basis for their claims, which they 
advanced despite the availability of strong evidence to the 
contrary.  This again suggests that a willful bias for the 
offense was at work. 
       The French and British armies show that the offensive 
reflexes of militaries have their limits.  When budgets are 
not enhanced by offense, and when organizational essence is 
threatened by offense, militaries may well adopt the 
defensive. 
       These conditions are fairly uncommon, however, and 
military offense-mindedness is correspondingly common.  Most 
great power militaries have a strong proclivity to exalt the 
offensive and to embrace offensive doctrines and postures.  A 
range of diverse militaries from a range of states have 
repeatedly demonstrated this proclivity.  Elizabeth Kier's 
claim that "military organizations do not inherently prefer 
offensive doctrines" is refuted by abundant evidence of 
pervasive military offense-mindedness.369 
                         
    368  On French operations in 1940 see Posen, Sources of 
Military Doctrine: 86-94. 
    369  Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France 
 
 
 89 
       D. "It Pays To Strike First."  States seldom gain much 
advantage  
by being the first side to mobilize or attack.370  They may 
shift the balance of forces in their favor, but seldom by very 
much.  Morover, any such gains are usually outweighed by the 
harm of arousing enemy publics and alienating neutral 
governments.  Israel's 1967 first strike against Egypt, which 
proved a strategic success, was quite unusual.  Even the 
tactically successful 1941 surprise attacks by Germany on the 
Soviet Union and by Japan on the United States failed to 
deliver strategic victory, and Japan's attack was politically 
self-ruinous.  In fact, history yields no clear instance of a 
war whose outcome would have been reversed had the other side 
struck first. 
       Yet militaries often claim that moving first pays large 
rewards.  Military thought warns against losing the initiative 
and asserts the need to strike the first blow.  As Winston 
Churchill summarized, military leaders are "prone to emphasize 
the importance of forestalling the enemy in the beginning of 
great wars, and statesmen are at their mercy on such 
questions."371  Before World War I a French officer declared 
that "the victorious army will be the one which ... will first 
jump at the throat of the enemy";372 another stated that "an 
army which cannot be ready first cannot think of directing the 
war, but only of suffering it."373  A leading French general 
proposed in 1912 that France forestall Germany by entering 
Belgium first in case of war, a folly that surely would have 
alienated Britain, Belgium, and the United States from 
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France.374  (French civilian leaders wisely demurred.)  
Germany's General Bernhardi declared that Germany must "act on 
the offensive and strike the first blow,"375 and the German 
Chief of Staff, Hellmuth von Moltke the younger, warned that 
"we must forestall our principle adversary" if war seemed 
likely.376  British naval officers imagined a huge first-strike 
advantage at sea, the Directorate of Naval intelligence 
warning in 1905 that the advantage of the initiative was 
"enormous" and that "if history is any guide, a sudden and 
dramatic outbreak would be distinctive of future wars, 
especially the war at sea."377  Admiral Sir John Fisher argued 
that "suddenness is now the characteristic feature of sea 
fighting."378  But naval operations in World War I actually 
revealed no first-move advantage. 
       After World War I, Italy's Giulio Douhet claimed that 
the "principle of the value of surprise attack is obvious,"379 
and argued that the initiative in aerial wars of the future 
would be decisive.  After World War II, a U.S. officer pointed 
to "the tremendous advantages that accrue to the man who 
starts a war."380  Another faulted deterrent doctrines because 
they required "yielding of the initiative to the adversary."381 
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       Militaries can see advantage for the initiative even in 
new technologies that reduce it.  Thus many U.S. military 
officers wrongly argued that nuclear weapons increase the 
advantage of striking first382--e.g., Colonel Jack D. Nicholas: 
"Conceding the initiative in the thermonuclear age is an 
enormous concession.  At best it could produce a critical 
military situation for us.  At worst it carries the seeds of a 
national disaster."383  General Thomas Power likewise argued 
that "the nation which takes the initiative in nuclear war 
automatically assumes military superiority," and that "modern 
weapons have placed a fear greater premium on the initiative 
than ever before."384  General Lemay opposed American Cold War 
plans to defend Europe with conventional forces, since this 
strategy might deprive the United States of the nuclear 
initiative.385  The military leaders of the U.S. Strategic Air 
Command were oriented toward a preemptive doctrine from the 
mid-1950s forward.386 
       Four factors feed this military bias.  First, the side 
striking first imposes its programs on the side under attack. 
 Hence militaries can reduce uncertainty and ease planning by 
hitting first.  They much prefer the initiative for this 
reason.  Thus General Power explained why he sought the 
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initiative:387 
   [If we strike first] I know exactly how much of this force I 
can generate, how many airplanes I would have, how many 
bombs would go in those airplanes, what targets they would 
hit, and about what damage they would do, and this is a 
tremendous capability under those conditions. 
       But if you reverse this procedure and pass the 
initiative to the Soviets, then we can only be in a 
retaliatory role, and our capability will be greatly 
reduced. 
Likewise Moshe Dayan argued that if Israel struck first "the 
course of the campaign would then follow our dictates. ... The 
enemy would be forced to fight according to the moves we 
made."388 
       A first strike is often harder to execute than to 
defend against; but planning a first strike is harder than 
planning the defense against it.  Faced with this conundrum 
militaries choose ease of planning over ease of operations, 
and so choose the initiative.  This bias then creeps into 
military estimates of the advantage of the initiative. 
       Second, militaries often underrate the political 
backlash that a first strike provokes because judging that 
backlash is not their job.  A surprise attack often enrages 
and arouses the opponent's public.  It has aggressive 
overtones that arouse neutral states against the first-
striker.  But militaries may overlook these problems because 
political issues are not their responsibility.389 
       Third, the advantage of the initiative seems larger 
when conquest seems easier, since more territority can then be 
conquered by exploiting the material advantage that a first 
move provides.390  Hence the tendency of militaries to 
exaggerate the ease of conquest makes them exaggerate the 
advantage of the initiative. 
       Fourth, militaries exaggerate others' hostility, as 
noted above.  This inflates the apparent risk of standing pat 
and the benefits of forestalling others by making it seem more 
likely that others will strike first. 
       E. "Windows Are Large, Preventive War Pays Off."  
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Militaries often exaggerate the size of windows of opportunity 
and vulnerability, and overstate the advantage offered by 
launching preventive war.391  Five causes contribute.  First, 
militaries warn of national military decline to bolster the 
case for more military spending.  "Our adversaries are growing 
stronger, while we grow weaker--we must do more!"  Current 
trends are bad, they claim, putting the nation in later danger 
unless national defenses are strengthened now.  Thus in 1895 
Germany's Admiral Tirpitz warned that "Germany will, in the 
coming century, rapidly drop from her position as a great 
power unless we begin to develop our maritime interests 
energetically," and in 1979 U.S. Admiral Thomas Hayward warned 
that "the Soviets will attain a first-strike capability 
[against the U.S.] in the next few years."392  Such calls are 
intended as an argument for more military spending, but also 
work as an argument for preventive war. 
       Second, militaries underestimate the political backlash 
that states trigger by starting preventive wars because, as 
noted above, judging political issues is not a military 
responsibility.393  As a result militaries exaggerate the size 
of windows.   
       Third, windows seem larger when conquest seems easier, 
since more territority can then be conquered by striking at a 
time of relative material advantage.394  Hence the tendency of 
militaries to exaggerate the ease of conquest also makes them 
exaggerate the size of windows.  Thus General Moltke favored 
preventive war in 1914 partly because he thought German 
relative decline would leave Germany open to conquest.  State 
Secretary Jagow summarized Moltke's views: "Russia will have 
completed her armaments in 2 to 3 years.  The military 
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superiority of our enemies would be so great then that he did 
not know how we might cope with them. ... There was no 
alternative to waging a preventive war" while Germany could 
still succeed.395  To Moltke German decline meant more than 
disadvantage: it meant German ruin because he also believed 
that conquest was easy.396 
       Fourth, preventive war makes more sense if states 
exaggerate others hostility, since this narrows the choice 
toward "war now or war later" by making peace seem temporary. 
 Hence the military tendency to exaggerate others' hostility 
supports arguments for preventive war.  Thus Moltke explained 
in 1912: "I believe a war to be unavoidable and: the sooner 
the better."397  Italy's Chief of Staff, General Pollio, 
endorsed preventive war by the same logic: "Is it not more 
logical for the Triplice to ... start a war, which will be 
forced upon us, in our own good time?"398  U.S. Air Force Major 
General Orvil Anderson endorsed preventive war against the 
Soviet Union in 1950: "Since we're at war, damn it, I don't 
advocate preventive war.  I advocate the shedding of 
illusions. ... [C]ivilization demands that we act.  Give me 
the order to do it and I can break up Russia's five A-bomb 
nests in a week."399 
       Fifth, militaries often exaggerate the permanence of 
victory (as noted above) and the cumulativity of international 
resources (as noted below).  This leads them to exaggerate the 
advantage they gain if they win a preventive war, and the size 
of the loss if a war foregone today is lost later.400 
       As a result militaries often lobby for preventive war. 
 Calls for preventive war were a constant chorus from the 
military in Prussia/Germany after the mid-19th century.  
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Helmuth von Moltke the elder, Prussia/Germany's long-serving 
chief of staff (1857-1887), proposed preventive war against 
France in 1859, while France was diverted in Italy;401 against 
Austria, France and Bavaria in 1862, shortly before Bismarck 
arranged an important Austro-Prussian alliance;402 and against 
France in 1867403 and 1870.404  He believed Bismarck's policy of 
restraint in 1867 eventually "will cost us many lives."405  In 
the 1870's he favored another preventive war against France,406 
and advised preventive war against Russia in 1887.407 
       Other German officers gave similar advice.  Martin 
Kitchen notes that after 1870 the wish for preventive war with 
France was "an article of faith" among many German officers.408 
 Every major German military figure also endorsed Moltke's 
notion of preventive war on Russia in 1887.409  Generals 
Waldersee and Loe noted that Germany had just equipped its 
army with new magazine rifles, a new howitzer and better 
artillery shells; a golden moment for war with Russia had 
arrived.410  (Instead Bismarck wisely arranged a German-Russian 
alliance.)  In 1889, while serving as Chief of the General 
Staff, Waldersee opined that Bismarck's skill and reputation 
should be used until the German military advantage was at 
maximum; then the decisive war with France and Russia should 
be deliberately begun.411 
       British naval officers, joined by others, favored a 
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preventive strike against France in 1898 on grounds that war 
was inevitable and could be won more easily sooner than 
later.412  We can only wonder how such a blunder would have 
changed history.  Later Admiral John Fisher talked up 
preventive war against Germany, seeing a "golden opportunity 
for fighting the Germans in alliance with the French" in 
1905.413  How he planned to defeat Germany without the Russian 
and American help that proved vital in 1914-18 is unclear. 
       These episodes sometimes offered the strange sight of 
two militaries advising preventive war against one another.  
Both Prussian and French generals proposed preventive war 
against one another in 1867 and 1870.414  Both Russian and 
Austrian military officers proposed preventive war against one 
another in 1887.415  Both British and German officers saw 
windows of opportunity in 1905, as noted above.  Both sides 
cannot have a window at the same time, so at least one side 
was prey to illusions. 
       Leading German generals often favored preventive war in 
the decades before 1914.  General Bernhardi advised it 
constantly from 1890 onward, explaining in 1890 that Germany 
should "bring about war" at a propitious moment, and declaring 
in 1912 that the government had a "moral duty" to "begin the 
struggle while the prospects of success ... are still 
tolerably favorable."416  In 1905 General Schlieffen argued 
that Germany was "surrounded by an enormous coalition" but 
could still "escape from the noose" by striking before Russia 
recovered from the 1904-5 Russo-Japanese War.  "It will be 
years before Russia can take action; now we can settle the 
account with [France]," he explained.417  Moltke the younger 
thought the moment for war was suitable in 1909, "better than 
it is likely to be in a few years."418  He advised war again in 
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1912, "the sooner the better."419 
       The German general staff saw another window in 1914, 
and greeted the June 28 murder of Austrian Archduke at 
Sarajevo as a golden opportunity for preventive war.  Moltke 
declared that "we shall never hit it again so well as we do 
now with France's and Russia's expansion of their armies 
incomplete,"420 and he warned that "to wait any longer meant a 
diminishing of our chances."421  The leading German military 
periodical, Militärische Rundschau, argued in July that 
Germany faced eventual war under worse conditions if it stood 
pat, so "let us provoke [war] at once."422  The Saxon Military 
Plenipotentiary reported from Berlin on July 3 that "the 
military are pressing for war now while Russia is not yet 
ready."423  The German general staff was reportedly in high 
spirits when the war broke out: "Chances better than in two or 
three years hence and the General Staff is reported to be 
confidently awaiting events."424  After war began Bethmann 
Hollweg, the German Chancellor, admitted candidly that "Lord 
yes, in a certain sense it was a preventive war," driven by 
"the military's claim: today war is still possible without 
defeat, but not in two years!"425 
       In Austria the Chief of Staff, Franz Conrad von 
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Hötzendorff, repeatedly proposed preventive war against 
Austria's neighbors--against Italy (then formally an Austrian 
ally) in 1903-04, 1907 and 1911; against Serbia in 1909; and 
against Russia and Serbia in 1913 and 1914.426  Speaking of the 
Austrian military he wrote: "What country today could 
permanently maintain so formidable a power?  Hence create it 
only for a time--and use it!"427 
       Did German officers see real windows or apparitions in 
1914?  Germany then had the largest and fastest-growing 
economy in Europe.  Germany's share of world manufacturing 
production rose by some 74 percent--climbing from 8.5 percent 
to 14.8 percent of the world total--between 1880 and 1913.  
Russia's share of world manufacturing grew by a far smaller 
eight percent during this period, to just 8.2 percent of the 
world total.  The British and French shares of world 
manufacturing declined, to 13.6 percent and 6.1 percent of the 
world total, respectively.  (Austria-Hungary's share was 
unchanged at 4.4 percent.)  By 1913 Germany led all other 
European states in manufacturing production, and worldwide it 
trailed only the United States.428  Clearly, European power-
trends were running charply in Germany's favor, and were 
poising it to gain preponderance in Europe if it simply sat 
tight.  Only by sparking a ruinous war that ranged most other 
powers against it could Germany forestall its own rise to 
dominance.  Thus the windows that German officers saw were 
extraordinary illusions. 
       Japanese officers saw a window--also largely illusory--
against the United States in the early 1940s.  Vice Chief of 
the Navy General Staff KondÇ Nobutake argued in late 1940 for 
war against the United States the next year, when Japan's 
relative power would peak.429  Chief of the Navy General Staff 
Admiral Nagano Osami favored war in July 1941, arguing that 
"there is now a chance of achieving victory" against the 
United States, but "the chances will diminish as time goes 
on."430  Prime Minister Hideki Tojo, an army general, called 
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for war in November 1941 by warning that otherwise "two years 
from now we will have no petroleum for military use.  Ships 
will stop moving. ... I fear that we would become a third-
class nation after two or three years if we just sat tight."431 
 But Japan's disastrous defeat by the United States showed 
that its window was far too small to justify war. 
       German officers endorsed Hitler's disastrous 1941 
invasion of the Soviet Union because they saw German power 
waning relative to Soviet power.  General Alfred Jodl termed 
the attack "a purely preventive war."432  General Erich von 
Manstein explained that war was "the only way out.  The Soviet 
was a great potential threat even in 1940, and it would have 
become an active one as soon as we tied down our forces 
against Britain."433 
       In the 1940s and 1950s a good number of U.S. military 
officers called for preventive nuclear war with Russia and 
China.  General Orvil Anderson, commander of the Air War 
College, posed the choice in 1950: "Which is the greater 
immorality--preventive war as a means to keep the U.S.S.R. 
from becoming a nuclear power; or, to allow a totalitarian 
dictatorial system to develop a means whereby the free world 
could be intimidated, blackmailed, and possibly destroyed?"434 
 Around this time Generals George Kenney, Nathan Twining, 
Curtis LeMay, Thomas White, and Hoyt Vandenberg--each a major 
U.S. military figure--privately expressed sympathy for 
preventive war, and official Air Force manuals expressed 
preventive war ideas.435  Twining also wrote a stark memorandum 
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to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1953 on "The Coming National 
Crisis," arguing that the United States should "support such 
decisions as might involve general war" to forestall the 
Soviet Union from developing its nuclear forces.436  His advice 
was echoed by an Air Force strategy study, "Project Control," 
that advised preventive war against the U.S.S.R. if 
necessary,437 and by a 1954 Joint Chiefs of Staff study group 
report that favored "deliberately precipitating war with the 
USSR in the near future--that is before the USSR could achieve 
a large enough thermo-nuclear capability to be a real menace 
to the Continental U.S."438 
       At the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis, on the day the 
Russians agreed to withdraw their missiles from Cuba, General 
LeMay suggested that the United States attack Soviet forces in 
Cuba the next day in any case, presumably to exploit the 
fleeting nuclear superiority that the United States then 
enjoyed.  Another JCS member felt that the U.S. had somehow 
been betrayed by the crisis settlement.  A third once told 
Robert Kennedy that he believed in a preventive attack against 
the Soviet Union.439 
       General Twining maintained his vocal support for 
preventive war into the 1960s, arguing in 1966 that the U.S. 
should "face up to the Red Chinese leadership at places and 
times which are most favorable to the destiny of free men."440 
 General Power also implied an approval of preventive war 
during this period.441   
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       In contrast, civilians have been far more skeptical of 
preventive war in most countries.  German Chancellor Otto von 
Bismarck (1862-1890) waged two wars with preventive aspects--
in 1866 and 1870--but he later resisted military calls for 
more preventive wars, remarking dismissively that such wars 
resembled "a suicide for fear of death."442  Before 1914 
Germany's Kaiser Wilhelm II and Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg 
were markedly more skeptical of preventive war ideas than were 
German military officers.443  In 1940-41 Imperial Japanese 
civilians doubted Japanese military arguments for preventive 
war against the United States.444  During the early Cold War 
U.S. President Harry Truman ruled out preventive war in public 
statements and disciplined officers who publicly proposed 
it.445  President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John 
Foster Dulles, also firmly rejected preventive war.  
Contemplating the possibility of a successful preventive 
strike on the Soviet Union, Eisenhower wondered: "Gain such a 
victory and what to do you do with it?"446  He also quipped 
that "the only thing worse than losing a global war was 
winning one."447  After hearing arguments for preventive war in 
1954 Dulles declared that "no man should arrogate to himself 
the power to decide that the future of mankind would benefit 
by an action entailing the killing of tens of millions of 
people."448  
       Preventive wars are expedient if the window is large 
and the likelihood of war is great.  Some unfought preventive 
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wars would have made sense--for example, by the western powers 
against Hitler in 1936, or by the Soviet Union against Germany 
in May, 1940.  But windows are fewer than they seem, and 
preventive wars are fought far more often than they should be. 
 Militaries are prime causes of this error. 
       F. "Empires are Valuable, Resources are Cumulative."  
Modern empires have more often been millstones than assets.  
Some conquered industrial regions conferred power on their 
conquerors, but non-industrial empires absorbed vast resources 
while providing little strategic reward.  Domino effects were 
often forecast but seldom observed, so control over a given 
domino was seldom necessary to keep other dominos from 
falling.  Nor did modern empires provide economic or social 
rewards to their owners.  Their economic costs have far 
outweight their economic benefits, and empires have never 
served their alleged social functions, such as absorbing 
surplus population.  Thus the alleged value of modern empires 
has been largely fictional. 
       Yet militaries have often claimed that empires have 
great strategic, economic, or social value.  They argued that 
national safety or national prosperity required holding 
current spheres of influence or gaining an even wider sphere. 
 They did this by overstating the intrinsic value of 
territories and by advancing domino arguments connecting the 
defense of one territory to another. 
       These ideas serve military organizational needs.  If 
empire provides security or prosperity, forces to seize or 
protect empire become necessary.  Force requirements expand 
accordingly, allowing the military to lay claim to more 
resources. 
       Militaries also exaggerate the value of empire because 
they focus on the narrow military value of seizing a resource 
while overlooking the political backlash that a seizure might 
create. 
       Militaries are not the only actors that exaggerate the 
value of empire.  Businesses with foreign operations may want 
to persuade their home governments to intervene on their 
behalf against difficult foreign host governments; this is 
easier if their government exaggerates the host country's 
strategically importance.  Third World governments often want 
to persuade great power patrons to help them against domestic 
or foreign enemies; this is easier if their patron exaggerates 
their strategic or economic value.  Officials who run empires 
want to persuade their governments to keep them employed.  All 
these groups have an interest in exaggerating the value of 
empire.  But militaries are a key part of the chorus that 
makes this argument. 
       Military writers most often stress the national 
security value of empire.  The German Navy League's journal 
warned in 1900 that without colonies Germany would "suffocate 
in her small territory or else will be crushed by the great 
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world powers."449  Shortly before World War I Germany's General 
Bernhardi likewise argued that "acquiring colonies ... is for 
Germany a question of life or death."450  Germany could secure 
itself only by expanding: "we shall not be able to maintain 
our present position ... if we are contented to restrict 
ourselves to our present sphere of power, while the 
surrounding countries are busily extending their dominions."451 
 Standing pat would bring ruin: "there can be no standing 
still, no being satisfied for us, but only progress or 
retrogression."452   
      Before World War II Imperial Japan's military leaders 
vastly exaggerated the security that wider empire could 
provide.  First they believed that expansion into China would 
give Japan strategic independence.  When China proved hard to 
subdue they thought the key to China's defeat lay in wider 
conquests on China's periphery, in Indochina and farther 
afield in Southeast Asia.453  In fact each expansionist move 
created more problems than it solved.  Expansion undertaken to 
make Japan self-suffient and secure left it less self-
sufficient and far less secure than before. 
       American naval strategist Captain A.T. Mahan warned in 
1890 that the U.S. was handicapped by lack of colonies,454 and 
he later forecast that the global balance of power could be 
tilted by the outcome of a coming struggle for control of 
China between "Slavonic" and "Teutonic" peoples.455 
       During the Cold War General Douglas MacArthur often 
declared that the defense of each part of Asia required the 
defense of every other, and that the loss of a single 
territory--such as Taiwan or South Korea--would cause the loss 
of all Asia and perhaps the whole Pacific.  Regarding Korea, 
he argued that "we win here or we lose everything."456  
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Regarding Taiwan, he warned that the U.S. would be forced back 
to "the west coast of the continental United States" if the 
mainland Communists took the island.  "Our whole defensive 
position in the Far East" would be lost, including the 
Philippines and Japan.457  The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 
voiced similar views, warning from 1948 onward that communist 
victory in the Chinese civil war would cause "very grave long-
range jeopardy to our national security interests"--surely an 
overstatement given China's then-tiny war potential.458  In 
contrast top U.S. civilians, including George Marshall, Dean 
Acheson, and George Kennan, judged China a marginal prize in 
the Cold War.459 
       U.S. civilians and military officers differed sharply 
on the validity of the domino theory.  Polls from the later 
Cold War showed that U.S. officers were markedly more inclined 
to endorse it than civilian elites.460 
       Military writings also stress the social and economic 
benefits of empire.  We see inflated claims that new land is 
needed to supply food and to absorb surplus products and 
population.  Bernhardi declared that Germany is "compelled to 
obtain space for our increasing population and markets for our 
growing industries."461  A state without colonies risks 
"diminishing production and lessened profits," and may lose 
its population to emigration.462  Hence "an intensive colonial 
policy is for us especially an absolute necessity."463  
Likewise the younger Moltke argued that "Germany [must] pursue 
offensive objectives.  Its ever-growing population points 
inexorably to colonial expansion."464  And Admiral Georg von 
Müller wrote that "surplus population" required colonies for 
settlement.465 
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       France's General Ferdinand Foch voiced Marxist-style 
claims that capitalist states had to conquer new markets to 
absorb their surplus production.  Modern states need 
"commercial outlets to an industrial system which produces 
more than it can sell, and therefore is constantly smothered 
by competition."466  Force was the answer: "new markets are 
opened by force of arms."467 
       In the United States Captain Mahan argued the colonies 
would provide an imperial power "a new outlet for what it had 
to sell, a new sphere for its shipping, more employment for 
its people, more comfort and wealth for itself"468--claims that 
later American imperial experience disproved.  Yet Japanese 
militarists later repeated many of the same ideas, claiming, 
for example, that "Japan's overpopulation grows more serious 
every year.  Where should we find an outlet for these 
millions? ... The only remaining area is the Asian 
mainland."469 
       Not all officers express these views.  Many can be 
found doubting the value of empire.  Thus the U.S. Joint 
Chiefs of Staff argued in 1947 that Korea had little strategic 
value, and argued in 1954 that Indochina was "devoid of 
decisive military objecives."470  But these are minority views. 
 Dominant modern miltary opinion has overstated the value of 
empire. 
       G. "War Is Cheap" and "War is Beneficial": The 
Trivialization and Glorification of War.  Militaries tend to 
downplay the costs and risks of using force.  They 
underestimate the casualties and physical damage that war will 
cause.  They downplay the tendency of war to get out of 
control, and of opponents to counter-escalate.  They 
underestimate the propensity of war to outlast its purposes, 
and to be difficult to end.  Thus Ivan Bloch noted the danger 
of military advisors who "beguile themselves and the people 
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into belittling the risks, the hindrances, the cost in men and 
money of a 'little expedition' or a big war."471 
       Militaries also understate the pychological horrors of 
combat and the cruelty war inflicts on enemies and innocents. 
 Instead militaries tend to glorify and glamorize war: war is 
heroic, healthy, uplifting, beneficial. 
       The trivialization of war serves five organizational 
purposes for the military.  First, if war seems cheap it seems 
more likely.  This bolsters arguments for larger military 
forces and budgets.  If war is unthinkably bad other states 
will shink from starting it, but if war is tolerable a 
decision for war is more plausible, so the danger of war is 
more real.  Militaries trivialize war to emphasize its 
plausibility. 
       Second, force seems more useful when its use appears 
less risky and costly.  If the use of force is relatively 
sanitary, governments can use force more safely to solve 
national problems, so buying more force makes more sense.  The 
military also enjoys more prestige, since it fills a bigger 
social role, by claiming to help solve more problems.  Thus 
Jack Snyder notes a military interest in preserving the image 
of "war as a beneficial social institution."  This interest is 
protected by obscuring the costs of war: if "wars are expected 
to be long, costly, and indecisive, they are likely to be seen 
as aberrations that need to be stamped out--hardly a climate 
of opinion conducive to the prestige and health of military 
institutions."472 
       Third, conquest seems easy and security seems scarce 
when the costs of war seem low.  If war is very destructive, 
both sides can inflict more harm than the other can accept.  
War then becomes a contest of pain-taking, won by the side 
that will suffer the most.  Defenders have the advantage in 
such a world, because they prize their own country more highly 
than an aggressor prizes it, hence they can outlast the 
aggressor in a pain-taking contest.473  These realities incline 
militaries--whose organizational interest lies in stressing 
the ease of conquest and the scarcity of security--to 
understate the costs of war. 
       Fourth, when civilian leaders expect a costly war they 
worry more about how to prevent or control war.  This leads 
the civilians to intrude more in military matters, which in 
turn threatens the autonomy of the military.  Instead 
militaries want civilian leaders who worry more about how to 
win war than how to prevent or control war.  Such leaders will 
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give the military more resources and less oversight.  
Militaries can induce this attitude in civilians by 
trivializing the destruction of war and the risk of 
escalation. 
       Fifth, militaries discuss war in a manner consistent 
with their need to recruit personnel.  They lose their appeal 
as an employer if they emphasize the nasty side of military 
life. 
       Militaries do not always understate the destructiveness 
of war.  If such understatement clashes with their 
organizational interests militaries will do the opposite.  In 
the 1930s the RAF and other air forces exaggerated the 
destructiveness of aerial bombardment, to advance the growth 
and autonomy of their services and to glorify the offensive 
generally.  At that time a destructive aerial campaign was 
conceived to be an offensive instrument, so air forces 
stressed its destructiveness.  Earlier Germany's General 
Schlieffen stressed that a long war would ruin the German 
economy; this bolstered the case for the quick-victory 
offensive strategy that Schlieffen favored.474  But as a 
general matter militaries have an interest in trivializing and 
glorifying warfare. 
      Before World War I many military officers glorified war, 
claiming war itself was a good thing.  Germany's General 
Hellmuth von Moltke the elder discussed the healthy side of 
war: "Perpetual peace is a dream--and not even a beautiful 
dream. ... War is an integral part of God's ordering of the 
Universe.  In War, Man's noblest virtues come into play: 
courage and renunciation, fidelity to duty and a readiness for 
sacrifice. ... Without War the World would become swamped in 
materialism."475  Likewise the magazine of a martial German 
youth organization explained the beauties of war to German 
youngsters in 1913:476 
   For us as well the great and glorious hour of battle will 
one day strike. ... Yes, that will be a great and happy 
hour, which we all may secretly look forward to. ... 
[Q]uiet and deep in German hearts the joy of war and a 
longing for it must live, for we have had enough of the 
enemy, and victory will only be given to a people who go 
to war with joy in their hearts as if to a feast. ... 
[L]et us laugh as loud as we can at the old women in men's 
trousers who are afraid of war and therefore complain that 
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it is ghastly or ugly.  No, war is beautiful.  Its 
greatness lifts a man's heart high above earthly things, 
above the daily round.  Such an hour awaits us.  We must 
wait for it with the manly knowledge that when it has 
struck it will be more beautiful and wonderful to live for 
ever among the heros on a war memorial in a church than to 
die an empty death in bed, nameless. ... [L]et that be 
heaven for young Germany.  Thus we wish to knock at our 
God's door. 
       In the same spirit Germany's General Ludendorff 
concluded that "war is the highest expression of the racial 
will to life."477  Bernhardi wrote that war "produces happy and 
permanent results in the national life. ... The brutal 
incidents inseparable from every war vanish completely before 
the idealism of the main result."478  Without war, Bernhardi 
thought, "all real progress would soon be checked, and a moral 
and intellectual stagnation would ensue which must end in 
degradation."479  He declared: "The inevitableness, the 
idealism, and the blessing of wars" should be "repeatedly 
emphasized to every citizen."480 
       To Bernhardi even a lost war could bring benefits:481 
   Even defeat may bear a rich harvest.  It often, indeed, 
passes an irrevocable sentence on weakness and misery, but 
often, too, it leads to a healthy revival, and lays the 
foundation of a new and vigorous constitution. 
       Bernhardi thought the Boer people benefitted from their 
bloody defeat by British arms in the Boer War: they had made 
"inestimable moral gains" and won "glorious victories" that 
gave them "a store of fame and national consciousness."482 
       Military writers have downplayed the damage that war 
inflicts on others and claimed that its results were both fair 
and inherently good for humankind.  Bernhardi thought "might 
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is at once the supreme right, and the dispute as to what is 
right is decided by the arbitrament of war.  War gives a 
biologically just decision."483  He claimed that war was "a 
general progressive development" beneficial for all humankind, 
because "without war, inferior or decaying races would easily 
choke the growth of healthy budding elements, and a universal 
decadence would follow."484  These and other positives made war 
"an indispensible instrument of civilization."485  Absent war 
"there could be neither racial nor cultural progress."486 
       Russian military education before World War I likewise 
stressed that war could be a force for national purification, 
unity and development.487  Britain's Field Marshall Lord 
Wolseley argued in 1903 that only war could restore 
"manliness" and "virility" to overcivilized nations.488  And a 
Japanese Army pamphlet declared in 1934 that "war is the 
father of creation and the mother of culture."489 
       Before 1914 military leaders also grossly 
underestimated the losses and destruction of war.  In 1906 
France's General Bonnal forecast that "the outcome of the next 
war will be decided in less than a month after the opening of 
hostilities."490  In 1912 his compatriot Commandant Mordaq 
thought that another war might last "about one year."491  I.F. 
Clarke notes the "general view [before 1914] ... that a 
decisive battle or two would quickly end hostilities."492   
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       Some German officers dismissed battle deaths as 
unimportant, be they many or few.  Germany's General Alfred 
von Waldersee once acknowledged that many would die in a war 
he wanted with Russia, but declared that since no "man can die 
more than once, I am not inclined to regard death for the 
individual as a misfortune."493   
       In more recent times some military officers have 
trivialized nuclear war.  General Daniel Graham, former 
director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, estimated in 
1979 that if U.S. ICBM fields and bomber bases were attacked 
by 2,500 Soviet nuclear warheads, the U.S. would lose "less 
than a quarter-million people--six years' traffic 
fatalities"494--an appraisal that was low by perhaps two orders 
of magnitude.  Graham also claimed that "nuclear war cannot 
destroy the world, but may conquer it less damaged than Europe 
and Japan were damaged by World War II," at a time when a 
general war surely would have annihilated both sides.495  Major 
Alexander de Seversky likewise declared in 1946 that the 
effect of the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
"had been wildly exaggerated" and that the same bombs dropped 
on New York or Chicago might have produced property damage 
limited to "broken window glass over a wide area."496  
       Not all officers voice these views.  Many have warned 
of the costs and risks of war and spoken vividly of the 
horrors of war.  General William Tecumseh Sherman famously 
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declared that "war is hell."  In Germany the younger Moltke 
forecast in 1905 that the the next war would be "a long, weary 
struggle" that would push even the winners "to the limits of 
exhaustion."497  U.S. Air Force General Richard Ellis, 
commander of the U.S. Strategic Air Command, told the U.S. 
Senate in 1979 that nuclear war "would be a catastrophic event 
of such magnitude that I don't think the human mind could 
understand it. ... There is not going to be very much left. 
... A desert perhaps."498  Indeed, during the 1980s and 1990s a 
tone of realism and sobriety about the nature of war, at odds 
with the optimism depicted here, prevailed in American 
military discussions.  But these are exceptions.  If we look 
at the large picture, militaries in modern times have 
generally gilded the lily of war. 
       H. "We Will Lose/We Can Win": False Pessimism and False 
Optimism.  On balance, militaries are pessimists in peacetime 
and optimists in wartime.  Their peacetime pessimism is a 
force for peace, but their wartime optimism is a force for 
prolonging and escalating war. 
       In peacetime militaries generally understate national 
power and exaggerate the power of adversaries in order to lay 
claim to a larger budget, as noted above (pp. *-*).  This has 
mixed effects on the probability of war.  Pessimism about 
relative power per se inclines governments toward peace, since 
they avoid fights they expect to lose.499  But governments are 
more inclined toward war if they exaggerate others' hostility, 
as they will if they exaggerate others' military programs.  
Hence pessimism has contradictory effects on the risk of war 
if it stems mainly from exaggerating others' military 
programs: the pessimistic state is discouraged from fighting 
from fear of defeat but provoked to fight by the hostile 
intentions it perceives in others.  Also, peacetime pessimism 
strengthens peace only if it extends to offensive as well as 
defensive wars, but sometimes military faith in the offense 
confines military pessimism to defensive wars.  Nevertheless, 
on balance military peacetime pessimism is probably a force 
for peace. 
       In wartime things are reversed.  Militaries at war 
paint an unduly rosy picture of progress on the battlefield.  
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As a result governments at war wrongly believe that success is 
in sight--there is "light at the end of the tunnel."  Hence 
they wrongly hope they can later make peace on better terms, 
or perhaps win a clean victory, if they persevere at war.  As 
a result wars are prolonged.  Geoffrey Blainey notes that 
"wars usually end when the fighting nations agree on their 
relative strength"--that is, when states estimate their 
relative capabilities correctly.500  But militaries extend the 
fighting by sowing false optimism, which they foster by 
providing unduly optimistic wartime intelligence.  In war the 
peacetime military tendency toward exaggerated pessimism 
reverses to become the opposite mistake. 
       Military wartime optimism is not undiluted.  Before 
fighting begins militaries voice pessimism about the current 
situation, to give themselves room to show improvement.501  
Once action starts militaries are optimistic about past and 
present achievements, claiming that "we have done well, and we 
are doing well"; they are pessimistic about the future if they 
are not given more freedom and resources; and they are 
optimistic about the gains they can make with more freedom and 
resources.502  Thus German navy analysts argued in 1917 that 
Britain would never make peace unless Germany moved to 
unlimited submarine warfare, but would certainly make peace if 
Germany did so, although they knew this move would reduce 
British shipping inventory only marginally.503  Likewise 
General William Westmoreland, the U.S. commander in Vietnam, 
argued in 1967 that with 470,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam the 
war would continue as a "meatgrinder" for five years, or 
indefinitely; but with only 95,000 additional troops he could 
win the war in three years.504 
       Militaries have three aims in mind: to claim full 
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credit for achievements, to avoid blame for failures, and to 
gain more resources and freedom of action.  These aims 
sometimes conflict.  For example, claims of success will lead 
civilians to ask: "if you've done so well, why do you need 
more resources?"  This tempts militaries picture the war 
differently depending on whether their past achievements or 
future needs are at issue.  Thus Richard Betts notes that in 
Vietnam "pessimism drove military recommendations, [but] good 
news characterized military reports.  The contrast between 
Westmoreland's caution about the future and boastful good 
cheer about past accomplishments was remarkable."505 
       The military tendency in wartime, then, is to foster 
false optimism by exaggerating past achievements, false 
pessimism by exaggerating the danger if more resources are not 
invested in the war, and false optimism by exaggerating what 
more investment can achieve. 
       Exaggerating past achievements is endemic among 
fighting units.  Commanders exaggerate body counts and pilots 
claim doubtful kills to promote their careers and avoid blame 
for failure.  And each military service overstates its wartime 
achievements to bolster its case for a big budget after the 
war is over.  War is the proving ground for postwar budget 
debates.  The services know this and report their wartime 
performance with a corresponding gloss.  Aggregated, these 
rosy reports create false optimism at the top. 
       Far more British than German troops died during 
Britain's disastrous 1916 offensive on the Somme river.  But 
during the battle the British commander told British leaders 
that German casualties were more than twice those of British 
forces, and speculated that a quick German collapse might 
catch Britain unprepared for peace.506  The next year the story 
repeated: during Britain's horrendously failed offensive at 
Passchendaele the British commander reported German forces 
were "so near the breaking point" that they might collapse "at 
any moment."507 
       During World War II General Claire Chennault's 
Fourteenth Chinese Air Force claimed it had destroyed at least 
five times the Japanese shipping that it actually sank.508  
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U.S. Army General Douglas MacArthur likewise boasted after his 
bloody campaign in New Guinea that "no campaign in history" 
had achieved such decisive results "with so low an expenditure 
of life and resources."  In fact his forces suffered very 
large losses--triple those of U.S. forces in the notorious 
Guadalcanal campaign--making his victory among the costliest 
of the Pacific war for the U.S.509 
       Japanese officers made similar false claims.  Japan's 
Navy admitted losing only one aircraft carrier and claimed 
victory after disastrously losing four carriers and the battle 
at Midway in 1942.510  And Japanese pilots reported sinking 
eleven (!) U.S. aircraft carriers, two U.S. battleships, three 
U.S. cruisers, and one U.S. destroyer or light cruiser in an 
air-sea battle off Formosa in 1944.  Emperor Hirohito declared 
a national holiday.  In fact the Americans had routed the 
Japanese without losing a single ship.511 
       Britain's Fighter Command exaggerated its own success 
during the Battle of Britain.  In 1940 the British government 
claimed 2432 German aircraft during the battle; but official 
German records later revealed that Germany lost only 1408 
planes.512  RAF accounting procedures were biased to inflate 
German losses: to count German planes killed the RAF might 
have counted wrecked German aircraft, since most German losses 
crashed on land, and the wrecks were then collected for scrap. 
 But instead the RAF accepted the exaggerated reports of 
individual pilots, who were less reliable and more likely to 
inflate their achievements.513 
       During the Korean war the U.S. Eighth Army commander, 
General James Van Fleet, once told his corps commanders that 
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if he believed their figures of enemy casualties "there 
wouldn't be a live Chinese or Korean opposing us."514  Chinese 
officers likewise boasted of stunning success against the 
Americans in their reports to superiors.  Nikita Khrushchev 
records that U.S. forces "were crushed and the war ended many 
times" in battle summaries that were sent to Beijing and then 
shared with Stalin.515 
       During the Vietnam War each U.S. service exaggerated 
its achievements, fostering false hopes of victory in 
Washington.  As Gelb and Betts note, the U.S. military was 
often deliberately optimistic, "even to the point of 
falsification."516  By one estimate U.S. Air Force bombing 
operations often accomplished less than half the damage the 
Air Force claimed.517  The Air Force achieved this deception by 
highlighting exaggerated pilot reports to estimate the damage 
that its air strike inflicted, while downplaying more accurate 
photo intelligence.518  The U.S. Army likewise relied on body 
counts to measure its progress instead of counting captured 
enemy weapons, even though captured weapons were a better 
index of success.519  Army claims of success were 
correspondingly inflated.  The Navy air arm and agencies 
involved in the pacification program (CIA, State Department 
and AID) also exaggerated their achievements.  Gelb and Betts 
explain:520 
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   Optimism in the assessments was part of the gamesmanship of 
Vietnam.  Optimism had a purpose.  Career services tacitly 
and sometimes explicitly pressured their professionals to 
impart good news, which was seen as a job well done; bad 
news represented a personal failure. ... Why did the Air 
Force [exaggerate its successes]?  First, because of the 
intense competition among the services, and second, 
because of the pressures regarding promotion. 
       In short, false "light at the end of the tunnel" is 
inherent in the bureaucratic politics of war.  Once the 
fighting starts each combat organization has an incentive to 
exaggerate its achievements.  These exaggerations compile to 
create the illusion that victory is in sight.  This illusion 
prolongs the war and supplies a large reason why wars continue 
once they begin. 
 
IV.  CASES: WILHELMINE GERMANY AND IMPERIAL JAPAN 
       Wilhelmine Germany and imperial Japan offer strong 
evidence for militarism theory.  In both cases the causes of 
militarism--as identified by militarism theory--were present 
in abundance, and both cases saw the appearance of full-blown 
militarism.  This matches our expectation that abundant causes 
will produce correspondingly large effects.  We also can trace 
in each case the process by which these causes of militarism 
produced their effects.  Specifically, we see that in both 
countries the military worked hard to infuse civilians with 
bellicist ideas.  And in both countries observers widely 
blamed the military for stirring the extreme public bellicism 
that emerged. 
       Wilhelmine Germany, 1890-1914.  Before 1914 the German 
military was isolated from society, and German political 
culture contained no normative or institutional barriers 
against military intrusion into civil life.  The German state 
faced serious external threats.  Germany had no national 
memory of injurious military involvement in German public 
affairs.  German political life was more authoritarian than 
democratic.  Other European societies had similar attributes, 
but none to the same degree on all dimensions.  Thus Germany 
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was primed for an eruption of militarism. 
       Wilhelmine German officers lived a cloistered life that 
left them without social ties to civilians.  As Hans-Ulrich 
Wehler writes, they were "an almost separate, self-
perpetuating caste."521  This social segregation bred a 
contempt toward civilians that deepened as time passed after 
the 1870 Franco-Prussian war.  Reflecting later on his own 
military experience, General Colmer von der Goltz wrote that 
Wilhelmine German officers "had isolated ourselves completely 
from the civilians" and "naturally" had nothing to do with 
them.522  Another German observer described the "great gulf 
between the Officer Corps and the bourgeoisie" in the 
Wilhelmine era.523  Philipp Eulenburg, a confidant of the 
Kaiser, wrote in 1903 that "the army will never look with 
anything but growing distaste on the 'civilian,' who was 
already sufficiently despised."524  Gordon Craig, a historian 
of German civil-military relations, notes that much of the 
Wilhelmine officer corps viewed civilians with "a mixture of 
contempt and hostility."525 
       German political culture had no barrier against 
military participation in politics.  Popular German political 
writings contained no warning against it.  Instead Germans 
adulated the past role of the Prussian army in creating and 
protecting the Prussian state.  This set Germany apart from 
other powers: the duty of the military to remain apart from 
politics was often argued in Britain and France and was 
embedded in the U.S. constitution. 
       Geography condemned Germany to military insecurity.  
Lying in the center of Europe, it faced powerful enemies 
across two frontiers.  Moreover, both frontiers lacked 
imposing defensive barriers to invasion: the western border 
with France and Belgium had some river barriers but no 
mountains to speak of, and the Eastern border with Russia was 
even more open.  Spain had the Pyrenees, Italy had the Alps, 
and Britain had the Channel; Germany was relatively naked.  
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Thus it faced far larger security problems than any other 
European power.  These problems were magnified in the German 
mind by memories of great German suffering at the hands of 
invading European armies during pervious periods of German 
weakness and disunion--most notably during the Thirty Years 
war, the Seven Years' War, and the Napoleonic wars.  Germany's 
felt insecurity ensured that its military would enjoy large 
budgets, large prestige, and comparably outsized influence in 
German society. 
       Germans saw no warning against militarism in their 
history.  The disasters that an overbearing German military 
brought in World War I lay in the future.  This did not set 
Wilhelmine Germany apart from other powers of the time, but 
distinguishes it from later powers that emerged after 1919 
imbued with the danger of unbridled military influence. 
       Germany was democratizing during the decades before 
World War I but it remained markedly more autocratic than 
Britain, France, Italy, and the United States.  And unlike 
Britain, Germany had no corps of civilian experts on military 
affairs that could challenge official interpretations of 
national security issues.526  German civilians thus had no 
basis to question military arguments. 
       These conditions coincided with an extreme flowering of 
militarism in Germany.  The German military became immensely 
willful and powerful, dominating German discourse about 
foreign affairs.  The German public embraced a panoply of 
militaristic ideas, including the notion that conquest was 
easy and security was scarce, that empires were essential to 
national life, that neighboring states were violently 
aggressive toward Germany, that Germany faced a large window 
of vulnerability, and that war was a positive, healthy 
activity.  The German military itself also embraced these 
views--perhaps because it imbibed its own propaganda--and 
became a powerful lobby for war. 
       Historians widely agree that the Wilhelmine German 
military had great influence on German elites and the German 
public mind.527  Wilhelm Deist notes the "extraordinary 
predominance of the military over the civilian authorities" in 
the Wilhelmine era.528  Adolf Gasser likewise stresses that the 
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military, not the civilian leaders, dominated German public 
affairs.529  Friedrich Meinecke notes the vast prestige that 
Wilhelmine German officers enjoyed, writing that the German 
"lieutenant moved through the world as a young god and the 
civilian reserve lieutenant as a demi-god."530  Isabel Hull 
observes that the Wilhelmine German military had "enormous 
popular prestige" and "complete independence" from civilian 
rule, achieving "ascendancy vis-à-vis the civilian leadership" 
after around 1905-1906.531  F.L. Carsten notes that the 
military had greater influence on political and cultural life 
in Germany than anywhere else in Europe: "its prestige cast a 
shadow over the country."532  Louis Snyder observes that the 
German Navy League attained far greater power in German 
politics than most German political parties.533  Gordon Craig 
summarizes that the German army became "a state within a 
state, claiming the right to define what was, or was not, to 
the national interest and to dispense with those who did not 
agree."534 
       The military's power and prestige is seen in the 
obsequious deference shown the military by German civilians.  
The German Kaiser idolized the officer corps, filling his 
entourage with officers and spending most of his time with 
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them.535  Other high German civilians lamely deferred to the 
military's often-misguided policy proposals with barely a 
question raised.  Thus Baron Friedrich von Holstein, a top 
German diplomat, supinely accepted General Schlieffen's 
disastrous plan to invade Belgium in event of war, saying that 
"if the Chief of the Great General Staff, and particularly a 
strategic authority like Schlieffen, thought such a measure to 
be necessary, then it would be the duty of diplomacy to adjust 
itself to it and prepare for it in every possible way."536  
Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg also limply agreed to Schlieffen's 
unwise plan, writing that "political measures had to be shaped 
in accordance with the needs of the [military] campaign 
plan."537 
       Cabinet ministers that crossed the military were 
dismissed.  Between 1871 and 1914 military pressure forced the 
resignations of two German War Ministers, a Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, a Minister of the Interior, and two 
Chancellors.538  The Chief of Staff had the right of private 
personal access to the emperor.539  The chief of the military 
cabinet saw the Kaiser privately three times a week, while the 
civilian secretary of war saw him only once.540 
       This military influence was accompanied by a rise of 
bellicist ideas in the German public mind.  Hans-Ulrich Wehler 
notes the "spread of military values throughout German 
society" before the war.541  Avner Offer notes the "pervasive 
militarism of the professional and upper-classes" in pre-war 
Germany.542  Gerhard Ritter argues that "military patterns of 
thinking came to invade the ideology of the [German] middle 
class."543  Fritz Stern summarizes that Germany was "a 
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thoroughly militaristic country" in the years before World War 
I.544 
       These judgments match those of contemporary observers, 
who often noted the militarization of German popular 
attitudes.  Friedrich Meinecke, a German historian who 
witnessed firsthand the late Wilhelmine period, later wrote 
that the German army "produced a curiously penetrating 
militarism which affected the whole of civilian life and found 
no comparable expression in any of [Germany's] neighboring 
states."545  A Frenchman travelling through Germany in 1913 
found rampant militarism in the German universities and the 
German press.546  On the eve of the war another observer wrote 
that "the microbe of militarism has been inoculated into the 
German people."547  Yet another noted a "predominance of the 
military spirit" that was "more strongly developed in the 
German nation than in ... any other nation."548  Still another 
contemporary described the German mood:549 
   In Germany an army spirit distinct from, and sometimes 
antagonistic to, the civilian spirit of the average man 
and woman in England and France seems to pervade the whole 
reach of life. ... [Germany's] national life [was] 
permeated by the idea of war as an end, and the German 
people accepted it. ... Hence in conversation, newspapers, 
and popular writings, the constant references to strategy, 
mobilization, comparative strength of armies.  The effect 
of all this on the national mind has been that there was 
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no peace party in Germany corresponding to the leaders of 
the larger movement in England who claimed to stand for a 
higher culture. ... In Germany the military spirit has 
penetrated every fibre of the national resources, and the 
men who have done most to guide the people and control 
their destinies have had as their supreme aim the 
cultivation of this spirit, in order to strengthen the 
army. 
       German civilian leaders even complained that this 
militarized public climate narrowed their choices.  Thus 
German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg complained 
before the war that his hands were tied by extremist public 
opinion: "With these idiots one cannot conduct a foreign 
policy--on the contrary.  Together with other factors they 
will eventually make any reasonable course impossible for 
us."550   
       How was this bellicose public climate created?  German 
officers conducted a vast propaganda campaign aimed at German 
civil society, on a scale never before seen.  The German Navy 
led the way.  It planted thousands of articles in German 
newspapers and oversaw the printing and distribution of 
thousands of books and pamphlets that told the Navy story.  It 
induced many university luminaries, including Max Weber, Hans 
Delbrück, Gustav Schmoller and many others, to tour the 
country giving pro-big-Navy talks.  It created a Navy League 
in 1898 that had more than a million members by 1906.551  At 
one point the Navy League journal had a circulation of 
300,000.  The German army started later, but by 1914 it had an 
Army League and two paramilitary youth organizations that gave 
it a vast ready audience for its views.  Some five million 
Germans--a sixth of all adult German males and youths--were 
either in military service or were members of one of these 
leagues before 1914, forming a huge conduit for military 
arguments.552 
       These publicity campaigns were the first of their scope 
in history.  They marked the invention of a new method of 
politics--the systematic and continuous manipulation of mass 
public opinion by the state--that was later mimicked by other 
regimes. 
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       Contemporary observers widely blamed this propaganda 
for Germany's bellicose mood.  Otfried Nippold, a German 
academic, ascribed German public militance to "our war-loving 
generals in the Pan-German League, the Defense Association 
(Wehrverein) and similar organizations" who engaged in 
"systematic stimulation of the war spirit" and stirred "ill 
feeling against other states and nations."553  Admiral Georg 
von Müller, a top German official, likewise explained that the 
German government risked war in 1914 because it was "under 
pressure from a great part of the German people which had been 
whipped into a high-grade chauvinism by Navalists and Pan-
Germans."554  Price Collier, an American observer of Germany, 
wrote in 1913 that "the [German] press is so largely 
influenced by Admiral von Tirpitz and his corps of press-
agents and writers, that it is even difficult to procure the 
publication of a protest or a reply."  Collier further noted a 
"poisonous teaching of patriotism" that "produced wide-spread 
enmity of feeling ... but this enmity has built the navy."555 
       German civilians noted the role of army reserve service 
in stirring their own militance.  The widow of sociologist Max 
Weber observed that his reserve training inspired in him "a 
warlike and patriotic attitude which made him hope one day he 
would be able to go into the field at the head of his 
company."556 
       Many ideas purveyed by the German military were 
internally inconsistent or patently incorrect.  This casts 
doubt on the notion that the authors of these arguments 
believed them, suggesting instead--as militarism theory 
argues--that these were unbelieved propaganda arguments 
advanced to serve organizational interests.  For example, 
Tirpitz's argument for a large offensive battle fleet was 
riddled with contradictions.  It rested on claims that a 
strong German battle fleet could gain control of the seas 
through a decisive offensive; while also claiming that an 
inferior German fleet could win by exploiting the tactical 
advantage of the defensive; while further claiming that 
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Britain would expose its fleet to defeat by taking the 
tactical offensive against Germany, eschewing for some reason 
the tactical advantage of the defensive.557  German navalists 
also argued that Britain was so aggressive that it would use 
its naval superiority to strangle German trade, but so supine 
that it would not seriously contest a German move to close the 
gap at sea.558  Such logical incoherence indicates that these 
arguments were propaganda, not belief, since any coherent mind 
that saw the whole case would quickly see its internal 
contraditions.559  Only the audiences of these arguments, each 
hearing fragments of the whole but none hearing it all, would 
overlook the cacophany. 
        This audience included German officers themselves.  We 
can not say for certain if their views were shaped by this 
propaganda, but this is suggested by the the shape of their 
thinking, which reproduced the belligerent worldview they 
purveyed to civilians.  Reflecting this worldview, the German 
Army became a loud lobby for war and played a large role in 
pushing Germany toward war in 1914.560 
       Imperial Japan, 1900s-1941.  Like the Wilhelmine German 
military, the imperial Japanese military lived in segregated 
seclusion from Japanese civilians.  Imperial Japan had no 
national memory of injury stemming from military involvement 
in public life, and no cultural tradition that confined the 
role of military in public life.  In retrospect it appears 
that imperial Japan did not face large security threats, but 
Japan's elite thought Japan was in peril.  Japan's democratic 
institutions were frail and often failed to function.  These 
conditions primed imperial Japan for an outbreak of militarism 
during the decades before World War II. 
       Many Japanese officers--25 to 30 percent--began 
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military life at the age of twelve or thirteen with studies at 
official military preparatory schools, where they had no 
contact with civilian life.  For the rest the isolation began 
at fifteen or sixteen with studies at a national military 
academy.561  Their schooling stressed that they were members of 
a chosen group with a special social role.562  Active officers 
had their time off base restricted and their reading material 
strictly censored.563  This isolation bred an ingrown worldview 
and a disregard for civilian views and wishes.564  Officers 
came to see themselves "apart from and indeed above the 
Japanese nation as a whole."565 
       Japanese culture offered no warning against undue 
military influence and no barriers against it.  Europeans had 
learned to fear military control of policy in the fires of 
World War I, but Japan had escaped these disasters.  Instead, 
Japan's samurai traditions and its military victories in the 
Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars (1894-95 and 1904-5) 
fostered the veneration of military officers.  Japan's 
constitution enshrined the independence of the military from 
the civil government.566 
       Japan had no strong neighbors aside from the Soviet 
Union, and the Soviets could project only limited power in 
Asia.  Nor were any Western powers intent on colonizing Japan. 
 In fact Western interest in Asian colonies waned soon after 
the turn of the century, and moved into reverse in the 1930s 
as decolonization began.  Yet the international scene seemed 
ominous to contemporary Japanese elites.  As the twentieth 
century dawned they saw that the European powers that had just 
carved up Africa and Southeast Asia and were moving to 
partition China.  There seemed no limit to western colonial 
appetites, and Japan seemed a ripe and likely target for 
future Western predations if it remained weak.  In Japanese 
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eyes Japan's security seemed precarious.  This fear ensured 
that Japan's military would have large budgets, large 
prestige, and correspondingly large social influence. 
       Japanese democracy was flawed and frail, as seen by the 
relative ease with which the military took control in the 
1930s.  Published civilian analysis of military questions was 
unknown, leaving the Japanese public with no basis to judge 
the claims of the military. 
       As these conditions developed Japan saw the burgeoning 
of militarism.  The military came to dominate public debate 
and finally seized the reigns of government itself.  It used 
its power to indoctrinate the public with a Darwinist view of 
international affairs that stressed the malevolence of other 
states, the insecurity of Japan, the necessity and feasibility 
of expansion, and the glories of war.    
       Scholars widely agree that the military came to 
dominate the Japanese public sphere before World War II.  
Volker Berghahn notes that by 1939 "Japan was for all 
practical purposes a highly militarized society in which the 
Army and the Navy called the tune."567   
       The power of the military was manifest in the deference 
that civilians gave to military wishes.  During the 1930s 
Japan's political parties came to curb their words and deeds 
from fear of retaliation by the military, and the Japanese 
Diet faded into a mere rubber stamp.568  Military officers were 
given top diplomatic posts, including Foreign Minister and 
Ambassador to the United States, Germany and the Soviet 
Union.569  The professional diplomatic corps was bypassed.  
After around 1937 "the military's hold on the government was 
now complete: they could make or unmake a cabinet at their 
pleasure."570 
       As in Wilhelmine Germany the imperial Japanese military 
stirred public militarism through massive use of public 
relations.  The military gained large control over the 
national press by intruding itself into the government press 
censorship process, using this control to turn coverage in its 
favor.571  It created a host of public support organizations, 
comprised of retired and reserve officers as well as 
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civilians, as venues to purvey arguments for expanding 
Japanese military power.572  A navalist Protection Society 
published a monthly magazine and a yearly naval review that 
pled the navy's case.  The Navy Ministry ran a speakers bureau 
that arranged thousands of speeches against arms control and 
published a range of navalist pamphlets.573 
       The army developed a program for placing legions of 
former officers in public schools, where they conveyed the 
army message to students.574  And the army pushed to militarize 
Japanese school textbooks, so that "pro-military sentiment 
became pervasive" in school texts before World War II.575   
       This propaganda infused the public with a militaristic 
spirit.  It also blew back into the military, infecting junior 
officers with a belligerence that their superiors never 
intended.  In this way the military was trapped by its own 
rhetoric: arguments made to persuade the public to support 
military spending also persuaded junior officers that war was 
necessary.576  These officers then became a major lobby for war 
and helped push Japan over the brink in 1941. 
     What motivated this military propaganda?  Protecting 
organizational size and budget was the key concern.  Michael 
Barnhardt writes that Japan's navy was "ever mindful of the 
need to embellish the fleet's roles and missions in order to 
justify sharp increases in size."577  This required an 
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aggressive foreign policy that could justify a large navy.  
Accordingly, navy admirals advised an imperial advance to the 
south--despite the risk that this would trigger an unwanted 
war with the United States--"as much for internal budgetary 
and resource reasons as for any truly military ones."578 
       In unguarded moments Japanese officers sometimes even 
admitted that budget concerns underlay their bellicose policy 
advice.  Admiral Suetsugu Nobumasa, asked in 1934 if the navy 
was seriously considering war with the United States, replied: 
"Certainly, even that is acceptable if it will get us a 
budget."579 
       The arguments of the Japanese military, like those of 
the Wilhelmine German military, were internally inconsistent 
or demonstrably wrong or both--further indicating that these 
arguments were organizationally self-serving propaganda, not 
belief.580  For example, Japanese officers argued that the 
United States was so aggressive that Japan had to forestall 
its aggression by imperial expansion, and so meek that it 
would not fight seriously after Japan attacked it.  They 
argued that industrial strength was so important in modern war 
that Japan required an independent industrial empire, and that 
Japan could gain this empire by warring against a United 
States with ten times Japan's industrial capacity.  And they 
argued that Japan needed an empire to escape the threat of 
economic strangulation by enemy blockade, but pursued an 
overseas empire that could provide no security against a 
blockading enemy with a superior navy. 
       These notions clashed with one another but matched the 
organizational interests of Japan's military establishment.  
Each notion bolstered the claim that Japan faced serious 
security problems that could best be solved by offensive 
military operations.  Thus each justified large military 
budgets and the offensive postures and doctrines that the 
military services preferred.581 
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       How strong are the tests posed by the German and 
Japanese cases?  The tests are strong because no competing 
explanations for patterns in the cases suggest themselves; 
hence the action of militarism theory must account for these 
patterns.  Some aspects of both cases could have other 
explanations.  For example, many authors have blamed German 
and Japanese culture for their belligerent public moods.  Some 
have also blamed German bellicosity on Germany's social 
stratification, and blamed Japan's belligerence on its ancient 
Bushido code.  But the whole picture outlined above--including 
evidence of military efforts to shape civilian opinion, 
testimony of contemporaries that blames the military for 
civilian bellicosity, and evidence of organizational motives 
for the military's political actions, including confessions by 
military officers admitting these motives--is not compatible 
with any other explanation.  Accordingly, the tests are strong 
and their passage gives militarism theory strong support. 
       These tests also suggest that militarism theory points 
to strong causes.  The conduct of Germany and Japan changed 
markedly, and went to extremes, as the causes of militarism 
appeared within.  This suggests that the causes of militarism 
have large effects. 
       Still open is the question of how much militarism 
theory explains.  It passes two strong tests, but are the 
conditions needed for its operation common or rare?  If common 
it explains lots of politics and history; if rare it explains 
rather little.  I turn to this question next. 
 
VI. WHAT CAN MILITARISM THEORY EXPLAIN? 
       Military582 establishments do not want war, but they 
support policies and purvey misperceptions that raise the risk 
of war to protect their organizational interests.  Their 
internal nature and external environment make militaries 
politically effective and intrusive.  Their political 
intrusions foster dangerous misperceptions and high-risk 
foreign and defense policies.  Militaries also may come to 
believe their own arguments and press for war as a result.  
All organizations struggle to protect their organizational 
interests.  In the case of the military war as an unintended 
byproduct of this struggle. 
       This is militarism theory in a nutshell.  How much can 
it explain of the past?  Of the present and future? 
       Militarism theory has fairly narrow applicability.  It 
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is a hot-house theory, needing special conditions to operate. 
 These conditions are often missing, hence there are many 
cases that militarism theory does not cover.  But the theory 
does explain some important events and offers answers to large 
questions about modern international affairs.  It is worst at 
explaining pre-modern warfare, best at explaining industrial-
era warfare. 
       To identify cases that militarism theory explains we 
look for cases where the causes of militarism were present; 
cases where we have evidence of military action to militarize 
civilian thinking; and cases where the product of militarism--
state policies guided by a militaristic worldview--are 
observed.  Using those criteria, militarism theory sheds light 
on both world wars and a select set of additional cases. 
       World War I.  As I just explained, the Wilhelmine 
German military gained great influence on the mind of German 
civilians.  It worked to militarize German society, with 
considerable success.  Moreover, other European societies 
suffered milder symptoms of the same virus.  The Russian, 
Austro-Hungarian and Serbian militaries all were willful and 
powerful social actors.  All favored the same militarist ideas 
as the German military.  The French military was less 
influential but not without social power.  As a result 
militarism became a general European phenomenon, greatest in 
Germany but found elsewhere as well.  Only Britain showed few 
signs of it.583  Colonel Edward House generalized about the 
region when he wrote Woodrow Wilson from Berlin on May 29, 
1914:584 
   The situation is extraordinary.  It is militarism run stark 
mad.  Unless someone acting for you can bring about a 
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different understanding, there is some day to be an awful 
cataclysm.  No one in Europe can do it.  There is too much 
hatred. 
       Thus throughout the European continent military 
influence was at an unusual high point before 1914. 
       What ideas did Europe's militaries purvey?  Most 
important, as noted above they spread the notion that conquest 
was easy.585  This belief, in turn, was the root cause of many 
other causes of war in 1914.586  Specifically, it fostered both 
German and Austrian expansionism and fierce Entente resistance 
to this expansionism, setting up an powerful collision between 
the Central Powers and the Entente.  It encouraged Russia to 
mobilize preemptively early in the 1914 July crisis, in a 
desperate effort to seize a slender military advantage, 
thereby pushing the crisis over the edge to war.  It supported 
preventive war thinking in Germany, where such thinking fueled 
schemes to attack Russia.  It led Germany and Austria to adopt 
risky fait accompli diplomatic tactics that made the July 
crisis far more dangerous.  It led the German and Russian 
militaries to design inflexible military mobilization plans 
that required early action against every opponent in event of 
mobilization, leaving civilian leaders no room to defer or 
confine the war once mobilization began.  It led the European 
powers to form essentially unconditional alliances with one 
another, which ensured that a minor conflagration anywhere in 
Europe would quickly spread to engulf the region.  It led the 
powers to react quickly and violently to threatening moves 
by others, leaving civilian leaders no room for error and 
turning their small mistakes, reversible under normal 
conditions, into historical blunders.  And it created a rapid 
cycle of action and reaction that allowed Germany to hide its 
responsibility for the war, instead casting blame onto others. 
       These dangers played an important role in triggering 
the war.  If so, their common cause--the belief that conquest 
was easy--was a prime cause of the war.  If militarism caused 
this belief then it, too, was a prime cause of the war.587 
       Militarism was also the likely cause of several other 
factors that impelled Europe toward war in 1914, and that 
intensified and prolonged the war once it began.  These 
include Germany's tendency to exaggerate its neighbors' 
hostility; the German belief in bandwagoning and big stick 
diplomacy, which led Germany to discount the risk that Britain 
                         
    585  See above at notes 278-353. 
    586  I argue this in Van Evera, "Cult of the Offensive and 
the Origins of the First World War." 
    587  May 4, 2000: CUT this para or the summary para two 
paras down.  2 summaries is 1 too many. 
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would intervene against it, and to adopt a risky bullying 
diplomatic strategy; the general glorification of war 
throughout Europe; and the blind optimism on both sides that 
helped keep the war going once it began.  Europe's militaries 
purveyed all these ideas, and historians widely agree that 
these ideas helped cause or sustain the war.  Moreover, 
militaries were warhawks in many states, including Germany, 
Russia, France, and Austria and Serbia, perhaps after imbibing 
their own violent Darwinist propaganda.  Their hawkishness 
pressure helped steer Europe's governments toward war.588 
       Thus militarism appears as a master-cause of World War 
I.  It caused the belief that conquest was easy and the many 
dangers that flowed from it.  It also caused other conditions 
that helped bring about the war.  Many factors that helped 
trigger the war had militarism as their source.   
       A thumbnail explanation for the First World War that 
emphasized militarism, then, would be as follows.  Militarism 
arose with industrialism in the nineteenth century: 
industrialism created the division of labor, creating 
specialized bureaucracies, creating a military with a separate 
identity and interest, creating militarism.  The industrial 
world had no previous experience with militarism and was 
caught unawares.  Militarism had not yet caused any disasters, 
so militaries enjoyed high prestige and enjoyed great 
credibility in debates over foreign policy and national 
security.  As a result Europeans were predisposed to believe 
military arguments, even patently false and self-serving 
claims.  Civilians saw little need to institutionalize 
civilian control and erected few political barriers to confine 
the role of the military in public affairs.  Militarism was 
worse during 1890-1914 than earlier or later chiefly because 
the military was by then highly professionalized but the 
dangers of militarism were still unknown.589  After the war 
militarism was better controlled in Europe because people 
learned--for a time at least--that militarism was dangerous, 
making them less susceptible to it. 
       During the Cold War, the argument would run, militarism 
was less acute among the superpowers than it was among the 
pre-World War I European powers for idiosyncratic reasons.  
Most of the top Soviet civilian leadership gained large 
                         
    588  See note 13, above, and the text at notes 416, 419-
432, and 437-446. 
 
    589  Jack Snyder offers a competing but not incompatible 
explanation, suggesting that militarism was intense in Europe 
before 1914 because special circumstances involved the 
European militaries in domestic political conflicts, in ways 
that gave them incentives to intrude into the domestic debate. 
 Ideology of the Offensive: passim. 
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military experience during the Russian revolution, the Russian 
civil war, and World War II, so the Soviet military had no 
monopoly of military information that it could exploit to 
dominate debate.  The Soviet state also installed strong 
barriers against undue military influence, in the form of 
close Communist Pary supervision over military decision making 
and a proscription on military public speech on political 
questions.  In the U.S. militarism was (and is) dampened by 
the substantial integration of the military into civilian 
life, by strong traditions of civilian control, and by 
informed civilian input in security policy debates from 
thinktanks and universities.   
       In short, the exceptional events of 1914-18 were 
created by conditions that allowed an exceptional degree of 
militarism.  This militarism was not the only cause of World 
War I: other factors, most notably the rabid nationalist 
mythmaking that infected Europe before 1914, also played a 
role.  But militarism was a key cause. 
       The case for this explanation is bolstered by the lack 
of alternative explanations for the militarization of European 
ideas.  No plausible competing explanation suggests itself.  
Its absence bolster the case for a militarism explanation. 
       Militarism theory sheds new light on the debate over 
responsibility for World War I.  The theory blames Europe's 
militaries.  It also supports arguments, advanced by the 
Fischer school of historians, that heavily blame Germany.590  
The Fischer school has long argued that Germany consciously 
risked war in 1914 and perhaps even sought to bring it about. 
 Fischerites marshalled impressive evidence but their argument 
left many unpersuaded partly because they lacked an 
explanation for the conduct they alleged.  Why would Germany 
behave so belligerently?  Skeptics doubted the Fischer 
argument because Fischerites had no persuasive explanation for 
why Germany would behave so aggressively.591  Militarism theory 
explains that Germany was so aggressive because it was highly 
militarized.  In so doing it completes the Fischer school 
argument by answering the "why?" question about German 
conduct. 
       At the same time militarism theory lifts broad blame 
from the German people.  It suggests that responsibility for 
                         
    590  The flagship work of the Fischer school is Fischer, 
War of Illusions.  A summary of the Fischer view is Geiss, 
German Foreign Policy. 
    591  The Fischer school has offered a social imperialism 
explanation, suggesting that German elites sought conflict 
with other states to bolster support for the conservative 
groups at home.  Evidence for this explanation is thin, 
however.  I think the social imperialism explanation has some 
validity but not much. 
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the war lies not with all Germans, but only with their 
malevolent, and now vanished, ancien security elites.  This 
rather small band of elite predators carry the burden of 
guilt; they alone sowed the ideas that spawned the war; the 
wider society is not culpable.  One could fault the German 
public for following these predators, but this is a high 
standard of conduct to demand.  It seems unlikely that any 
other public would have behaved any better under the same 
conditions.  The trouble lay with the specifics of German 
civil-military relations, not with the German public at large 
or the culture at large.  And if so, militarism theory largely 
exculpates the broader German public for the violence their 
government began.   
      The Pacific War, 1941-45.  The Pacific War stemmed from 
Japanese expansionism.  Hard-line United States policies also 
played a role, but war is hard to imagine without Japan's 
extremist policies.  These Japanese policies, in turn, were 
guided by arguments that the Japanese military had purveyed 
for decades: that other powers were out to get Japan, that 
Japan required a wider empire to survive against these powers, 
that conquering such an empire was feasible, and that a war 
triggered by a reach for empire would be glorious.  As 
outlined above, Japan's military had great prestige and 
influence, and it purveyed these arguments with great energy 
and success.  Japan's military also pushed for war, perhaps 
because many officers heard and believed its own propaganda. 
       The ideas behind Japanese policies make little sense as 
a national strategy; but they do make sense viewed as 
organizationally self-serving military myths.  Historians 
should view Japanese national ideas of this period less as 
national than as organizational beliefs.  Viewed as a national 
belief system, Japanese ideas are incoherent and irrational.  
As an organizationally self-serving belief system Japanese 
ideas are logical and coherent. 
     Others have explained Japan's conduct as stemming from 
Japanese culture, or have put prime blame for that conduct on 
civilian elements of the Japanese elite, especially the 
emperor.  Militarism theory offers a stronger explanation 
because it better fits the whole pattern we see.  Cultural 
explanations are unsatisfying because they cannot account for 
the large role of the military in shaping public opinion, or 
for the budgetary motives that underlay the military's action. 
 Explanations that blame the emperor or other civilians 
misread the balance of power in imperial Japan: the emperor 
was clearly a weak player playing a weak hand during the slide 
to war.  Factors aside from militarism were surely at work, 
but militarism theory offers the strongest explanation. 
       Who bears guilt for the Pacific War?  Militarism theory 
puts blame narrowly on Japan's pre-war security institutions, 
and thus lifts blame from wider Japanese society.  This should 
ease Japan's task in coming to terms with its past.  Many 
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Japanese have resisted an admission because it implied blame 
for the whole nation, including their own ancestors and 
elements of their current culture.  Militarism theory should 
make the pill less bitter.  It narrowly blames arrogant, self-
serving military leadership groups.  The wider Japanese public 
were pawns and victims of the military elites, not independent 
actors.  When Japan takes blame for the Pacific war, the blame 
flows not to the broad Japanese people but to small malevolent 
military elites that have long since disappeared. 
       Other cases.  Ottoman officers infused with 
militaristic ideas foolishly led Turkey into World War I in 
1914.592  Imbued with the cult of the offensive, they dreamed 
of launching vast offensive maneuvers that would take their 
armies all the way through Afghanistan to the borders of 
India.593  Instead they were vanquished after many bloody 
defeats and saw their state carved to pieces at war's end. 
       During 1918-22 Poland's military strongman Marshal 
Józef Pilsudski sought to conquer an empire including the 
whole Ukraine--a huge multiethnic area larger than the Poland 
of 1772.594  He declared that Poland would either be "a state 
equal to the great powers of the world, or a small state that 
needed protection of the mighty."595  He also expressed 
fondness for war, remarking in 1919 that he loved war "with 
all its horrors," and calling war "a mistress" in 1920.596 
       Later Hungary's military pressed for its suicidal 1941 
attack on the Soviet Union, dreaming of restoring Hungary to 
its traditional borders.597  Some observers have detected 
                         
    592  Grant and Temperley summarize that these officers 
"were actively preaching a doctrine of war in which even 
Bernhardi would have delighted."  A.J. Grant and Harold 
Temperley, Europe in the Nineteenth Century (1789-1914) (New 
York: Longmans, Green, 1927): 34. 
    593  M.S. Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774-1923 
(London: Macmillan, 1966): 315. 
    594  Hugh Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe Between the Wars, 
1918-1941 (New York: Archon Books, 1962): 332. 
    595  Piotr S. Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 1917-1921 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969): 159. 
    596  Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations: 159n-160n.  He also 
remarked in 1920 that "I love this war which either crushes a 
man's character like glass or makes it strong like steel."  
Ibid. 
    597  Thomas L. Sakmyster, "Army Officers and Foreign Policy 
in Hungary," Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 10, No. 1 
(January 1975): 19-40. 
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militarism in modern South Africa, Chile, Brazil, and 
Argentina.598  Paraguay's suicidal rampage against Brazil, 
Argentina, and Uruguay during 1864-1870 under military 
strongman Francisco Solano López may owe something to 
militarism; likewise Pakistan's belligerence toward India and 
Afghanistan since 1947.  And militarism theory sheds some 
light on Naziism.  Most Nazi leaders formed their political 
worldviews while steeped in the militarist propaganda of 1890-
1918, and they carried these views forward into the 1930s.  
Hitler was an avid reader of right-wing literature and as a 
youth he almost surely imbibed the militarist propaganda of 
the era.  His thinking tracks many of the more violent themes 
of Wilhelmine German military propaganda, including the notion 
that states must grow or die, that decisive war was 
inevitable, that Britain would not balance against a Germany 
that reached for control of Europe, and that war was 
essentially a good thing.  Thus Nazi expansionism can be seen 
as an afterecho of Wilhelmine militarism.599 
       The wilder foreign policy ideas put forward in less 
militarized states often originate with the military.  In 1940 
British and French Air Force officers argued that the allies 
should attack the Soviet oil fields at Baku in hopes of 
inducing "sooner or later the total collapse of the war 
potential of the USSR," as British Air Force documents argued. 
 The British officers thought this operation could "decide the 
course of the entire war," as it might have, by cementing the 
Nazi-Soviet Pact and thus making Hitler's defeat impossible.600 
 During the Cold War the loudest calls in the United States 
for preventive war against the Soviet Union and China were 
military.  In 1968 General LeMay complained that "we probably 
could have made Russia pull out of Eastern Europe, but the 
sensible policies of 'roll back' were never carried out."601  
During the Cuban Missile Crisis the U.S. military advised 
forceful solutions that the President wisely rejected.602  
                         
    598  On South Africa see Kenneth W. Grundy, The 
Militarization of South African Politics (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1986): 58-67 and passim; and Philip H. 
Frankel, Pretoria's Praetorians: Civil-Military Relations in 
South Africa (London: Cambridge University Press, 1984): 29-34 
and passim.  On Chile, Brazil, and Argentina see Jack Child, 
Geopolitics and Conflict in South America: Quarrels Among 
Neighbors (New York: Praeger, 1985). 
    599  Generally concurring is Snyder, Myths of Empire: 93. 
    600  Iklé, Every War Must End: 58. 
    601  LeMay, America Is In Danger: 151. 
    602  Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the 
Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W.W. Norton, 1971): 14, 26, 
 
 
 137 
Militarism theory may explain such suggestions. 
       Other phenomena explained.  Why do states often 
exaggerage the size of first-move advantages, the size of 
windows of opportunity and vulnerability, the cumulativity of 
resources, and the ease of conquest and the scarcity of 
security?  In Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict I 
argued that these misperceptions are common.  Militarism 
theory accounts in part for their appearance.  Professional 
militaries have an incentive to sow these misperceptions, and 
uncivilianized militaries have sown them in the past. 
       What explains the misperceptions identified by the 
cognitive psycholgy school of national misperception?  The 
psychology school notes that states tend to exaggerate others' 
hostility, and to underestimate their own role in provoking 
others' hostility.603  It warns of the risk of conflict 
spirals, in which states punish others hoping to make them 
behave better but actually provoke them to greater 
hostility.604  It notes that states exaggerate the unity and 
coordination among adversaries, seeing monolithic hostility 
when others in fact are not coordinating against them.605  
       Cognitive psychology may explain these syndromes, but 
militarism theory also has plausible explanations, arguing 
that militaries purvey these misperceptions for 
organizationally self-seeking reasons.  Specifically, it 
suggests that militaries exaggerate others' hostility in 
search of the larger military budgets that hostile neighbors 
justify, and sells this misperception to the wider society.  
It suggests that militaries conceal their own state's role in 
provoking others' hostility because they favor strong-arm 
policies, and are therefore slow to admit it when these 
policies backfire, instead interpreting such backfires as 
having other causes.  It argues that conflict spirals arise 
because militaries exaggerate the benefits and underestimate 
the costs of brandishing force, so they advise belligerent 
policies even when such methods will provoke more than they 
deter.  It claims that militaries exaggerate the scope and 
unity of the opposition in order to widen the range of threats 
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the state must address, and sell this misperception to the 
wider society.606  Thus Wilhelmine Germany and Imperial Japan 
exaggerated their neighbors' hostility under sway of 
relentless military propaganda that painted others' aims in 
the darkest terms.  Wilhelmine Germany provoked British 
hostility by its vast naval building during 1898-1912, but 
forgot this after hearing the German Navy's constant (self-
serving) claims that German naval building had not provoked 
Britain.  Germany spiraled with the Entente states before 1914 
by pursuing a policy of threat and belligerence--strongly 
endorsed by the German military--that aroused Entente 
hostility.  And Soviet and American officers both exaggerated 
the unity of the opposing camp during the Cold War. 
       What causes expansionism and imperialism?  A host of 
causes have been suggested: Marxists point to capitalism, 
others point to communism, and still others point to the 
insecurity of states and their resulting need to seek security 
by expansion.  Militarism should join the list.  In leading 
states to exaggerate their insecurity and to exaggerate the 
ease of conquering others militarism incites states toward 
expansionist policies. 
       Why are medium and small powers generally less 
belligerent than great powers?  Why, in particular, are they 
generally less alarmed about their security, even though their 
relative weakness should leave them feeling more exposed?  
Militarism theory offers an answer, since it argues that 
militarism is a disease confined largely to great powers.  
Great powers are more secure than lesser powers, but they also 
have more powerful and willful security establishments that 
have a large interest in warning society of its insecurity. 
       What explains the persistance of interstate warfare 
after the industrial revolution removed many reasons for 
fighting?  Carl Kaysen explains that the material causes of 
war have diminshed sharply over the past two centuries.  
Conquest no longer confers nearly the profit nor the power 
that it once did.607  Why has warfare itself has not 
diminished?  Some war-causing "Factor X" must be on the rise, 
replacing older causes as they fade.  Militarism theory 
nominates the rise of professional militaries as a likely 
culprit. 
       Militarism theory in perspective.  Militarism theory 
has strengths and weaknesses.  Its main weakness is its narrow 
real-world applicability.  Militarism requires uncommon 
                         
    606  Tests that competed cognitive psychological 
explanations for these mispercepetions against militarism 
explanations would be useful. 
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conditions.  As a result it is quite rare in history.  
Wilhelmine Germany and imperial Japan are the only cases of 
full-blown militarism that present themselves, and milder 
cases are not very common either.  On the other hand, the 
theory points to a strong cause: when militarism appears it 
has a dramatic impact on state behavior.  And the theory has 
wide explanatory range, explaining many phenomena.  These 
include overestimates of others' hostility, overestimates of 
bandwagoning and the efficacy of belligerent political 
tactics, exaggeration of the ease of conquest, the embrace of 
unduly offensive military force postures and strategies, 
exaggeration of the size of first-move advantages and windows 
of opportunity and vulnerability, exaggeration of the value of 
empire, wartime false optimism, and underestimation of the 
costs of war. 
       Some of these phenomena explain still other phenomena. 
 For example, exaggeration of the ease of conquest explains 
expansionism, fait accompli diplomatic tactics, secrecy, arms 
racing, and more.  Exaggeration of first move advantage 
explains why states might conceal their grievances from one 
another, raising the risk of inadvertent war, and why they 
might launch preemptive war.  Exaggeration of windows explains 
why states might force the pace of decision making, leading to 
war-causing mistakes.608 
       By explaining the causes of these phenomena, militarism 
theory encompasses them.  So it explains only a small set of 
cases but it explains a good deal about them. 
       Militarism theory also serves a useful social purpose, 
by helping Germany and Japan to come to terms with their past. 
 It suggests that blame for the world wars belongs not on all 
Germans and Japanese, but only on on their malevolent, and now 
vanished, ancien security institutions.  This shift in blame 
lets today's Germans and Japanese more easily admit their 
country's crimes.  Many have resisted an admission because it 
implied blame for the whole society, including their own 
ancestors and elements of their current culture.  To their 
credit many Germans (but fewer Japanese) have nevertheless 
acknowledged their nation's crimes and aggressions, but they 
have not found it easy. 
       Militarism theory makes the pill less bitter.  It 
narrowly blames arrogant, self-serving military leadership 
groups and their allies in industry.  This rather small band 
of elite predators carry the burden of guilt; the wider 
society is not culpable.  The German and Japanese publics can 
be faulted for following these predators, but this is a high 
standard of conduct to demand.  It seems unlikely that the 
British, French, or America publics would have behaved any 
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better under the same conditions.  The trouble lay with the 
specifics of civil-military relations, not with the public at 
large or the culture at large.  And if so, militarism theory 
largely exculpates the broader German and Japanese public for 
the wars their governments launched. 
 
VIII.  DOES MILITARISM HAVE A FUTURE? 
       Full-blown militarism is nowhere on the world horizon. 
 Today's Russia and China are not models of good civil-
military relations,609 but nothing like the militarism of 
Wilhelmine Germany or imperial Japan is evident there or 
elsewhere.  Is this cessation permanent or temporary? 
       Many of the causes of militarism can be controlled or 
eliminated by states.  States can choose to integrate their 
military officers into society; there is little advantage to 
secluding officers away from the people they serve, and little 
cost to close social integration.610  States and societies can 
choose to remember the history that warns of the possible 
dangers of militarism; the record is there to read.  States 
can choose to erect high legal and normative barriers to 
military intrusion into the political sphere.  Societies can 
choose to be informed about national security and military 
affairs.  These are choices that every nation can make if it 
wishes. 
       Other causes of militarism are hard to control by 
policy but are waning naturally.  Authoritarian regimes are 
slowly pluralizing across the world, as the world economy 
grows and middle classes expand.  And the insecurity of states 
has been sharply reduced by the nuclear revolution, which 
makes great powers essentially unconquerable.611 
       Thus the secular tides of global change are running 
against militarism, and governments can dampen it further. 
       On the other hand, the changes that brought militarism 
are permanent.  Militarism was ushered by the sharpening of 
                         
    609  An ominous portrait of current Russian civil-military 
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likely to lead to social separation and a sense of separate 
civil and military cultures.  These in turn are a recipe for 
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Huntington calls for. 
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the division of labor in the early industrial revolution.  
This division of labor will only sharpen in the future as 
military science becomes more arcane.  Hence the laws of 
motion that govern organizations will continue to characterize 
the behavior of military organizations.  They will always have 
a buried impulse to protect their organizational interest by 
purveying war-causing ideas.  For this reason militarism can 
always recur when conditions for it are ripe.  Its root 
cause--the division of labor--once having arisen will never 
abate.  Half an eye should therefore be kept on this danger, 
and prudent steps taken to keep it at bay. 
